In this (very) short essay, I establish these points: All speech is symbolic; any conduct can be used to communicate a message (i.e., symbolically); government\u27s purpose in regulating, and not a speaker\u27s intention to communicate, defines the realm of freedom of expression; and determining the value of speech has a denominator problem

Alexander, Larry

English

University of San Diego

University of San Diego Digital USD School of Law: Faculty Scholarship Law Faculty Scholarship 2015 The Misconceived Search for the Meani of "Speech"in Freedom of Speech Larry Alexander Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/law_fac_works  Part of the Law Commons Digital USD Citation Alexander, Larry, "The Misconceived Search for the Meani of "Speech"in Freedom of Speech" (2015). School of Law: Faculty Scholarship. 21. https://digital.sandiego.edu/law_fac_works/21 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Law: Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu. L. Alexander   41 equally effective means of reaching his intended audience with his message. I think it fair to surmise that the Court did not really mean what it said in O’Brien on this point, or that if it did, it will ignore what it said and render its error harmless. 2. Addendum A related issue: Some free speech jurisprudence turns on the idea that some types of speech are “low value” speech, and that other types of speech lack any redeeming social value. (So-called “adult” books and movies are said to belong to the “low value” category (Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 1976); hard-core pornogra-phy is said to belong to the “no value” category (Miller v. California, 1973; Roth v. United States, 1957)). But there is a major problem with assigning value to types of speech, a problem analogous to the so-called “denominator” problem in takings jurisprudence. (That problem stems from the Supreme Court’s making the determination of a regulatory taking turn on the effect of the regulation on the parcel taken as a whole, which seems arbitrary because both space and time can be infinitely divided or added to (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 1992)). The analog of the denominator problem for low and no-value speech can be easily illustrated6. Suppose a medical text in the public library is only looked at by people pruriently interested in its pictures of naked men and women. For its actual audience, it functions as pornography. On the other hand, suppose some hard-core porn—Debbie Does Dallas, say—is used in several college classrooms and research projects for the purpose of examining human sexual psychology, the sociology of deviant sexuality, or some other serious scholarly pur-pose. One might conclude that for purposes of determining the value of some speech token, one should use as the denominator the larger environment in which it occurs—much as one does not isolate its sexual descriptions from the rest of Lady Chatterley’s Lover, or a steamy sex scene from a high-brow movie. In terms of the overall context, the medical text may be low or no value, whereas Debbie Does Dallas may be very high value. Of course, once one appreciates that a speech token’s value is a product of its broader context, we will see how hard it is to determine a speech token’s value. Perhaps the scholarly research using Debbie Does Dalles will itself turn out to be valueless or even harmful. Perhaps the prurient use of the medical text will produce some unanticipated benefit. The contextual lens can be ever and ever widened spatially and temporarily, just as it can be narrowed to the sex scene within a high-brow book or movie. The focus should be, not on the value of the speech type or token, but on why government is regulating what it is regulating. References Alexander, L. (1989). Low Value Speech. Northwestern University Law Review, 83, 547-554. Alexander, L. (2005). Ch. 2: Freedom of Expression and Regulations that Affect Messages But are Not Enacted for That Reason. In Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression? (pp. 13-37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614668.003 Benjamin, S. M. (2013). Algorithms and Speech. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 161, 1445-1494. Calvert, C. (2013). Fringes of Free Expression: Testing the Meaning of “Speech” Amid Shifting Cultural Mores & Changing Technologies. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, 22, 545-590. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 830 (1992). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Rubenfeld, J. (2001). The First Amendment’s Purpose. Stanford Law Review, 52, 767-832.  http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1229492 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). United States v. O’Brien, 397 U.S. 367 (1968). Volokh, E. (2009). Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment. The Georgetown Law Journal,   6The following draws an earlier article of mine (Alexander, 1989). L. Alexander   42 97, 1057-1084. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Wu, T. (2013). Machine Speech. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 161, 1495-1533. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 

The Misconceived Search for the Meani of  Speech in Freedom of Speech

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The Misconceived Search for the Meani of Speech in Freedom of Speech

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