How to Choose the European Executive: A Counterfactual Analysis (1979-1999)

In this paper, we use data on roll-call votes by MEP’s in the five elected EuropeanParliaments (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999) to evaluate the likely impact of current proposalsin the Convention on the Future of Europe for the appointment of the European executive. Wefind (a) that the different procedures for appointing the Commission lead to quite differentresults in terms of the composition of the Commission, (b) that election of the President of theCommission by the national parliaments (our preferred mode of appointment) gives the resultthat is most in line with the observed composition of the Commission since 1979, whereas (c)election by the European Parliament creates a ‘built-in’ form of divided government betweenthe Council and the Commissio n that could prove counterproductive for the functioning ofEuropean institutions.European Parliament; European Parliament; European Convention; European Commission; European Council

Are leading papers of better quality? Evidence from a natural experiment

Leading papers in a journal’s issue attract, on average, more citations than those that follow. It is, however, difficult to assess whether they are of better quality (as is often suggested), or whether this happens just because they appear first in an issue. We make use of a natural experiment that was carried out by a journal in which papers are randomly ordered in some issues, while this order is not random in others. We show that leading papers in randomly ordered issues also attract more citations, which casts some doubt on whether, in general, leading papers are of higher quality.

Government‐opposition or left‐right? The institutional determinants of voting in legislatures

This study uses roll-call voting data from 16 legislatures to investigate how the institutional context of politics—such as whether a country is a parliamentary or presidential regime, or has a single-party, coalition or minority government—shapes coalition formation and voting behavior in parliaments. It uses a geometric scaling metric to estimate the “revealed space” in each of these legislatures and a vote-by-vote statistical analysis to identify how much of this space can be explained by government-opposition dynamics as opposed to parties’ (left-right) policy positions. Government-opposition interests, rather than parties’ policy positions, are found to be the main drivers of voting behavior in most institutional contexts. In contrast, issue-by-issue coalition building along a single policy dimension is only found under certain restrictive institutional constraints: presidential regimes with coalition governments or parliamentary systems with minority governments. Put another way, voting in most legislatures is more like Westminster than Washington

Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians

This paper analyzes the voting behavior of Euro-parliamentarians. The roll call data from the plenary sessions of European parliament(EP) during the third and fourth legislatures is used to estimate legislators' preferences. Applying the spatial models of roll call voting to the EP, we investigate the dimensions underlying legislators' voting behavior. We focus on the relative importance of political party affiliation(i.e. ideology) versus nationality(i.e. the economic interest) as the main factor influencing the voting behavior. The results support the existence of a European political system where the main actors are political groups and not the delegations of nations. Also, the pattern of voting in the EP is found to be quite stable across time and issues. Moreover, after taking into account members' political party affiliations, nationality becomes, though to a lesser extent, statistically significant in explaining legislators' ideal positions.

Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament

We examine the magnitude and significance of selection bias in roll call votes. Prior to 2009, all recorded (roll call) votes in the European Parliament had to be requested explicitly by European Political Groups. Since 2009, a roll call vote has been mandatory on all final legislative votes. We exploit that change in the rules and compare differences between final legislative votes, amendment votes and non-legislative votes before and after 2009, using a difference-in-differences approach with extensive controls. Using data from the Sixth (2004–2009) to Seventh (2009–2014) European Parliaments, we fail to find any large differences in voting cohesion for the main political groups. We find even less significance when we control for changes in parliamentary membership between those two periods. The results suggest that selection biases in the European Parliament associated with strategic choices are negligible

Political Institutions and Public Policy: The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union and the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy

In this paper we study the implications of the introduction of the co-decision procedure for the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy and its refirm. We use a game-theoretical model of the legislative procedures in the European Union and show that the move from consultation to co-decision implies a shift of power from the Commission to the European Parliament. The implications for the Common Agricultural Policy depend on the configuration of preferences, the location of the status quo, and the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the member states and the European Parliament are more opposed to refirm than is the Commission, the introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for refirm of the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy

POLICY PREFERENCE FORMATION IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS:STRUCTURES, ACTORS, AND FOCAL POINTS

This dissertation introduces and tests a model of policy preference formation in legislative politics. Emphasizing a dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and decision-making process, it ties the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative political space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda-setters. The model proposes that structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative specialists successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the provision of informational focal points. These focal points shift attention toward particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content and consequences and, in turn, individual-level policy preferences. The propositions of the focal point model are tested empirically with data from the European Parliament (EP), using both qualitative (interview data, content analyses of parliamentary debates) and quantitative methods (multinomial logit regression analyses of roll-call votes). The findings have implications for our understanding of politics and law-making in the European Union and for the study of legislative decision-making more generally