官员独董的辞职时机选择：动机与后果

中组部18号文发布之后，在中国资本市场掀起一股官员独董辞职的浪潮。面对同一政策，这些官员独董的辞职时机选择却不尽相同。使用手工收集的从2013年10月19日至2014年12月31日期间的官员独董辞职事件公告数据，本文研究发现：官员独董的行政级别越高、年龄越小、学历越高，其选择辞职的时间就越早；同时，官员独董所任职公司的贷款水平越高，其辞职时间也越早。进一步，本文发现官员独董辞职时间越晚，市场对其辞职事件的反应越好。本文的研究结论为18号文的政策约束力提供了经验证据，并对上市公司和投资者具有重要的实践启示。After the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC released the No. 18 document, a wave of reg- ulation-induced resignations among independent directors with official background was set off in capital market in China. It was observed that the timing choices of the official independent directors were varied when facing the same policy. Using a hand-collected data of official independent director resignation announcement events from 19 October 2013 to 31 December 2014, this study finds that the higher administrative position official independent directors hold, the younger they are, or the higher education they have received, the earlier they resign; Meanwhile, if the corporate, which the official independent direc- tors work, has a higher debt ratio, the earlier the directors will resign. As to the market consequences following these official independent director resignations, this study shows that the later the directors resign, the better market response will appear. Our findings provide empirical evidence for the implementation constraint of the No. 18 document of Organization Depart- ment, and have significant practical implications for listed companies and investors.国家自然科学基金面上项目“上市公司聘请社会名人和退休官员担任独立董事的动机与后果”（编号：71572160）的资助,当然文责自负

The Motives and Consequences of Official Independent Directors’ Resignation Timing

2013年10月19日，中共中央组织部发布了《关于进一步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职（任职）问题的意见》（简称“中组部18号文”），规定党政领导干部不得在企业兼职，从而掀起一股官员独董辞职的浪潮，但所涉及独立董事辞职的时间先后却各有不同。官员独董辞职时机选择不同的现象促使本文思考其背后的动机和产生的经济后果。 本文使用手工收集的自2013年10月19日至2014年12月31日期间发布辞职公告的官员独董数据，考察了官员独董在面对中组部18号文这一政策冲击时辞职时机的选择动机，并进一步考察了不同动机下辞职事件所产生的经济后果差异。研究发现：（1）官员独董辞职时机的选择与个人背景显著相关。官员独董的...“Opinions on Further Regulations of Party and Government Officials Holding Part-time (or Full-time) Positions in Businesses”, promulgated by Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee on 19 October 2013, prohibits party and government officials from taking any part-time positions in businesses, which has set off a wave of regulation-induced resignations among independent directors with o...学位：会计硕士院系专业：管理学院_会计硕士学号：1752013115119

Political Connections and Stock Price Crash Risk

【中文摘要】本文利用2006〜2011年中国A股主板上市公司的5437个年度观察样本数据，实证检验了政治联系对公司股价未来崩盘风险的影响，并进一步考察了不同类别的政治联系方式对股价崩盘风险的影响差异。结果发现：①政治联系、政治联系强度都与上市公司股价未来崩盘的风险显著负相关。②更具体地，政府官员类政治联系及其强度与公司的股价未来崩盘风险显著负相关，而代表委员类政治联系则与公司的股价崩盘风险并不相关。本文的研究结论对全面认识我国现阶段的政治联系的经济后果及如何应用政治关系降低股价崩盘风险具有重要的意义。 【Abstract】Using a dataset of 5437 firm-year observations from Chinese A-share companies listed on the main board from 2006 to 2011，we examine the effect of a firm’s political connections on the firm's future stockprice crash risk.We also explore whether two types of political connections，i.e.，“government officials” connections and “members of People's Congress (PC) and Chinese Peopless Political Consultation Conference (CPPCC) ” connections， have potentially different effects on a firm’s stock price risk. We find that ① both political connections and their strength are significantly and negatively related to a firm’s future stock price crash risk;②however，the significantly negative effect is mostly attributed to “government officials ” connections and their strength， and PC and CPPCC connections have no effects on stock price crash risk. Overall，our results deepen our understanding of the mechanisms and consequences of political connections and have importantimplications for policies regarding reducing the stock price crash risk in China.国家自然科学基金青年项目“家族内外部所有权结构安排与家族企业冒险行为及绩效研究：基于双重代理理论框架”（71202061