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    μˆ˜λ„κΆŒ 지역을 μ€‘μ‹¬μœΌλ‘œ (2017~2020)

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    ν•™μœ„λ…Όλ¬Έ (석사) -- μ„œμšΈλŒ€ν•™κ΅ λŒ€ν•™μ› : ν™˜κ²½λŒ€ν•™μ› ν™˜κ²½κ³„νšν•™κ³Ό, 2021. 2. κΉ€κ²½λ―Ό.ν˜„ μ •λΆ€μ—μ„œ μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯ μ•ˆμ •ν™”λ₯Ό λͺ…λΆ„μœΌλ‘œ 쑰세와 μ£ΌνƒκΈˆμœ΅μ— λŒ€ν•œ νŒ¨λ„ν‹°λ₯Ό κ°•ν™”ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. κ·ΈλŸ¬λ‚˜ 개인과 법인 κ°„ 규제의 ν˜•ν‰μ„±μ΄ μΆ©λΆ„νžˆ κ³ λ €λ˜μ§€ λͺ»ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. κ·Έ κ²°κ³Ό μ£Όνƒμˆ˜μš”μžμΈ κ°œμΈμ—κ²Œ λΆ€κ³Όλ˜λŠ” μ‘°μ„ΈλΆ€λ‹΄κ³Ό λŒ€μΆœκ·œμ œλ₯Ό μš°νšŒν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•œ λ°©λ²•μœΌλ‘œ 법인을 ν†΅ν•˜μ—¬ μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯에 μ°Έμ—¬ν•˜λŠ” κ²°κ³Όλ₯Ό μ΄ˆλž˜ν•˜κ²Œ λ˜μ—ˆλ‹€. μ΄λŸ¬ν•œ ν˜„μƒμ΄ μ£Όμš” μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯인 μˆ˜λ„κΆŒμ—μ„œ μ§€μ—­μ μœΌλ‘œ μ–΄λ–»κ²Œ μ°¨λ³„ν™”λ˜μ–΄ λ‚˜νƒ€λ‚˜λŠ”μ§€λ₯Ό κ³ μ°°ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•΄ λ³Έ μ—°κ΅¬λŠ” κ°œμΈμ— λŒ€ν•œ μ£Όνƒκ·œμ œμ •μ±…μ΄ 법인 λͺ…μ˜μ˜ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ κ±°λž˜μ— μ–΄λ– ν•œ 영ν–₯을 λ―ΈμΉ˜λŠ”μ§€ μˆ˜λ„κΆŒ μ‹œκ΅°κ΅¬ 76개 지역을 λŒ€μƒμœΌλ‘œ 연ꡬλ₯Ό μ§„ν–‰ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. λ³Έ μ—°κ΅¬λŠ” λ²•μΈμ˜ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ κ±°λž˜μ— λ―ΈμΉ˜λŠ” 영ν–₯을 κ³„λŸ‰μ μœΌλ‘œ λΆ„μ„ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•˜μ—¬ 2017λ…„ 7μ›”μ—μ„œ 2020λ…„ 7μ›”κΉŒμ§€ 총 37κ°œμ›” λ™μ•ˆ μ›”λ³„λ‘œ λ°œν‘œλœ 주택정책을 μ •μ±…μˆ˜λ‹¨ 및 μ •μ±…λŒ€μƒμ— 따라 2μ’…λ₯˜λ‘œ λΆ„λ₯˜ν•˜μ—¬ μ§€μˆ˜ν™”ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. 이후 법인이 λ§€μˆ˜ν•œ 뢀동산 κ±°λž˜λŸ‰μ„ μ’…μ†λ³€μˆ˜λ‘œ, μ„œμšΈμ‹œμ•„νŒŒνŠΈκ°€κ²©μ§€μˆ˜, μ‹œκ΅°κ΅¬ μ£Όλ―Όλ“±λ‘μ„ΈλŒ€μˆ˜ μ¦κ°€μœ¨, 이자율, μ½”μŠ€ν”Όμ§€μˆ˜ λ“± μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯κ³Ό 기타 κ±°μ‹œκ²½μ œλ³€μˆ˜λ₯Ό λ…λ¦½λ³€μˆ˜λ‘œ ν•˜μ—¬ νŒ¨λ„λ°μ΄ν„°λ₯Ό κ΅¬μΆ•ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. 뢄석 λͺ¨ν˜•μœΌλ‘œλŠ” νŒ¨λ„ λ‹¨μœ„κ·Ό κ²€μ •κ³Ό νŒ¨λ„ 곡적뢄 검정을 ν†΅ν•˜μ—¬ λ‹¨μœ„κ·Όκ³Ό μ‹œκ³„μ—΄μ  μˆ˜λ ΄ν˜„μƒμ„ κ²€μ •ν•œ 이후, νŒ¨λ„ 데이터 뢄석을 μœ„ν•œ κ³ μ •νš¨κ³Ό λͺ¨ν˜•κ³Ό ν™•λ₯ νš¨κ³Ό λͺ¨ν˜•μ„ ν†΅ν•˜μ—¬ λΆ„μ„ν•˜μ˜€κ³ , 뢄석 이전에 ν•˜μš°μŠ€λ§Œ 검정을 ν†΅ν•˜μ—¬ κ³ μ •νš¨κ³Ό λͺ¨ν˜•κ³Ό ν™•λ₯ νš¨κ³Ό λͺ¨ν˜• 쀑 μ μ •ν•œ λͺ¨ν˜•μ„ μ„ νƒν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. λ˜ν•œ 1계 μžκΈ°μƒκ΄€ 검정을 ν†΅ν•˜μ—¬ μ˜€μ°¨ν•­μ˜ μ‹œκ³„μ—΄μ  μžκΈ°μƒκ΄€μ„±μ„ κ²€μ •ν•˜κ³  이λ₯Ό ν†΅μ œν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. λ˜ν•œ μ§€μ—­μ μœΌλ‘œ λ²•μΈμ˜ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈλ§€μˆ˜λŸ‰ 및 규제의 강도가 크게 차이 λ‚˜λ―€λ‘œ μˆ˜λ„κΆŒ 전체(λͺ¨λΈ1), μ„œμšΈ μ™Έ μˆ˜λ„κΆŒ(λͺ¨λΈ2), μ„œμšΈ(λͺ¨λΈ3)둜 λ‚˜λˆ„μ–΄ λΆ„μ„ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. λͺ¨λΈ 1(μˆ˜λ„κΆŒ 전체) 및 λͺ¨λΈ 2(μ„œμšΈ μ™Έ μˆ˜λ„κΆŒ)의 경우 뢀동산 규제 μ§€μˆ˜λŠ” μ–‘μ˜ 상관관계가 μžˆμ—ˆλ‹€. λ˜ν•œ κΈˆλ¦¬μ™€λŠ” 음의 상관관계, μ„œμšΈμ‹œ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ 가격 μ§€μˆ˜μ™€ μ½”μŠ€ν”Ό μ§€μˆ˜μ™€λŠ” μ–‘μ˜ 상관관계λ₯Ό λ³΄μ—¬μ£Όμ—ˆλ‹€. κ·ΈλŸ¬λ‚˜ 이와 달리 λͺ¨λΈ3(μ„œμšΈ)은 μ„ΈλŒ€μˆ˜ μ¦κ°€μœ¨, 이자율, μ„œμšΈμ‹œ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ 맀맀가격 μ§€μˆ˜λ§Œμ΄ μœ μ˜ν•œ 영ν–₯λ ₯이 μžˆμ—ˆκ³ , μ£Όνƒκ·œμ œμ§€μˆ˜λŠ” μœ μ˜ν•œ 영ν–₯을 주지 λͺ»ν•˜λŠ” κ²ƒμœΌλ‘œ λ‚˜νƒ€λ‚¬λ‹€. μœ„ 연ꡬ결과λ₯Ό μš”μ•½ν•˜λ©΄ 쑰세와 금육 νŒ¨λ„ν‹°λ₯Ό ν†΅ν•œ 개인의 μ£Όνƒκ±°λž˜μ— λŒ€ν•œ μ •λΆ€μ˜ 지속적인 κ°œμž…μ€ λ²•μΈμ΄λΌλŠ” μƒˆλ‘œμš΄ 거래 주체λ₯Ό μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯에 μ°Έμ—¬μ‹œν‚€κ³ , 이듀은 μ„ΈλŒ€μˆ˜ 증가 λ“± μ‹€μˆ˜μš”μΈ‘λ©΄λ³΄λ‹€λŠ” 뢀동산 규제, μ½”μŠ€ν”Όμ§€μˆ˜, 금리 λ“± 투자의 μΈ‘λ©΄μ—μ„œ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ μ‹œμž₯에 μ°Έμ—¬ν•œλ‹€κ³  λ³Ό 수 μžˆλ‹€. 그리고 μ΄λŸ¬ν•œ κ²½ν–₯성은 μ„œμšΈλ³΄λ‹€λŠ” μ„œμšΈ μ™Έ μˆ˜λ„κΆŒμ—μ„œ κ°•ν•˜κ²Œ λ‚˜νƒ€λ‚œλ‹€κ³  λ³Ό 수 μžˆλ‹€. λ”°λΌμ„œ ν–₯ν›„ 뢀동산 규제 μ‹œ 개인과 λ²•μΈκ³Όμ˜ ν˜•ν‰μ„± 및 지역 뢀동산 μ‹œμž₯의 거래 원인 및 νŠΉμ„±μ„ μΆ©λΆ„νžˆ κ³ λ €ν•œ λŒ€μ±… 수립이 ν•„μš”ν•˜λ‹€.Although the current government is strengthening penalties for tax and housing finance in the name of stabilizing the housing market, it has resulted in a new economic entity called corporations participating in the housing market. As the cause of this phenomenon needs to be analyzed, this study conducted a study on 76 areas of metropolitan city, county and district to see how the housing regulation policy for individuals affects apartment transactions under the corporate name. In order to quantitatively analyze the impact of corporations on apartment transactions, this study is based on the housing policies published monthly for a total of 37 months from July 2017 to July 2020 according to the policy instruments and policy targets (taxation for individuals). And housing finance incentives/penalties and corporate taxes and housing finance incentives/penalties). After that, the panel data was constructed using the real estate transaction volume purchased by the corporation as the dependent variable, and the housing market and other macroeconomic variables such as the Seoul apartment price index, the increase rate of the number of resident registration households in the city, county and district, interest rate, and KOSPI index as independent variables. As an analysis model, unit root and time series convergence was tested through unit root test and cointegration test, and then analyzed through fixed effect model and probability effect model for panel data analysis. The appropriate model was selected among the and probability effects models. In addition, the time-series autocorrelation of the error term was tested and controlled through a first-order autocorrelation test. In addition, since the amount of apartment purchases by corporations and the intensity of regulation differ greatly in regions, the analysis was divided into the entire metropolitan area (model 1), Seoul (model 2), and the metropolitan area outside Seoul (model 3). In the case of Model 1 (the entire metropolitan area) and Model 2 (the metropolitan area other than Seoul), the real estate regulation index had a positive correlation. It also showed a negative correlation with interest rates and a positive correlation with the Seoul apartment price index and the KOSPI index. Unlike this, however, Model 3 (Seoul) showed that only the household growth rate, the interest rate, and the Seoul apartment sale price index had a significant influence, and the housing regulation index did not have a significant effect. Summarizing the results of the above study, the government's continuous intervention in individual housing transactions through tax and financial penalties will involve a new entity called a corporation in the housing market. In terms of investment, it can be seen that it participates in the apartment market. And this tendency can be seen to be stronger in the metropolitan area outside Seoul than in Seoul. Therefore, it is necessary to establish measures that fully consider the causes and characteristics of transactions in the local real estate market and equity between individuals and corporations when regulating real estate in the future.제 1 μž₯ μ„œλ‘  1 제 1 절 연ꡬ λ°°κ²½ 1 제 2 절 연ꡬ λͺ©μ  2 제 3 절 연ꡬ λ²”μœ„ 3 제 4 절 μ—°κ΅¬μ˜ 흐름 4 제 2 μž₯ 선행연ꡬ 5 제 1 절 뢀동산 κ·œμ œμ™€ μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯ 5 1. μ‘°μ„Έμ •μ±…κ³Ό μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯ 5 2. μ£ΌνƒκΈˆμœ΅κ³Ό μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯ 7 3. λΆ€λ™μ‚°κ·œμ œμ§€μˆ˜λ₯Ό ν™œμš©ν•œ 연ꡬ 7 4. 법인 및 μž„λŒ€μ‚¬μ—…μžμ˜ μ£Όνƒμ‹œμž₯ μ°Έμ—¬μš”μΈ 8 제 2 절 μ„ ν–‰μ—°κ΅¬μ˜ μ’…ν•© 9 제 3 μž₯ 연ꡬ 방법둠 12 제 1 절 νŒ¨λ„λ°μ΄ν„° 연ꡬ 방법 12 1. νŒ¨λ„ λ‹¨μœ„κ·Ό κ²€μ • 및 νŒ¨λ„ 곡적뢄 κ²€μ • 12 2. νŒ¨λ„ 데이터 뢄석 15 제 2 절 연ꡬ 자료 μ„ μ • 19 1. κ±°λž˜μ£Όμ²΄λ³„ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ 거래 (ꡭ토ꡐ톡뢀 μ‹€κ±°λž˜ 데이터) 19 2. 뢀동산 규제 μ§€μˆ˜ 20 3. 기타 λ³€μˆ˜ 22 제 3 절 싀증뢄석을 μœ„ν•œ λͺ¨ν˜• μ„€μ • 23 제 4 μž₯ 싀증 뢄석 26 제 1 절 λΆ„μ„μžλ£Œ κ°œμš” 26 제 2 절 자료 κΈ°μ΄ˆλΆ„μ„ 27 1. λ³€μˆ˜ 전체 기초 ν†΅κ³„λŸ‰ 27 2. 지역별 법인 λͺ…μ˜ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ λ§€μˆ˜λŸ‰ 28 3. 뢀동산 규제 μ§€μˆ˜ 및 개인과 법인 κ°„ 규제 차이 29 4. μ„ΈλŒ€μˆ˜ μ¦κ°€μœ¨κ³Ό μ•„νŒŒνŠΈλ§€λ§€κ°€κ²©μ§€μˆ˜ 30 5. κ±°μ‹œ 경제 μ§€ν‘œ 32 제 3 절 νŒ¨λ„ λ‹¨μœ„κ·Ό 및 곡적뢄 κ²€μ • κ²°κ³Ό 33 1. νŒ¨λ„ λ‹¨μœ„κ·Ό κ²€μ • κ²°κ³Ό 33 2. νŒ¨λ„ 곡적뢄 κ²€μ • κ²°κ³Ό 35 제 4 절 νŒ¨λ„ κ²€μ • κ²°κ³Ό 36 1. ν•˜μš°μŠ€λ§Œ κ²€μ • κ²°κ³Ό 36 2. 1계 μžκΈ°μƒκ΄€ κ²€μ • κ²°κ³Ό 36 3. κ·œμ œμ§€μˆ˜μ™€ λ²•μΈμ˜ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ λ§€μˆ˜λŸ‰κ°„μ˜ 관계 : μˆ˜λ„κΆŒ 37 4. κ·œμ œμ§€μˆ˜μ™€ λ²•μΈμ˜ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ λ§€μˆ˜λŸ‰κ°„μ˜ 관계 : μ„œμšΈ μ™Έ 38 5. κ·œμ œμ§€μˆ˜μ™€ λ²•μΈμ˜ μ•„νŒŒνŠΈ λ§€μˆ˜λŸ‰κ°„μ˜ 관계 : μ„œμšΈ 40 제 5 μž₯ κ²° λ‘  41 제 1 절 연ꡬ μš”μ•½ 41 제 2 절 연ꡬ κ²°κ³Ό 및 μ‹œμ‚¬μ  42 제 3 절 연ꡬ 의의 및 ν•œκ³„ 43 μ°Έκ³ λ¬Έν—Œ 45 영문초둝 48Maste
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