Transformations of the State

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the gradual nationalization of political authority that was typical for much of the State’s history since the seventeenth century has come to a standstill and given way to the denationalization of political authority. Non-state actors acquire political authority, thus giving rise to a complex network of political authorities, in which the State is only one authority among others. Yet, the denationalization of political authority remains fragmentary and incomplete. No non-state authority, be it an international institution, a private business or transnational organization, has the capacity to supplant the State. In fact, they all remain reliant on the State because only the State can provide the complementary resources that non-state actors lack to exercise political authority effectively and legitimately. For this reason, the State remains the key body of authority despite denationalization and the accretion of political authority by non-state entities. Its role has changed, however. The State no longer exercises authority always directly and exclusively through its own powers and resources, but more and more indirectly, by providing and complementing the powers and resources of non-state actors. The state remains the central authority but its role is transforming: once monopolist, the state is now becoming a manager of political authority

Judicialization in International Security

Many claim a process of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures is taking place. In order to capture this ongoing process we introduce an analytical framework to assess the degree of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures. We then proceed to present preliminary results of applying this framework to the procedure and practice of dispute settlement in the United Nations Security Council. In our concept, judicialization means that international dispute settlement procedures increasingly incorporate the normative principle of impartiality, i.e. the principle of a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of law. We use a graded scale ranging from purely diplomatic to predominantly judicial procedures to assess the degree of judicialization of any given dispute settlement procedure. From our institutionalist point of view, it is entirely an empirical question whether – and if so when – judicialized dispute settlement procedures lead to a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement. For this reason we analyze in a second step the corresponding practice of dispute settlement. The degree of judicialization of the dispute settlement procedure within the framework of the United Nations Security Council remains low. Nonetheless, our comparison of the periods 1974-1983 and 1990-1999 suggests so far an increasing judicialization of the dispute settlement practice within the Security Council

Transformations of the state: from monopolist to manager of political authority

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the gradual nationalization of political authority that was typical for much of the State's history since the seventeenth century has come to a standstill and given way to the denationalization of political authority. Non-state actors acquire political authority, thus giving rise to a complex network of political authorities, in which the State is only one authority among others. Yet, the denationalization of political authority remains fragmentary and incomplete. No non-state authority, be it an international institution, a rivate business or transnational organization, has the capacity to supplant the State. In fact, they all remain reliant on the State because only the State can provide the complementary resources that non-state actors lack to exercise political authority effectively and legitimately. For this reason, the State remains the key body of authority despite denationalization and the accretion of political authority by non-state entities. Its role has hanged, however. The State no longer exercises authority always directly and exclusively through its own powers and resources, but more and more indirectly, by providing and complementing the powers and resources of non-state actors. The state remains the central authority but its role is transforming: once monopolist, the state is now becoming a manager of political authority -- Seit den 1970er Jahren kommt es zu einer Trendwende: weg von der Verstaatlichung von Herrschaft hin zu deren Entstaatlichung. Nicht-staatliche Akteure üben in wachsendem Maße politische Herrschaft aus. Dadurch entsteht ein komplexes Geflecht aus Herrschaftsstrukturen, in denen der Staat nur noch ein Herrschaftsträger unter anderen ist. Diese Entstaatlichung bleibt jedoch bruchstückhaft und unvollständig. Kein nicht-staatlicher Herrschaftsträger, weder internationale Institutionen, noch private Akteure oder transnationale Organisationen haben die Herrschaftsressourcen, um den Staat zu verdrängen und in seiner Rolle als Herrschaftsmonopolist zu beerben. Vielmehr bleiben sie auf den Staat angewiesen, weil nur er die komplementären Herrschaftsbeiträge leisten kann, die sie brauchen, um effektiv und legitim Herrschaft ausüben zu können. Der Staat bleibt deshalb auch unter den Bedingungen der Entstaatlichung die zentrale Herrschaftsinstanz, nur seine Rolle ändert sich: er mutiert vom Herrschaftsmonopolisten zum Herrschaftsmanager

Judicialization in international security: A theoretical concept and some preliminary evidence

Many claim a process of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures is taking place. In order to capture this ongoing process we introduce an analytical framework to assess the degree of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures. We then proceed to present preliminary results of applying this framework to the procedure and practice of dispute settlement in the United Nations Security Council. In our concept, judicialization means that international dispute settlement procedures increasingly incorporate the normative principle of impartiality, i.e. the principle of a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of law. We use a graded scale ranging from purely diplomatic to predominantly judicial procedures to assess the degree of judicialization of any given dispute settlement procedure. From our institutionalist point of view, it is entirely an empirical question whether - and if so when - judicialized dispute settlement procedures lead to a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement. For this reason we analyze in a second step the corresponding practice of dispute settlement. The degree of judicialization of the dispute settlement procedure within the framework of the United Nations Security Council remains low. Nonetheless, our comparison of the periods 1974-1983 and 1990-1999 suggests so far an increasing judicialization of the dispute settlement practice within the Security Council. -- Viele Beobachter stellen eine Judizialisierung von internationalen Streitbeilegungsverfahren fest. Um diesen fortlaufenden Prozess erfassen zu können, stellen wir ein Analyseraster für die Bestimmung des Ausmaßes von Vergerichtlichung internationaler Streitbeilegungsverfahren vor. Danach präsentieren wir vorläufige empirische Ergebnisse der Anwendung unseres Rasters auf das Verfahren und die Praxis der Streitbeilegung im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen. Unserem Konzept zu Folge bedeutet Judizialisierung (Vergerichtlichung) von internationalen Streitbeilegungsverfahren die zunehmende Einbeziehung des normativen Grundsatzes von Unparteilichkeit, also einer Gleichbehandlung von gleichartigen Rechtsverletzungen. Wir verwenden eine abgestufte Skala, die von rein diplomatischen bis zu vornehmlich gerichtsförmigen Verfahren reicht, zur Bestimmung des Grades von Vergerichtlichung beliebiger Streitbeilegungsverfahren. Aus unserer institutionalistischen Perspektive ist es eine empirische Frage, ob - und wenn ja, wann - juridizialisierte Streitbeilegungsverfahren zu einer entsprechenden Praxis der Streitbeilegung führen. Aus diesem Grund untersuchen wir in einem zweiten Schritt die Praxis der Streitbeilegung. Das Ausmaß von Vergerichtlichung des Verfahrens im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen ist weiterhin gering. Nichtsdestotrotz weist bislang der Vergleich der Zeiträume 1974-1983 und 1990-1999 auf eine zunehmende Judizialisierung der Streitbeilegungspraxis im Sicherheitsrat hin.

Courts Matter! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement under GATT and the WTO

Analysing disputes between the US and the EU under GATT and the WTO respectively, the paper demonstrates that the judicialization (or legalization) of international dispute settlement procedures can contribute to states’ compliance with these dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper compares four sets of pairwise similar disputes with US had with the EU: the so-called Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) case (which arose under GATT) and the Foreign Sales Corporations case (which was settled through WTO procedures), the Steel case (GATT) and the Patents case (WTO), the two Hormones cases under GATT and the WTO respectively, and the Citrus case (GATT) and the Bananas case (WTO). In each of the four comparisons the US acted more in accordance with the judicial WTO dispute settlement procedures than with the diplomatic GATT procedures. We can therefore say that contrary to realist assumptions, the judicialization of dispute settlement procedures can contribute to their effectiveness. However, contrary to idealist assumptions the effectiveness of international dispute settlement procedures does not automatically follow from their judicialization. Yet, as assumed by institutionalists, judicialized dispute settlement procedures are better than diplomatic dispute settlement mechanisms in sustaining states’ compliance with these procedures precisely because of their normative and strategic effects

Courts Matter! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement under GATT and the WTO

Analysing disputes between the US and the EU under GATT and the WTO respectively, the paper demonstrates that the judicialization (or legalization) of international dispute settlement procedures can contribute to states’ compliance with these dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper compares four sets of pairwise similar disputes with US had with the EU: the so-called Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) case (which arose under GATT) and the Foreign Sales Corporations case (which was settled through WTO procedures), the Steel case (GATT) and the Patents case (WTO), the two Hormones cases under GATT and the WTO respectively, and the Citrus case (GATT) and the Bananas case (WTO). In each of the four comparisons the US acted more in accordance with the judicial WTO dispute settlement procedures than with the diplomatic GATT procedures. We can therefore say that contrary to realist assumptions, the judicialization of dispute settlement procedures can contribute to their effectiveness. However, contrary to idealist assumptions the effectiveness of international dispute settlement procedures does not automatically follow from their judicialization. Yet, as assumed by institutionalists, judicialized dispute settlement procedures are better than diplomatic dispute settlement mechanisms in sustaining states’ compliance with these procedures precisely because of their normative and strategic effects

Transformations of the state?

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