The Russian War against Ukraine: Middle East Food Security at Risk

As a region, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the world's largest grain importer. Approximately 30 per cent of global exports of wheat and barley, 20 per cent of corn, and a whopping three-quarters of sunflower oil come from Ukraine and Russia. The aggression against Ukraine is thus disrupting global food trade and affecting food security in the MENA. The war is also raising questions about future food systems and their water footprint. In the Arab world, dependence on Ukraine and Russia for imports of wheat, the world's largest source of calories, is at 50 per cent - among the highest globally. The greatest vulnerability exists in Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan. Imports will actually need to rise from pre-war levels if population growth and dietary changes towards meat and dairy products are taken into consideration. For lack of water, food self-sufficiency is not an option in the MENA. Food imports constitute "virtual water" - that is, the water used to produce a commodity and thus embedded in it. Virtual water can be imported by MENA countries via the food trade and has mitigated water scarcity by adding a "second Nile River" to the region's water balance. The global food crisis of 2007/2008 spurred MENA countries to attempt to alleviate their import vulnerabilities bilaterally, via investments in land and in value chains, but reliance on the multilateral international trading system remains. The reaction to the current crisis can build on lessons learnt since then, with coping capacities unevenly distributed between the region's richer oil exporters and poorer countries. Avoiding new export restrictions such as those that occurred during the global food crisis of 2007/2008 is crucial. Western attempts to stabilise the multilateral food trade could help the MENA to source alternative supplies. This might also offer an opportunity to mend fences between the West and MENA at a time when closer energy cooperation is essential and an ambivalent stance in the MENA towards Russia has caused irritation in the West

Iraq 20 Years after the US Invasion: Challenges and Continuity

Two decades after the US invasion of Iraq, the civil war of the years that followed and the ravages of the Islamic State have faded into the background. Yet the country remains shaken by internal cleavages, torn apart by corruption, and vulnerable to influence operations by external actors. Overcoming economic crisis and infrastructural shortcomings could contribute to greater political stability. Oil production has doubled over the past two decades. The historical underdevelopment of the Iraqi oil sector has been reversed, yet the federal oil law has been contested between Baghdad and Erbil. Natural gas production has grown in recent years as well, but still falls short of providing enough energy to the power grid. The country is a net importer of natural gas, relying on supplies from Iran. Oil remains paramount for the Iraqi state, its budget, exports, and its economy. Heavy industries like fertilisers and petrochemicals could enhance the value chain of Iraq's primary resources that include the second-largest phosphate reserves worldwide. Population growth in Iraq is still high. Beyond hydrocarbons, economic diversification in other areas is urgently needed. This could include alternative energies, light industries, education, services, water management, and a reorientation of agriculture. Iraq ranks 157 out of 180 in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. Its consociational muhasasa system, which allocates power along sectarian lines, is abetting such corruption and thus requires reform. Iraq can be a vital partner for European energy cooperation and not only in hydrocarbons, but competition from China is stiff. Europe is already eyeing collaboration with Middle East and North Africa countries on the production of green hydrogen. Interconnectors of electricity grids within and beyond the region as well as storage solutions are needed to increase the share of renewables involved in power generation

Virtual water, international relations and the new geopolitics of food

Food security and virtual water considerations interact in a corporatized third food regime, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the world's largest grain importing region. Globalization has created asymmetric trade interdependence that can be weaponized by states that control global economic hubs, yet countries in the Global South have actively exploited the rivalries of big powers, temporarily capturing chokepoints and entering new alignments. The virtual water paradigm that Tony Allan first coined can be applied creatively to international relations that are increasingly characterized by 'weaponized interdependence'

COVID-19 in the Middle East and North Africa: Reactions, Vulnerabilities, Prospects

There have been three different kinds of reactions to the coronavirus crisis: those from early movers, with extensive measures taken (Israel, Jordan, Gulf countries, Morocco); those from states that initially struggled to acknowledge the magnitude of the crisis out of concern about its economic impact (Iran, Turkey, Egypt); and, those from countries whose ability to react to the crisis is in doubt because of civil war and internal disarray (Yemen, Libya, Syria). The capacities of regional health systems are lagging in comparison to international peers. The median age of the population is relatively low. However the number of vulnerable elderly is still substantial, as the region has been undergoing a demographic transition for several decades now. Other at-risk groups are the poor, labour migrants, the prison population, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The economic impact of COVID-19 will affect domestic spending and threatens to undermine the social contract and political stability. The pandemic also has the potential to shake up geopolitical dynamics, as it will reduce the ability of key actors to intervene regionally (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia). The coronavirus crisis requires government intervention on a large scale. Such intervention will be used to further the political goals of authoritarian regimes, too. It will be integrated into their repression strategies - including cyber surveillance - and will likely outlast the health crisis itself. The pandemic is thus reinforcing trends towards populism and authoritarian restoration in the Middle East and North Africa. The European Union is currently preoccupied with its own coronavirus crisis, and struggling to find coordinated approaches to the tackling of it. Yet it should not overlook the unfolding socio-economic crisis in its southern neighbourhood. If Europe wants to be a serious geopolitical actor, it needs to find the wherewithal to provide assistance - and advertise that fact - to match similar efforts undertaken by China as part of its "mask diplomacy" in the region

Aramco Goes Public: The Saudi Diversification Conundrum

The state-owned oil company Saudi Aramco will float 1.5 per cent of its shares in an initial public offering (IPO) on the Riyadh stock exchange in December of this year. The long-awaited and often-postponed IPO marks a cornerstone of the Vision 2030 diversification strategy of crown prince and de facto ruler Muhammad bin Salman. It comes at a time when the oil price remains subdued as a result of the United States shale revolution; it might also be affected in the medium term by renewable energy transitions and growing e-mobility. The IPO is expected to be priced below the USD 2 trillion market value that Muhammad bin Salman initially envisaged. With a possible value of USD 1.6–1.7 trillion, Aramco would still rival the largest IPO ever: the USD 25 billion IPO of the Chinese firm Alibaba in 2014. Saudi Aramco is the producer with the lowest costs in the world of oil, while the greenhouse gas emissions from its production facilities are relatively small compared to its competitors. With its petrochemical expansion strategy it is well positioned to serve petroleum product markets such as plastics. Even in a world of stagnating or declining oil demand in the medium term, Saudi Aramco will likely show considerable perseverance. Oil remains paramount for the Saudi state, its budget, exports, and its economy. The Aramco IPO is part of a larger quest for economic diversification, and indeed for the consolidation of power in the hands of the crown prince. European politicians should still engage with Saudi Arabia economically, while using such engagement to pressure the country on human rights and regional stability. Otherwise, Saudi Arabia will increasingly turn to Asia - to where it already exports 70 per cent of its oil. What was once a mere buyer-seller relationship could gain in strategic depth

Wither the self-sufficiency illusion? Food security in Arab Gulf States and the impact of COVID-19

Past approaches to food security in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were informed by concerns about food availability. They aimed at domestic self-sufficiency and self-sufficiency by proxy (via farmland investments abroad). These strategies have failed. Water scarcity at home increasingly compromises agricultural production. Farmland investments abroad have not matched ambitious related announcements due to a complex mixture of commercial, socio-economic and political factors. They do not contribute meaningful quantities to the Gulf countries' food imports. The failure of such strategies has prompted a shift of focus instead towards value chain management as a means to secure food availability. Rather than trying to fight food import dependence, the Gulf countries now accept and manage it. However, malnutrition that leads to high levels of obesity and diabetes constitutes a risk factor in the face of COVID-19. Food accessibility for vulnerable population segments such as migrant labour is another issue that requires yet further policy measures, such as safety nets – whose expansion would be politically controversial if not impossible, however

Resilience, conflict and areas of limited statehood in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria

In a context of areas of limited statehood and contested order, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have been affected by similar diffuse global and more specific regional and local risks over the past two decades. Yet they differ in outcomes. Lebanon has not descended into civil war despite fears that the one raging in Syria might spill over to its territory and Iraq has coped better over the past decade than Syria has - despite having been subject to various forms of conflict since 1980. We analyse this variance by asking to what extent resilience might buffer against violent conflict and governance breakdown. Through a comparative discussion of sources of resilience - social trust, legitimacy and institutional design - we find that limited input and threatened output legitimacy are harmful to resilience, while collective memory and reconciliation, as well as flexibility of institutions are crucial factors of resilience. Nonetheless, our findings caution that resilience should not only mean the capability to adapt to crises but also needs to set the stage for comprehensive and inclusive transformations that are locally rooted

Populism and Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: The Barcelona Process 25 years after

A populist surge in Europe is affecting Euro-Mediterranean cooperation 25 years after the Barcelona Process was launched, reinforcing existing trends of de-Europeanization and renationalization of foreign policies. This article analyses the landscape of political contestation of Mediterranean cooperation in Europe in a new age of populism, focusing on France, Italy and Spain as well as the Visegrad 4 states that have turned from bystanders to veto players in Mediterranean affairs. We find that the 'thick' ideologies from which populists are borrowing condition the thrust of their influence. The impact of right-wing populism trumps that of its left-wing counterpart in quantity and quality, while market-liberal populism is in decline and regional populism is mainly an issue only in Spain. Populism has personalized decision-making and shaped political agendas directly and indirectly, most notably on migration. It has whitewashed authoritarian leaders in the southern Mediterranean and fragmented the European Union's position on key issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. National interests and the weight of institutions have, however, formed a counterbalance to the focus on migration emanating from domestic politics. Populism alone cannot be blamed for renationalization trends that have existed before, but it does build on and reinforce them

Algae Grown on Dairy and Municipal Wastewater for Simultaneous Nutrient Removal and Lipid Production for Biofuel Feedstock

Algae grown on wastewater media are a potential source of low-cost lipids for production of liquid biofuels. This study investigated lipid productivity and nutrient removal by green algae grown during treatment of dairy farm and municipal wastewaters supplemented with CO2. Dairy wastewater was treated outdoors in bench-scale batch cultures. The lipid content of the volatile solids peaked at Day 6, during exponential growth, and declined thereafter. Peak lipid content ranged from 14–29%, depending on wastewater concentration. Maximum lipid productivity also peaked at Day 6 of batch growth, with a volumetric productivity of 17 mg/day/L of reactor and an areal productivity of 2.8 g/m2/day, which would be equivalent to 11,000 L/ha/year (1,200 gal/acre/year) if sustained year round. After 12 days, ammonium and orthophosphate removals were 96 and \u3e99%, respectively. Municipal wastewater was treated in semicontinuous indoor cultures with 2–4 day hydraulic residence times (HRTs). Maximum lipid productivity for the municipal wastewater was 24 mg/day/L, observed in the 3-day HRT cultures. Over 99% removal of ammonium and orthophosphate was achieved. The results from both types of wastewater suggest that CO2-supplemented algae cultures can simultaneously remove dissolved nitrogen and phosphorus to low levels while generating a feedstock potentially useful for liquid biofuels production

The Effect of Self-Help Support Groups on Self Esteem and Blood Glucose in Young Insulin-Dependent Diabetics

Successful adaptation to diabetes is probably a function of many factors: the stress involved, the rewards, the motivation of the individual, and the self concept. The more optimal the self concept the more optimal the behavior may be. By helping the patient shape a positive self concept, a base can be built for blood glucose control (Bruhn, 1977, pp. 93-97). One method of improving self concept or self esteem may be through the development of self-help support groups for diabetics. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of self-help support group intervention on the levels of self esteem and blood glucose in 18- to 35-year-old insulin-dependent diabetics. The correlation of self esteem and blood glucose was measured in a pre- and post-test method. A review of related literature indicated that self-help groups have benefitted individuals who have diabetes, lupus, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or other conditions that require psychosocial adaptation and support. Little mention has been made of objective measurements of group effectiveness in improving participants\u27 self esteem. Several studies have supported the relationship between psychosocial and physiological function in diabetics. A pilot study was conducted to assess the receptivity of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale and Dextrometer® in measuring self esteem and blood glucose, respectively, Since there was a positive response to the tools, these measurements were used in a pre-test and post-test pattern in both study and control groups. Six weekly support group sessions were held for the eight study group members while the five control group members did not participate in group activities. Blood glucose measurements were taken throughout the six weeks to obtain an average of blood glucose control. The study was based on several hypotheses that dealt with comparison of the two groups in the measurements of self esteem and blood glucose and the correlation of these two variables. The measurements of blood glucose and self esteem were similar between the study and control groups at the beginning of the study. At the conclusion of the study, both groups showed an improvement in levels of self esteem and blood glucose. This improvement was not significant (α = 0.05); thus the null hypotheses regarding change in blood glucose and self esteem were supported. The hypotheses that there would be no correlation (α = 0.05) between self esteem and blood glucose within or between groups were rejected since there was a strong correlation between low self esteem and high blood glucose in the control group members. Several recommendations for nursing practice and additional studies were made as a result of the findings of this study