3,296 research outputs found
The sense of rotation of subhaloes in cosmological dark matter haloes
We present a detailed analysis of the velocity distribution and orientation
of orbits of subhaloes in high resolution cosmological simulations of dark
matter haloes. We find a trend for substructure to preferentially revolve in
the same direction as the sense of rotation of the host halo: there is an
excess of prograde satellite haloes. Throughout our suite of nine host haloes
(eight cluster sized objects and one galactic halo) there are on average 59% of
the satellites corotating with the host. Even when including satellites out to
five virial radii of the host, the signal still remains pointing out the
relation of the signal with the infall pattern of subhaloes. However, the
fraction of prograde satellites weakens to about 53% when observing the data
along a (random) line-of-sight and deriving the distributions in a way an
observer would infer them. This decrease in the observed prograde fraction has
its origin in the technique used by the observer to determine the sense of
rotation, which results in a possible misclassification of non-circular orbits.
We conclude that the existence of satellites on corotating orbits is another
prediction of the cold dark matter structure formation scenario, although there
will be difficulties to verify it observationally. Since the galactic halo
simulation gave the same result as the cluster-sized simulations, we assume
that the fraction of prograde orbits is independent of the scale of the system,
though more galactic simulations would be necessary to confirm this.Comment: 16 pages, 9 figures, accepted by MNRAS; extended comparison with
previous work (mistake corrected) and observations, typos correcte
Five Indefinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory
I experimentally test play in five indefinitely repeated games: a hawk-dove game, a game of chicken, a trust game, a coordination game, and a constant-sum game. I compare the different game histories that affect decision making in each of the games. Une Ă©tude expĂ©rimentale a Ă©tĂ© menĂ©e afin de tester les dĂ©cisions prises lors de cinq jeux rĂ©pĂ©tĂ©s oĂč le nombre de rĂ©pĂ©titions est inconnu : un jeu de type hawk-dove, un jeu de type chicken, un jeu de confiance, un jeu de coordination et un jeu Ă somme constante. Les historiques des diffĂ©rents jeux sont comparĂ©s afin dâanalyser les prises de dĂ©cisions des participants dans chaque jeu.experimental economics, repeated games, Ă©conomie expĂ©rimentale, jeux rĂ©pĂ©tĂ©s
Learning-by-Doing in an Ambiguous Environment
We experimentally test whether risk aversion or ambiguity aversion can explain decisions in a learning-by-doing game. We first measure subjects' preferences toward risk and ambiguity, and then use these measures to predict behavior in the game. We find that ambiguity averse subjects pay more often to resolve ambiguity, and we find that less risk averse subjects earn more in the game. Our results, in light of a previous field study of farmers in a developing economy, provide further evidence of a link between ambiguity aversion and technology choice, as well as a link between risk aversion and farm profitability. Une Ă©tude expĂ©rimentale a Ă©tĂ© menĂ©e afin de tester si lâaversion au risque ou lâaversion Ă lâambiguĂŻtĂ© peuvent expliquer les dĂ©cisions prises par les sujets lors dâun jeu dâapprentissage par essais. Nous avons dâabord mesurĂ© la prĂ©fĂ©rence des sujets face au risque et Ă lâambiguĂŻtĂ©, et avons ensuite utilisĂ© ces mesures pour prĂ©dire le comportement des sujets au cours du jeu. Nous avons pu constater que les sujets qui Ă©prouvent de lâaversion Ă lâambiguĂŻtĂ© dĂ©cident de payer plus souvent afin de clarifier cette ambiguĂŻtĂ©. Dâautre part, nous avons constatĂ© que moins les sujets Ă©prouvent de lâaversion au risque, plus leurs gains lors du jeu sont Ă©levĂ©s. Ă la lumiĂšre dâune Ă©tude sur le terrain ayant eu lieu avec des fermiers travaillant dans une Ă©conomie en dĂ©veloppement, nos rĂ©sultats confirment l'Ă©vidence d'un lien entre l'aversion Ă l'ambiguĂŻtĂ© et les choix technologiques, ainsi que d'un lien entre l'aversion au risque et la rentabilitĂ© d'une ferme.learning-by-doing, technology choice, risk preferences, risk measurement instruments, ambiguity aversion, experimental economics, apprentissage par essais, choix technologiques, prĂ©fĂ©rences vis-Ă -vis du risque, instruments de mesure du risque, aversion Ă lâambiguĂŻtĂ©, Ă©conomie expĂ©rimentale
Harnessing the Power of Focal Points To Measure Social Agreement
This paper reports results from an application of Thomas Schellingâs (1960) concept of a focal point to the measure of social agreement on the received tone of media content. In our experiments, subjects rate the tone, positive, negative, or neutral, of newspaper articles and news broadcasts, with an incentive to coordinate responses. We compare the content analysis of a traditional subject pool with those of a representative cross-section of the general public. Our application of the coordination game with strategy labels illustrates that the concept of a focal point can be put to use as a measure of social agreement. Le document prĂ©sente les rĂ©sultats obtenus en appliquant le concept de point focal, avancĂ© par Thomas Schelling (1960), Ă la mesure de lâaccord social concernant la perception du ton qui se dĂ©gage du contenu mĂ©diatique. Dans le cadre des expĂ©riences mises sur pied, les sujets Ă©valuent le ton, positif, nĂ©gatif ou neutre, adoptĂ© dans des articles de journaux et des bulletins de nouvelles et sont encouragĂ©s, par des mesures incitatives, Ă coordonner leurs rĂ©ponses. Nous comparons lâanalyse du contenu rĂ©alisĂ©e par un bassin traditionnel de sujets Ă celle menĂ©e par un Ă©chantillon reprĂ©sentatif du grand public. Notre application du jeu de coordination faisant appel Ă des Ă©tiquettes de stratĂ©gies dĂ©montre que la notion de point focal peut ĂȘtre utilisĂ©e pour mesurer lâaccord social.Coordination, focal point, experiment, content analysis, media, Coordination, point focal, expĂ©rience, analyse du contenu, mĂ©dias
A Simple Test of Learning Theory?
We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 Ă 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We ran each game in high and low payoff treatments. We find that, in all treatments, average play is close to equilibrium even though there are strong cycles present in the data.: Games, Learning, Experiments, Stochastic Fictitious Play, Mixed Strategy Equilibria.
AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TAYLOR-TYPE RULES WITH INEXPERIENCED CENTRAL BANKERS
We experimentally test whether a class of monetary policy decision rules describes decision making in a population of inexperienced central bankers. In our experiments, subjects repeatedly set the short-term interest rate for a computer economy with inflation as their target. A large majority of subjects learn to successfully control inflation. We find that Taylor-type rules fit the choice data well, and are instrumental in characterizing heterogeneity in decision making. Our experiment is the first to begin to organize data experimentally with an eye on monetary policy rules for this, one of the most widely watched and analyzed decisions in economics.
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