2,601 research outputs found
Fast graphs for the random walker
Consider the time T_oz when the random walk on a weighted graph started at
the vertex o first hits the vertex set z. We present lower bounds for T_oz in
terms of the volume of z and the graph distance between o and z. The bounds are
for expected value and large deviations, and are asymptotically sharp. We
deduce rate of escape results for random walks on infinite graphs of
exponential or polynomial growth, and resolve a conjecture of Benjamini and
Peres.Comment: 22 page
Brownian beads
We show that the past and future of half-plane Brownian motion at certain
cutpoints are independent of each other after a conformal transformation. Like
in Ito's excursion theory, the pieces between cutpoints form a Poisson process
with respect to a local time. The size of the path as a function of this local
time is a stable subordinator whose index is given by the exponent of the
probability that a stretch of the path has no cutpoint. The index is computed
and equals 1/2.Comment: 24 pages, 1 figur
Outside offers and bidding costs
This paper provides a search theoretic model with endogenous job creation, and homogenous workers and firms. The model introduces bidding costs and allows the current employer to make a counteroffer with probability q when the worker receives an outside offer. In equilibrium, a higher level of ex-post competition (q) reduces the probability that an employed worker receives an outside offer. Therefore, a higher level of ex-post competition may decrease the expected income of the workers. In the extreme case when the competition is cutthroat (q = 1), no employed worker receives outside offers and each employed worker earns only the minimum wage. In contrast to existing models, our model allows for wage dispersion even if all frictions (including bidding and search costs) converge to zero simultaneously. When bidding costs are small and ex-post competition is strong, a small change in parameter values may influence the equilibrium bidding, wage distribution and job creation substantially. Consequently, it is not only the overall level of market frictions that matters, but also their structure.counteroffers, wage dispersion, job creation
Independence of a Regulatory Institution - a Means to Alleviate Credibility Problems in the CEE Countries
In Hungary and the Central-European region, state regulation has been at the forefront of interest since the beginning of the economic transition. Among the many interesting questions raised, we would like to analyze the problem of building an appropriate regulatory system allowing the industry to operate efficiently from a social point of view. We use the term "regulatory system" for the description of decision rights. A particular regulatory system amounts to the allocation of decision rights between the different actors in a regulatory game (regulatory agency, government, courts, consumer organizations, competition office). We do not propose a specific incentive scheme, which must be enforced (and is enforceable), instead we concentrate on the possible enforcement mechanisms.credibility, Hungary
TOURISM AS A WAY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Tourism is one of the most complex industries of world and national economy. The income of tourism has a substantial direct or indirect influence on the other sectors while its performance depends on the condition of the environment. Tourism can bring positive and negative influences as well for a region. This branch has big impression on financial balance and as an invisible export it creases the incomes of the country. This sector requires live labour that is why it is an important factor in occupation policy and it can help the economy of underdeveloped regions to catch up. In the case of Hungary tourism is the most economic activity of the production of foreign exchange as well. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX A turizmus a vilĂÂĄggazdasĂÂĄg egyik legösszetettebb iparĂÂĄga, valamint a nemzetgazdasĂÂĄg egyik legfontosabb ĂÂĄgazata. BevĂ©telei jelentĂ
âs közvetlen vagy közvetett hatĂÂĄst gyakorolnak a többi szektorra, miközben teljesĂÂtmĂ©nye nagymĂ©rtĂ©kben fĂÂŒgg környezete ĂÂĄllapotĂÂĄtĂÂłl. Az idegenforgalom pozitĂÂv Ă©s negatĂÂv hatĂÂĄsokat egyarĂÂĄnt okozhat egy adott tĂ©rsĂ©gben. Az ĂÂĄgazat kedvezĂ
â hatĂÂĄst gyakorol a fizetĂ©si mĂ©rlegre, valamint lĂÂĄthatatlan exportkĂ©nt növeli az orszĂÂĄg bevĂ©telĂ©t. Ăâ°lĂ
âmunka igĂ©nyes, ezĂ©rt jelentĂ
âs foglalkoztatĂÂĄspolitikai tĂ©nyezĂ
â Ă©s elĂ
âsegĂÂtheti a hĂÂĄtrĂÂĄnyos helyzetĂ
± tĂ©rsĂ©gek gazdasĂÂĄgĂÂĄnak felzĂÂĄrkĂÂłzĂÂĄsĂÂĄt. A turizmus MagyarorszĂÂĄgon a leggazdasĂÂĄgosabb devizatermelĂ
â tevĂ©kenysĂ©g.developing tercier sector, pozitiv effect on financial ballance, high live labour, fejlĂ
âdĂ
â harmadik szektor, pozitĂÂv hatĂÂĄs a pĂ©nzĂÂŒgyi mĂ©rlegre, magas Ă©lĂ
âmunkaigĂ©ny, Agricultural and Food Policy, Community/Rural/Urban Development,
First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
If agents engage in resale, it changes bidding in the initial auction. Resale offers extra incentives for bidders with lower valuations to win the auction. However, if resale markets are not frictionless, then use values affect bidding incentives, and stronger bidders still win the initial auction more often than weaker ones. I consider a first price auction followed by a resale market with frictions, and conïżœrm the above statements. While intuitive, our results differ from the two bidder case of Hafalir and Krishna (2008): the two bidders win with equal probabilities regardless of their use values. The reason is that they face a common (resale) price at the relevant margin, a property that fails with more than two bidders. Numerical simulations show that asymmetry in winning probabilities increases in the number of bidders, and in large markets resale loses its e€ect on allocations.auction, resale
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