Is Bitcoin Money? An Economic-Historical Analysis of Money, Its Functions and Its Prerequisites

Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies’ spectacular rise over the past years has attracted considerable public and academic interest. The important question arising in this context is whether cryptocurrencies can legitimately be regarded as money. This paper contributes to the current discourse by evaluating cryptocurrencies’ monetary merits based on (1) the orthodox, or Metallist, school of money and (2) the heterodox, or Chartalist, approach. The theoretical as well as empirical findings advanced in this paper serve to illustrate that cryptocurrencies cannot legitimately be regarded as money owing to their lack of essential characteristics universally shared by other monetary systems. By cryptocurrencies’ lack of intrinsic value as well as government support, virtual currencies fail according to the orthodox as well as the heterodox school of money, respectively. In addition, the inelasticity of the bitcoin stock due to the fixed maximum amount of 21 million units stands in sharp contrast to that of other monetary systems – including gold and other depletable resources –, further reducing bitcoin’s suitability as a medium of exchange, and thus as money. In an attempt to explain the apparent discrepancy between the current value the market attaches to cryptocurrencies and their monetary deficiencies, we advance that market participants are misled by what we term the input fallacy of value (IFV). Similar to the labour theory of value, which posits that value is a function of the labour required to produce a good or service, market participants appear to be misled into believing that the value of cryptocurrencies is the product of the input costs required in the “mining” process. In this context, it is overlooked that value, far from merely being a function of labour and capital deployed, is solely determined by the resultant utility. Since, however – as detailed in this paper –, bitcoin lacks the essential characteristics associated with money, cryptocurrencies’ utility, and hence price, should tend towards zero over time

Stable Gaussian Process based Tracking Control of Lagrangian Systems

High performance tracking control can only be achieved if a good model of the dynamics is available. However, such a model is often difficult to obtain from first order physics only. In this paper, we develop a data-driven control law that ensures closed loop stability of Lagrangian systems. For this purpose, we use Gaussian Process regression for the feed-forward compensation of the unknown dynamics of the system. The gains of the feedback part are adapted based on the uncertainty of the learned model. Thus, the feedback gains are kept low as long as the learned model describes the true system sufficiently precisely. We show how to select a suitable gain adaption law that incorporates the uncertainty of the model to guarantee a globally bounded tracking error. A simulation with a robot manipulator demonstrates the efficacy of the proposed control law.Comment: Please cite the conference paper. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1806.0719

Is Bitcoin Money? An Economic-Historical Analysis of Money, Its Functions and Its Prerequisites

Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies’ spectacular rise over the past years has attracted considerable public and academic interest. The important question arising in this context is whether cryptocurrencies can legitimately be regarded as money. This paper contributes to the current discourse by evaluating cryptocurrencies’ monetary merits based on (1) the orthodox, or Metallist, school of money and (2) the heterodox, or Chartalist, approach. The theoretical as well as empirical findings advanced in this paper serve to illustrate that cryptocurrencies cannot legitimately be regarded as money owing to their lack of essential characteristics universally shared by other monetary systems. By cryptocurrencies’ lack of intrinsic value as well as government support, virtual currencies fail according to the orthodox as well as the heterodox school of money, respectively. In addition, the inelasticity of the bitcoin stock due to the fixed maximum amount of 21 million units stands in sharp contrast to that of other monetary systems – including gold and other depletable resources –, further reducing bitcoin’s suitability as a medium of exchange, and thus as money. In an attempt to explain the apparent discrepancy between the current value the market attaches to cryptocurrencies and their monetary deficiencies, we advance that market participants are misled by what we term the input fallacy of value (IFV). Similar to the labour theory of value, which posits that value is a function of the labour required to produce a good or service, market participants appear to be misled into believing that the value of cryptocurrencies is the product of the input costs required in the “mining” process. In this context, it is overlooked that value, far from merely being a function of labour and capital deployed, is solely determined by the resultant utility. Since, however – as detailed in this paper –, bitcoin lacks the essential characteristics associated with money, cryptocurrencies’ utility, and hence price, should tend towards zero over time

The Paradoxical Genesis of Too-Big-To-Fail

At least since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, the problem of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) has received widespread attention. The research conducted in this context has, however, generally focused on the econometric aspect and the contribution of the TBTF doctrine to the financial crisis of 2007- 2009, while the economic historical approach has been confined to tracing the doctrine to its first appearance. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the academic literature by offering an explanation for why, as opposed to how, the TBTF doctrine has developed. This paper identifies the US population’s distrust and at times hostility against the prospect of concentration of power in large financial institutions as the causal factor leading to the TBTF phenomenon. The resulting socially nonoptimal regulation favoured a fragmented and fragile banking system based on small unit banks at the cost of more diversified branch banks. The Great Depression impressively highlighted the deep structural flaws of the US banking system. At the same time, however, it caused a shift in the public opinion, which had generally been opposed to deposit insurance, and thereby aligned the public interest with that of small banks, which would profit most from deposit insurance. The newly acquired public and political support enabled weak unit banks to lobby successfully against reforming the banking structure and instead for the adaption of federal deposit insurance. However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) only addressed the symptoms of the weak banking industry but not its causes. Moreover, the strongly biased FDIC policies have generally favoured creditors at large banks, which ultimately led to the TBTF doctrine which, in turn, provided banks with a non-technical incentive to grow in size in order to gain TBTF protection. Initially aimed at preserving the US financial landscape based on small unit banks, the FDIC as the main conduit for TBTF rescues thus became the main driver for big bank corporate welfare. Deposit insurance gave rise to TBTF and, at the same time, put small banks deemed “too-small-to-safe” at a competitive disadvantage, further accelerating the trend towards increasingly large and complex banks

Regulators’ Irrational Rationality and Bankers’ Rational Irrationality: Too Big to Fail, Self-Regulation, Moral Hazard and the Global Financial Crisis 2007–2009

Banks and other financial institutions which were „too-big- to-fail“ (TBTF) played a central role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007– 2009. The article lays out how misguided policies enabled banks to grow both in size as well as in complexity and therefore acquire TBTF status, particularly in the 10-year period preceding the crisis. The article then proceeds by detailing how an ill-designed policy framework, relying on supposed market approaches to regulation – including self-regulation and credit rating agencies – enabled TBTF financial institutions to game the system. They were thereby able to exploit the negative externalities which the flawed policy framework – in connection with TBTF status – had granted to large, systemically important financial institutions. The article therefore identifies defective government policies as the chief cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, revealing an urgent need for financial sector reform.Banks and other financial institutions which were „too-big- to-fail“ (TBTF) played a central role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007– 2009. The article lays out how misguided policies enabled banks to grow both in size as well as in complexity and therefore acquire TBTF status, particularly in the 10-year period preceding the crisis. The article then proceeds by detailing how an ill-designed policy framework, relying on supposed market approaches to regulation – including self-regulation and credit rating agencies – enabled TBTF financial institutions to game the system. They were thereby able to exploit the negative externalities which the flawed policy framework – in connection with TBTF status – had granted to large, systemically important financial institutions. The article therefore identifies defective government policies as the chief cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, revealing an urgent need for financial sector reform