Breaking Barriers to Renewable Energy Production in the North American Arctic

As climate change continues to affect our lives, the communities at the northern extremes of our world have witnessed the changes most profoundly. In the Arctic, where climate change is melting permafrost and causing major shoreline erosion, remote communities in Alaska and northern Canada are particularly vulnerable. Furthermore, these communities have limited access to electrical grids and bear oppressive energy costs relying on diesel generators. While some communities have started to incorporate renewable energy into their hamlets and villages, progress has generally been limited with the notable exception of Canada’s Northwest Territories and some coastal communities in western Alaska. During its latest stint as chair of the Arctic Council, the United States outlined community renewable energy in the Arctic as one of its primary goals. This Note focuses on regulatory and practical policy solutions to make that goal possible. It draws on examples from industrialized countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as examples from developing countries, such as India and Peru, to examine solutions for the technical, economic, regulatory, and community engagement problems that Arctic communities in Alaska face when setting up new energy projects. Additionally, this Note describes the current political structure of Alaskan villages under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and argues that Alaska Native Corporations should play a role in developing clean, cheap energy sources for their shareholders. Finally, this Note argues that public-private partnerships, like the non-profit Arctic Energy Alliance in the Northwest Territories, shows that clean, renewable energy projects for rural Arctic villages are possible throughout the Arctic. This Note draws lessons from other communities throughout the world and attempts to apply them to the unique situations that remote northern Alaska communities face regarding access to clean, renewable energy

Do We Value Our Cars More Than Our Kids? The Conundrum of Care for Children

Formal child care workers in the United States earn about $21,110 per year. Parking lot attendants, in contrast, make$21,250. These relative wages are telling: the market values the people who look after our cars more than the people who look after our kids. This article delves below the surface of these numbers to explore the systemic disadvantages of those who care for children—and children themselves. The article first illuminates the precarious economic position of U.S. children, a disproportionate number of whom live in poverty. The article then shows both that substantial care for children is provided on an unpaid basis in households, predominantly by women, and that care for children is undervalued when provided through the market. After presenting three distinct perspectives on market payments for care for children—(1) a public goods analysis, (2) a patriarchy analysis, and (3) a gift analysis— the article proposes a set of income tax breaks for jobs involving care for children

Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement : carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade

This paper provides a first analysis of optimal offset policies by a"policy bloc"of fossil fuel importers implementing a climate policy, facing a (non-policy) fringe of other importers, and a bloc of fuel exporters. The policy bloc uses either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, jointly with a fully efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe. The policy bloc is then shown to prefer a tax over a cap-and-trade scheme, since 1) a tax extracts more rent as fuel exporters reduce the export price, and more so when the policy bloc is larger relative to the fringe; and 2) offsets are more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme. The optimal offset price under a carbon tax is half the tax rate; under a cap-and-trade scheme the quota and offset price are equal. The domestic carbon and offset price are both higher under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme when the policy bloc is small; when it is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap-and-trade scheme. Fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc, and more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower, and since the price obtained when selling offsets is often higher (always so for a large fringe).Climate Change Economics,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Energy Production and Transportation,Markets and Market Access,Environment and Energy Efficiency

Allocative inefficiencies resulting from subsidies to agricultural electricity use : an illustrative model

This paper provides an analytical discussion of several interconnected resource allocation problems from under-pricing of electricity used by farmers for groundwater extraction. In these situations, groundwater extraction is inefficiently high even without electricity under-pricing. Moreover, part of the electric power supply intended for farmers is often diverted to other unauthorized uses (notably illicit consumption). The paper demonstrates that unless non-price electricity rationing imposes severe constraints on demand, the range of resource allocation problems includes insufficient incentives to provide high-level service by the power utility, insufficient incentives for farmers to install and operate efficient equipment, and losses due to political"rent seeking"activities to influence water allocations. It also shows that diversion of electricity to illicit uses can increase overall economic efficiency when this leads to less electricity use by farmers, thus somewhat ameliorating the problem of excessive groundwater extraction as well as the inefficiencies related to under-pricing of electricity. Systemic reforms for overcoming these problems may face severe political obstacles.Energy Production and Transportation,Water and Industry,Economic Theory&Research,Wastewater Treatment,Electric Power

Implications of a lowered damage trajectory for mitigation in a continuous-time stochastic model

This paper provides counterexamples to the idea that mitigation of greenhouse gases causing climate change, and adaptation to climate change, are always and everywhere substitutes. The author considers optimal policy for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions when climate damages follow a geometric Brownian motion process with positive drift, and the trajectory for damages can be down-shifted by adaptive activities, focusing on two main cases: 1) damages are reduced proportionately by adaptation for any given climate impact ("reactive adaptation"); and 2) the growth path for climate damages is down-shifted ("anticipatory adaptation"). In this model mitigation is a lumpy one-off decision. Policy to reduce damages for given emissions is continuous in case 1, but may be lumpy in case 2, and reduces both expectation and variance of damages. Lower expected damages promote mitigation, and reduced variance discourages it (as the option value of waiting is reduced). In case 1, the last effect may dominate. Mitigation then increases when damages are dampened: mitigation and adaptation are complements. In case 2, mitigation and adaptation are always substitutes.Climate Change Economics,Adaptation to Climate Change,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Science of Climate Change,Climate Change Policy and Regulation

Water Hauling and Girls' School Attendance Some New Evidence From Ghana

In large parts of the world, a lack of home tap water burdens households as the water must be brought to the house from outside, at great expense in terms of effort and time. This paper studies how such costs affect girls' schooling in Ghana, with an analysis based on four rounds of the Demographic and Health Surveys

Low-level versus high-level equilibrium in public utility service

Heterogeneity of public utility services is common in developing countries. In a"high-level"equilibrium, the quality of utility services is high, consumer willingness to pay for services is high, the utility is well funded and staff well paid in order to induce high quality of performance. In a"low-level"equilibrium the opposite is the case. Which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of utility management, and public perceptions about service quality. If a utility administration has the potential to offer high-quality service, and the public is aware of this, high-quality equilibrium also requires the public’s service payments to be high enough to fund the needed pay incentives for the utility staff. When the public lack knowledge about the utility administration’s quality, the public’s initial beliefs about the utility administration’s quality also will influence their willingness to make adequate service payments for a high-quality equilibrium. This paper shows that, with low confidence, only a low-level equilibrium may exist; while with higher initial confidence, a high-level equilibrium become possible."Intermediate"(in between the low- and high-level) outcomes also can occur in early periods, with"high-level"outcomes later on.Economic Theory&Research,Political Economy,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Urban Water Supply and Sanitation,Public Sector Economics