The added worked effect and intra household aspects of unemployment

The added worker effect states that unemployment of a household member leads to an increase in labour supply of another household member. This paper investigates whether there is such an effect in a developing country. We use a rich data set for urban Ethiopia. We first give a brief description of who is unemployed within the household and find that they are mostly related to the household head. Men are not more likely to be unemployed than women once we control for being family in law. The eldest remaining sons in the household are more likely to be unemployed, but this may be due to a selection bias. The oldest remaining unemployed have no higher job aspirations than their younger brothers, suggesting that if older brothers have more entitlements, waiting in unemployment for a good job is not one of them. We carry out two separate analyses to investigate the added worker effect. First we analyse the effect using actual labour supply and find no evidence for an added worker effect once we take unobserved individual effects into account. We then investigate whether there is an added worker effect using desired labour market participation and find that there is none. The combined evidence indicates that there is no added worker effect. This suggests that households have other ways to cope with unemployment and is consistent with results from previous analysis which shows that the use of savings (by selling assets) and consumption smoothing are important mechanisms to cope with unemployment.household behaviour, labour supply, unemployment, added worker effect

The Added Worker Effect and Intrahousehold Aspects of Unemployment

The added worker effect states that unemployment of a household member leads to an increase in labour supply of another household member. This paper investigates whether there is such an effect in a developing country. We use a rich data set for urban Ethiopia. We first give a brief description of who is unemployed within the household and find that they are mostly related to the household head. Men are not more likely to be unemployed than women once we control for being family in law. The eldest remaining sons in the household are more likely to be unemployed, but this may be due to a selection bias. The oldest remaining unemployed have no higher job aspirations than their younger brothers, suggesting that if older brothers have more entitlements, waiting in unemployment for a good job is not one of them. We carry out two separate analyses to investigate the added worker effect. First we analyse the effect using actual labour supply and find no evidence for an added worker effect once we take unobserved individual effects into account. We then investigate whether there is an added worker effect using desired labour market participation and find that there is none. The combined evidence indicates that there is no added worker effect. This suggests that households have other ways to cope with unemployment and is consistent with results from previous analysis which shows that the use of savings (by selling assets) and consumption smoothing are important mechanisms to cope with unemployment.household behaviour, labour supply, unemployment, added worker effect

Wages and Reciprocity in the Workplace

We explore the role of reciprocity in wage determination by combining experimental and survey data. The experiment is similar to Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe's (1995) and is conducted with Ghanaian manufacturing workers. The survey relates to the same sample workers and the firms within which they are mployed. We find a strong positive association between individual reciprocity and individual wages. However, the direction of causality is unclear. Various aspects of the distribution of the tendency to reciprocate within an employee's workforce are also associated with that employee's wage and, in this case, there are strong arguments for a causal link is from former to latter. In particular, the mean, median, and minimum levels of reciprocity have a positive effect on wages, while the spread in the distribution (standard deviation) has a strong significant negative effect. This suggests that homogenous behaviour, or convergence to a norm, is rewarded. The results underline theimportance of behavioural characteristics and firm culture for the operation of the labour market.wages, reciprocity, field experiment

Institutions for Health Care Delivery: A Formal Exploration of What Matters to Health Workers Evidence from Rwanda

Most developing countries face important challenges regarding both the quality and quantity of health care they provide and there is a growing consensus that health workers play an important role in this. Although contemporary analysis of development emphasizes the central role of institutions, surprisingly little work looks at how institutions matter for health workers and health care delivery, which is the focus of this paper. One reason for the scarcity of work in this field is that it is unclear what the relevant theory is in this area. We carry out a formal exploratory analysis to identify both the problems and the institutional factors that offer an explanation. Using qualitative research on Rwanda, a country where health care problems are typical but where the institutional environment is dynamic enough to embody changes, we find that four institutional factors explain health worker performance and career choice. Ranked in order of ease of malleability they are: incentives, monitoring arrangements, professional norms and health workers’ intrinsic motivation. We discuss their role and the implications for future research.health workers, institutions

The Performance of Health Workers in Ethiopia Results from Qualitative Research

Insufficient attention has been paid to understanding what determines the performance of health workers and how they make labor market choices. This paper reports on findings from focus group discussions with both health workers and users of health services in Ethiopia, a country with some of the poorest health outcomes in the world. We describe performance problems identified by both health users and health workers participating in the focus group discussions, including absenteeism and shirking, pilfering drugs and materials, informal health care provision and illicit charging, and corruption. In the second part of the paper we present four structural reasons why these problems arise: (i) the ongoing transition from health sector dominated by the public sector, towards a more mixed model; (ii) the failure of government policies to keep pace with the transition towards a mixed model of service delivery; (iii) weak accountability mechanisms and the erosion of professional norms in the health sector; and (iv) the impact of HIV/AIDS. The discussions underline the need to base policies on a micro-analysis of how health workers make constrained choices, both in their career and in their day to day professional activities.health worker performance, human resources for health, corruption

Intrinsic motivations and the non-profit health sector: Evidence from Ethiopia

Economists have traditionally assumed that individual behavior is motivated exclusively by extrinsic incentives. Social psychologists, in contrast, stress that intrinsic motivations are also important. In recent work, economic theorists have started to build psychological factors, like intrinsic motivations, into their models. Besley and Ghatak (2005) propose that individuals are differently motivated in that they have different “missions,” and their self-selection into sectors or organizations with matching missions enhances organizational efficiency. We test Besley and Ghatak’s model using data from a unique cohort study. We generate two proxies for intrinsic motivations: a survey-based measure of the health professionals philanthropic motivations and an experimental measure of their pro-social motivations. We find that both proxies predict health professionals’ decision to work in the non-profit sector. We also find that philanthropic health workers employed in the non-profit sector earn lower wages than their colleagues.

The massive production of iron in the Sahelian belt: Archaeological investigations at Korsimoro (Sanmatenga – Burkina Faso)

The large smelting site of Korsimoro was investigated during two fieldwork campaigns in 2011 and 2012. Four different technical traditions are identified. Each is characterized by the spatial organization of the working area, the architecture of the furnace, and the assemblages of wastes. Each technical tradition corresponds to one chronological phase. Phase KRS 1 lasted between 600 and 1000 AD and is characterized by small-scale production. Phases KRS 2 and 3, between 1000 and 1450 AD, showed a very significant increase of the production with an important impact on the organization of the society. There is a collapse of the industry at the time of the installation of the Nakomse conquerors followed by a recovery of the production at a small scale during the 17th century

To serve the community or oneself: the public servant's dilemma

Embezzlement of resources is hampering public service delivery throughout the developing world. Research on this issue is hindered by problems of measurement. To overcome these problems we use an economic experiment to investigate the determinants of corrupt behaviour. We focus on three aspects of behaviour: (i) embezzlement by public servants; (ii) monitoring effort by designated monitors; and, (iii) voting by community members when provided with an opportunity to select a monitor. The experiment allows us to study the effect of wages, effort observability, rules for monitor assignment, and professional norms. Our experimental subjects are Ethiopian nursing students. We find that service providers who earn more embezzle less, although the effect is small. Embezzlement is also lower when observability (associated with the risk of being caught and sanctioned) is high, and when service providers face an elected rather than randomly selected monitor. Monitors put more effort into monitoring, when they face re-election and when the public servant receives a higher wage. Communities re-elect monitors who put more effort into exposing embezzlement. Framing . whereby players are referred to as .health workers. and .community members. rather than by abstract labels . affects neither mean embezzlement nor mean monitoring effort, but significantly increases the variance in both. This suggests that different types of experimental subject respond differently to the framing, possibly because they adhere to different norms.

TO SERVE THE COMMUNITY OR ONESELF: THE PUBLIC SERVANT'S DILEMMA

Embezzlement of resources is hampering public service delivery throughout the developing world.Research on this issue is hindered by problems of measurement. To overcome these problems we use an economic experiment to investigate the determinants of coorupt behaviour. We focus on three aspects of bahaviour; (i) embezzlement by public servants; (ii) monitoring effort by designated monitors; (iii)voting by community members when provided with an opportunity to select a monitor. The experiment allows us to study the effect of wages, effort observability, rules for monitor assignment, and professional norms. Our experimental subjects are Ethiopian nursing students. We find that service providers who earn more embezzle less, although the effect is small. Embezzlement is also lower when observability (associated with the risk of being caught and sanctioned) is high, and when sevice providers face an elected rather than randomly selected monitor. Monitors put more effort into monitoring, when they face re- election and when the public servant receives a higher wage. Communities re-elect monitors who put more effort into exposing embezzlement. Framing - whereby players are referred to as 'health workers' and 'community members' rather than by abstract labels - affects neither mean embezzlement nor mean monitoring effort, but significantly increases the variance in both. This suggests that different types of experimental subject respond differently to the framing, possibly because they adhere to different norms.

The performance of health workers in Ethiopia - results from qualitative research

Insufficient attention has been paid to understanding what determines the performance of health workers and how they make labor market choices. This paper reports on findings from focus group discussions with both health workers and users of health services in Ethiopia, a country with some of the poorest health outcomes in the world. It describes performance problems identified by both health, users and health workers participating in the focus group discussions, including absenteeism and shirking, pilfering drugs and materials, informal health care provision and illicit charging, and corruption. The second part of the paper presents four structural reasons why these problems arise: (1) the ongoing transition from a health sector dominated by the public sector, toward a more mixed model; (2) the failure of government policies to keep pace with the transition toward a mixed model of service delivery; (3) weak accountability mechanisms and the erosion of professional norms in the health sector; and (4) the impact of HIV/AIDS. The discussions underline the need to base policies on a micro-analysis of how health workers make constrained choices, both in their career and in their day to day professional activities.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Systems Development&Reform,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Housing&Human Habitats,Health Economics&Finance