Non-eliminative reductionism : the basis of a science of conscious experience?

A coherent physicalist view of the nature of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. On the one hand, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical and can be studied and explained using the normal scientific approach used for all other things in the universe and present no problem any harder than any other faced by scientists. . On the other, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia - they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist world view without any concomitant need, either to reduce them into to non-existence, or to treat them as new fundamental properties. It is suggested that the position also has sufficient explanatory power to successfully deal with the 'why like anything - why does experience exist at all' question and to counter both Chalmers' Conceivability Argument and Jackson's Knowledge Argument

Rudolf Otto’s Encounter with Rāmānuja as a Model for Comparative Theology

Among his more noteworthy achievements, Rudolf Otto introduced Vaiṣṇava theism, Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita in particular, to a broader theological audience. In this paper, I argue that despite the well-known shortcomings of Otto’s comparative work, in particular, his tendency to essentialize the compared traditions and his presumption of Christian superiority, Otto’s encounter with Rāmānuja and Vaiṣṇavism nevertheless anticipates some of the characteristic features of the contemporary practice of Comparative Theology. The article describes how Otto’s work on Vaiṣṇavism exemplifies two such features of the new Comparative Theology in particular. The first of these is this discipline’s concern with problematizing the often invidious representations of non-Christian traditions that have historically sustained notions of Christian uniqueness. The second is its skillful use of comparison to foreground features of the home tradition that might otherwise escape notice. As is well known, the German Lutheran theologian Rudolf Otto undertook a serious study of Sanskrit and the theological traditions of Hinduism in the second half of his academic career. Arguably his greatest Indological achievement was introducing Vaiṣṇava theism, Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita in particular, to a broader theological audience.1 In this short paper I would like to argue that not only does Otto’s encounter with Rāmānuja and Vaiṣṇavism represent a significant moment in the reception history of Indian religious thought in the West, but it also exemplifies some of the characteristic features of the contemporary practice of Comparative Theology. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, Otto was a comparative theologian avant la lettre.2 There are two characteristic features of the new Comparative Theology in particular that I wish to highlight, the first of which is critical, the second constructive. The first of these is the discipline’s concern with problematizing the often invidious representations of non-Christian traditions that have historically sustained notions of Christian uniqueness. The second, more constructive aspect of Comparative Theology is its skillful use of comparison to foreground features of the home tradition that might otherwise escape notice. I shall discuss each of these in turn with reference to Otto’s encounter with Rāmānuja and the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava tradition

A case study of campus‐based flexible learning using the World Wide Web and computer conferencing

This paper explores the use of the World Wide Web (WWW) integrated with computer conferencing as a teaching and learning tool. The aim of the study described was to evaluate the effectiveness of the use of online materials designed in a flexible learning format and integrated with a computer conference. It was hoped that this would create additional opportunity for group discourse between campus‐based students. The paper is divided in the following way: a discussion of the context to new developments in teaching and learning is followed by an introduction to the case study. Finally the findings of the case study are discussed with reference to research from the field of collaborative systems (Orlikowski, 1992; Grudin, 1994) as a framework for reflection. Some tentative conclusions are made for future work

What's the Use of International Relations?

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Clumping towards a UK National catalogue?

This article presents a clumps-oriented perspective on the idea of a UK national catalogue for HE, arguing that a distributed approach based on Z39.50 has a number of attractive features when compared with the alternative physical union catalogue model, but also noting that the many difficulties currently associated with the distributed approach must be resolved before it can itself be regarded as a practical proposition. It is suggested that the distributed model is sufficiently attractive compared to the physical union model to make the expenditure of additional time, effort and resource worthwhile. 'Dynamic clumping' based on collection level description and other appropriate metadata is seen as the key to user navigation in a distributed national catalogue. Large physical union catalogues like COPAC are assumed to have a role, although updating difficulties and the lack of circulation information may limit its scope

Towards a Scientific Account of Experience

I outline and develop a particular physicalist perspective on qualia, and suggest that it may be the basis of a correct account of the relationship of mental states to the physical world.\ud \ud Assume that a quale is a perspective on a physical state in the organism – the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such – but that the perspective, though it entails irreducible experiential knowledge, has no physical substance over that encompassed in the physical state itself. Assume this physical state is also a brain state. The position is a useful one. First, reductionist physicalism is true, but experiential qualities are irreducible physical knowledge, and a required part of our physical world view. Second, experiences are not additional problems over those addressed externally, but only how these problems seem when known internally – an experience just is the physical state that underlies its external counterpart, and the same standard scientific account suffices to explain both, permitting a science of consciousness to develop by applying the same standard external–observer–based methods adopted in older scientific disciplines. Finally, challenges to physicalism associated with the ‘unbridgeable gap’, Leibniz's Law, Jackson's knowledge argument, and Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness are successfully countered.\u