On Localization and Regularization

Different regularizations are studied in localization of path integrals. We discuss the effect of the choice of regularization by evaluating the partition functions for the harmonic oscillator and the Weyl character for SU(2). In particular, we solve the Weyl shift problem that arises in path integral evaluation of the Weyl character by using the Atiyah-Patodi-Singer $\eta$-invariant and the Borel-Weil theory.Comment: 15 pages, LaTe

Compression of spectral meteorological imagery

Data compression is essential to current low-earth-orbit spectral sensors with global coverage, e.g., meteorological sensors. Such sensors routinely produce in excess of 30 Gb of data per orbit (over 4 Mb/s for about 110 min) while typically limited to less than 10 Gb of downlink capacity per orbit (15 minutes at 10 Mb/s). Astro-Space Division develops spaceborne compression systems for compression ratios from as little as three to as much as twenty-to-one for high-fidelity reconstructions. Current hardware production and development at Astro-Space Division focuses on discrete cosine transform (DCT) systems implemented with the GE PFFT chip, a 32x32 2D-DCT engine. Spectral relations in the data are exploited through block mean extraction followed by orthonormal transformation. The transformation produces blocks with spatial correlation that are suitable for further compression with any block-oriented spatial compression system, e.g., Astro-Space Division's Laplacian modeler and analytic encoder of DCT coefficients

Moral Hazard and Clear Conscience

The paper studies theoretically how the optimal contract in the hidden-action moral hazard model is affected when an agent feels bad when not reaching a target effort set in the contract. While the presence of guilt brings the outcome closer to first-best, an effort target is not costless for the principal. In equilibrium, the agent’s effort falls short of the target, inducing guilt which must be compensated by a higher financial reward. Thus, although the principal’s payoff is higher, the agent receives a part of the monetary rents accruing to intrinsic motivation. This result differs markedly from previous contributions on contracting under social preference or pro-social motivation.Moral Hazard; Norms; Agency; Social Preferences; Guilt; Work Ethic

Analogy-based Expectations and the Partially Cursed Equilibrium

Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This paper closes the gap by showing that a partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium.Analogy Expectations; Bounded Rationality; Curse; Learning

Information acquisition during a Dutch auction

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction.auctions; information acquisition

Information acquisition during a Dutch auction

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction.auctions; information acquisition

Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements

In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on whether actions are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic substitutes, there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and the incentives to abide. The opposite tends to be true when actions are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual promises.partnerships; contracts; pre-play communication; legal enforcement; social norms; guilt