CRISPR as a Driving Force: The Model T of Biotechnology

The CRISPR system for gene editing can break, repair, and replace targeted sections of DNA. Although CRISPR gene editing has important therapeutic potential, it raises several ethical concerns. Some bioethicists worry CRISPR is a prelude to a dystopian future, while others maintain it should not be feared because it is analogous to past biotechnologies. In the scientific literature, CRISPR is often discussed as a revolutionary technology. In this paper we unpack the framing of CRISPR as a revolutionary technology and contrast it with framing it as a value-threatening biotechnology or business-as-usual. By drawing on a comparison between CRISPR and the Ford Model T, we argue CRISPR is revolutionary as a product, process, and as a force for social change. This characterization of CRISPR offers important conceptual clarity to the existing debates surrounding CRISPR. In particular, conceptualizing CRISPR as a revolutionary technology structures regulatory goals with respect to this new technology. Revolutionary technologies have characteristic patterns of implementation, entrenchment, and social impact. As such, early identification of technologies as revolutionary may help construct more nuanced and effective ethical frameworks for public policy

Identifying and improving students' mental models of tooth decay

The aims of this study were to identify the initial mental models of tooth decay among a sample of 15-16 year-old Spanish students, and then to analyse changes in these models following the students’ participation in a teaching sequence on this topic. The study focuses on the analysis of two tasks that formed part of a pretest/ post-test design whose aim was to determine whether students could provide an adequate explanation of the problem of dental caries. Mental models were identified through an iterative process that combined an examination of the nature of the concept in question with an analysis of students’ responses. Five mental models of tooth decay were identified. Three of them were associated with a single active agent (the tooth, food or microscopic living organisms). The fourth model included sugar plus a second active agent, while the active agent in the fifth model was acids. We also identified four mechanisms, which were not exclusive to any one model. The results showed an evolution in students’ explanatory models of tooth decay following their participation in the teaching sequence. Initially, the majority of students used simple models involving a single active agent, whereas by the end of the teaching sequence the majority of them were employing the most advanced models. However, formulating the mechanism through which tooth decay develops remains a complex task for students, particularly as regards understanding that the interactions which produce the active agent and its action upon a tooth are chemical reactions.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

Monetary Policy Regimes: a fragile consensus

The last fifteen years have seen the emergence of widespread consensus that optimum monetary policy is designed on the basis of three pillars: a short-term official rate of interest as the sole policy instrument and the placing of that instrument in the hands of a central bank which is (a) independent of government and (b) transparent in its decision-making. We take a critical look at each of these. In the first case, we focus attention on the failure of mainstream economics to recognise the choice of instrument and the implications of its adoption. In the case of independence we argue that he theoretical case for independence has been misunderstood and that it is not an essential requirement for successful policy. We also show that ‘independence’ is not best measured against a checklist of statutory characteristics. As regards ‘transparency’ our argument is slightly different, though we come to a similar conclusion. Unlike independence, ‘transparency’ does address a real problem for central banks. However, the evidence suggests that transparency is not the only, or even the best, solution. A variety of evidence tells us that agents can understand and anticipate the actions of the most secretive institutions.Monetary policy; central banks; independence; transparency

Central bank communication, transparency and interest rate volatility: Evidence from the USA

The FOMC has changed its way of communication twice, recently: from 2000-2003, the Committee imparted information about its assessment on the economic outlook (the balance-of-risk statements) and since August 2003 the FOMC informs additionally about its outlook’s implications on the future federal funds target rate (forward-looking language). The result should be that agents do not need to deduce FOMC’s likely policy move on every twitch of central bank communication and macroeconomic news. Markets have anticipated FOMC policy decisions on the day of the meeting very well since 1994. Therefore, the focus of the paper is on the behaviour of market rates between FOMC meetings and on testing for greater ‘smoothness’ and lower volatility of market rates since 2000. We apply an EGARCH model to forward rates at the short end of the yield curve. The model is used to test for the effects of the three disclosure regimes (pre-2000, 2000-2003, post-2003) on the dependence of previous and current changes of the market rates in the conditional mean equation. It is expected to observe higher inertia during the periods when market participants are better informed. Furthermore, generally, news increases interest rate volatility, since markets adjust interest rates in response to relevant news. However, other FOMC communication (other than the press statements after the FOMC meeting), may have a lower news value in the new disclosure regimes than it had in the pre-2000 period. Therefore, ‘other’ central bank communication may affect the volatility of interest rates differently in the three different regimes. This effect is tested for in the conditional variance of the regression model. We find that there is evidence of differences in smoothness between the period until 2000 and the period of the balance-of-risk statement. Furthermore, we find that the effect of other than Fed press statements after FOMC meetings varies in the three periods. This is particularly so for Fed communication concerning economic outlook and speeches by the chairman of the Board.Macroeconomics; Post Keynesian;

Monetary Policy Transparency:Too Good to be True?

In the last fifteen years or so the conduct of monetary policy in developed economies has converged in a number of ways which include an increasing emphasis on ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’ in policy-making. There is a widespread belief that transparency in the conduct of UK monetary policy has increased substantially since, and because of, the introduction of inflation targeting and associated institutional reforms in 1992. A large measure of this belief is based upon studies which reveal the increased ability of money market agents to anticipate accurately the change in official rates. In this paper, we have updated one of those studies and show that the findings are largely unaffected by events of the last five years. More interestingly, perhaps, we have floated the possibility that this improved anticipation may be the result of developments other than institutional reforms. For example, it is notable that the Bank of England has made fewer and smaller interest changes since 1992. It is also widely believed (and the behaviour of many macro variables suggests this) that economies have generally become more stable since 1992. If this is true, then macroeconomic forecasts in general should have improved and the increased anticipation would be, partly at least, due to this rather than institutional changes. We test both theses hypotheses with negative results.

Monetary Policy Transparency and Uncertainty: A Comparison between the Bank of England and the Bundesbank/ECB

It is widely believed that institutional arrangements influence the quality of monetary policy outcomes. Judged on its ‘transparency’ characteristics, therefore the Bank of England should do better than the Bundesbank/ECB. We show that this is not confirmed by agents’ ability to anticipate central bank decisions. Furthermore, benefits from transparency should also show in a narrowing of the diversity in cross sectional forecasts. We show that the diversity in interest rate forecasts is no greater under the Bundesbank/ECB than the Bank of England. This suggests that other factors than ‘transparency’ may affect interest rate uncertainty. Increasing difficulty in forecasting inflation appears to play a part in the UK while being less of a problem in Germany.transparency, yield curve, forecasting uncertainty, Bank of England, Bundesbank/ ECB

Monetary Policy Uncertainty: Is There a Difference Between Bank of England and the Bundesbank/ECB?

It is widely believed that institutional arrangements influence the quality of monetary policy outcomes. Judged on its ‘transparency’ characteristics, therefore the Bank of England should do better than both the Bundesbank and ECB. However, studies based on market evidence show that on average, agents anticipate policy moves by both banks equally well. Since benefits from transparency should also show in a narrowing of the diversity in cross sectional forecasts, this paper extends the existing literature in an attempt to reconcile the contradictory evidence on ‘transparency’ of both banks. We show that the diversity in interest rate forecasts is greater under the Bundesbank/ECB than the Bank of England. Other factors than ‘transparency’ do not seem to affect interest rate uncertainty in Germany. Increasing difficulty in forecasting inflation appears to explain in part UK interest rate forecast dispersion.transparency, yield curve, forecasting uncertainty, Bank of England, Bundesbank, ECB

The Enigma of Mobile Money Systems

In this paper we argue that the success of mobile banking models represents an enigma in terms of their replicability to other countries. These models offer the opportunity to diminish the financial exclusion suffered by the poor by offering access to credit, savings, and transfers, which are key tools capable of transforming the livelihoods of the poor as well as the efficiency of the market. We show that mobile phones need a complete ecosystem that supports its application to a functioning mobile banking service. The aim of this paper is to contribute to existing knowledge of mobile money across the value chain by providing insight into the mechanisms of m-money and the value propositions within the business of m-banking. We develop a taxonomy of the key drivers of the business model to help assess the replicability of these models in other countries. We focus on models developed in Kenya, the Philippines, and Brazil, and explore if some of the conditions present in these models are lacking for a widespread adoption in other. We conclude, however, that there appears to be no set of clearly identifiable variables that serve as a basis for success and that those necessary conditions for the replication of m-banking models identified by the existing literature to other countries around the world do not guarantee results. Moreover, we find that some of these conditions are not present in countries where m-banking models have been successful.M-banking, financial inclusion, mobile applications, mobile opportunities, developing countries.