Semi-structured elite interviews in a nested analysis framework: studying presidential activism in Central and Eastern Europe

My PhD research deals with the use of presidential powers in Central and Eastern Europe during the first twenty years since the end of Communism. While previous research mostly debated the nature of the new regime types and measured presidents’ powers, I wanted to explore and explain how presidents actually use their constitutional prerogatives. My study uses a mixed-methods approach that combines statistical analysis of an original data set on the use of presidential powers in nine Central and East European democracies with qualitative elite interviews in four selected countries. This case focuses on the 65 semi-structured interviews that I conducted with political elites in Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and the challenges of nesting them into them into the statistical analysis. In particular, it addresses problems of how to prepare interviews based on quantitative findings and sampling strategies to counter bias through non-response. The case also highlights specific problems related to elite interview-based research in post-socialist Europe and sets these into perspective to the existing literature. Last, if offers more general advice on how to successfully integrate interviews into a mixed-methods framework

Veto et Peto: Patterns of Presidential Activism in Central and Eastern Europe

The powers of Central and East European presidents have been subject to a number studies. Paradoxically, only few scholars have tried to explain how presidents actually use them. This thesis maps and explains patterns in the activism of democratic presidents in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It proposes a new theoretical framework for the study of presidential activism, defined as the discretionary use of formal presidential powers, and argues that it can be explained by the constitutional setting and the political environment. To test these hypotheses, the study employs a nested analysis approach. Thereby, the patterns of presidential activism are assessed using an original data set on the use of presidents’ legislative powers in nine CEE democracies between 1990 and 2010, and the thesis provides one of the first cross-country empirical analyses of the actual use of presidents’ reactive powers to date. Based on the predictions of the statistical model 12 president-cabinet pairings from four countries (Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 4.) are selected for in-depth case studies. The qualitative analysis then uses the results of 65 semi-structured elite interviews and ample source material to examine the validity of the statistical results. A particular focus is placed on the use of presidential vetoes and presidential activism in government formation, censure and dismissal. The study finds most of the hypotheses confirmed. Most prominently, the findings show that popular presidential elections, cohabitation between president and government as well as a low seat share of the government are the most important predictors of presidential activism. These factors are not only strongly correlated with a more frequent use of powers, but the mechanisms of effect are also demonstrated in case studies. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis suggests intra-governmental divisions as an additional explanatory factor which should be included in future studies of presidential activism

The effects of majority requirements, selectorate composition and uncertainty in indirect presidential elections: the case of Estonia

This article assesses the effects of common features in the indirect election of presidents in parliamentary republics. In particular, it examines the influence of majority requirements, selectorate composition and uncertainty on party strategies, using Estonia (1996-2016) as a crucial case for analysis. The analysis demonstrates that the lack of a plurality run-off effectively eliminated incentives for inter-party cooperation and strategic voting. It furthermore shows that shifts in the partisan composition and control of the selectorate from parliament to electoral college provided considerable opportunities for agenda manipulation. Subsequently, results only rarely reflected the parliamentary balance of power. Last, although overall indicators suggest greater congruence between parliament and electoral college over time, this proliferated rather than reduced parties’ uncertainty over the electoral outcome as non-parliamentary electors voted based on local interests and acted independently from national party leaders

Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. Minority Presidents in Multiparty Systems

Book Review: Chaisty, Paul, Cheeseman, Nic & Power, Timothy J. Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. Minority Presidents in Multiparty Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, xiii + 267pp. £60.00 h/b

The Corona-Pandemic In Central And Eastern Europe – Between Concerted Executive Action And Creeping Authoritarianism

The Corona-pandemic has executives around the world facing new and in fact unprecedented challenges. While international media attention on Europe has largely focussed on Western European nations– notably on the Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK – and their responses, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have likewise scrambled to quickly implement measures to contain the pandemic’s spread. The latter is of particularly urgency for many CEE nations as their public health care system are in many aspects still a far cry from the capacities of its Western neighbours. Although actions have been characterised by remarkable cooperation between and within executives and legislatures, the urgency and speed of the response has meant that countries dispensed with normal mechanisms of scrutiny and in some cases adopted policies and decisions that may have long-lasting effects on the structure of executive power

The Temporary Transfer of Presidential Powers in the Czech Republic

The Presidency plays a central role in the functioning of the Czech political system. Among others, the President convenes the first sitting of the Chamber of Deputies after elections and must appoint the Government before it can seek parliamentary confidence. Therefore, the emergency hospitalization of President Miloš Zeman after the 2021 parliamentary election presented politicians with a hitherto unprecedented dilemma. Although a full-scale constitutional crisis was eventually averted, the incident still demonstrated the ambiguity and limitations of constitutional provisions on presidential inability and the temporary transfer of presidential powers in the Czech Republic. This article discusses the respective constitutional provisions and assesses their expedience in light of recent events. Drawing on historical precedents and political debates from the last 30 years, the article proposes options for reform and argues that constitutional crises will remain a real possibility unless political actors agree on at least a minimum of procedural requirements

An Introduction to Elite Interviewing

Dr Philipp Koeker explains how elite interviews differ from other interviews, and he offers suggestions for success. He identifies elite characteristics, access difficulties, power challenges, and reliability

Why dictators veto: legislation, legitimation and control in Kazakhstan and Russia

Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” and can serve as arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime’s output legitimacy and stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian legislatures. This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Democratization (2019) © Taylor & Francis, available online at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2019.1678029