Commentary on 3 papers on issues in value-at-risk modeling and evaulation

Bank capital ; Risk ; Bank investments

Derivatives, Portfolio Composition and Bank Holding Company Interest Rate Risk Exposure

This paper examines the role played by derivatives in determining the interest rate sensitivity of bank holding companies' (BHCs') common stock, controlling for the influence of on-balance sheet activities and other bank-specific characteristics. The major result of the analysis suggests that derivatives have played a significant role in shaping banks' interest rate risk exposures in recent years. For the typical bank holding company in the sample, increases in the use of interest rate derivatives corresponded to greater interest rate risk exposure during the 1991-94 period. This relationship is particularly strong for bank holding companies that serve as derivatives dealers and for smaller, enduser BHCs. During earlier years, however, there is no significant relationship between the extent of derivatives activities and interest rate risk exposure. There are two plausible interpretations of the relationship between interest rate derivative activity and interest rate risk exposure in the latter part of the sample period: one interpretation suggests that derivatives tend to enhance interest rate risk exposure for the typical BHC in the sample, while the other suggests that derivatives may be used to partially offset high interest rate risk exposures arising from other activities. The analysis provides support for the first of these two interpretations. This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's October 1996 conference on "

What market risk capital reporting tells us about bank risk

This paper was presented at the conference "Economic Statistics: New Needs for the Twenty-First Century," cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, and the National Association for Business Economics, July 11, 2002. In recent years, financial market supervisors and the financial services industry have increasingly emphasized the role of public disclosure in ensuring the efficient and prudent operation of financial institutions. This article examines the market risk capital figures reported to bank regulators by U.S. bank holding companies with large trading operations to assess the extent to which such disclosure provides market participants with meaningful information about risk. It argues that when one looks across banks, market risk capital figures provide little additional information about the extent of an institution's market risk exposure beyond what is conveyed by simply knowing the relative size of its trading account. In contrast, when one examines individual banks over time, these figures appear to provide information not available from other data in regulatory reports. These findings suggest that market risk capital figures are most useful for tracking changes in individual banks' market risk exposures over time.Bank capital ; Risk ; Bank holding companies ; Financial services industry - Law and legislation

Bank capital requirements for market risk: the internal models approach

The increases prominence of trading activities at many large banking companies has highlighted bank exposure to market risk-the risk of loss from adverse movements in financial market rates and prices. In response, bank supervisors in the United States and abroad have developed a new set of capital requirements to ensure that banks have adequate capital resources to address market risk. This paper offers an overview of the new requirements, giving particular attention to their most innovative feature: a capital charge calculated for each bank using the output of that bank's internal risk measurement model. The authors contend that the use of internal models should lead to regulatory capital charges that conform more closely to banks' true risk exposures. In addition, the information generated by the models should allow supervisors and market participants to compare risk exposures over time and across institutions.Bank capital ; Risk

The evolution of U.S. bank branch networks: growth, consolidation, and strategy

Bank branches have become steadily more concentrated within large and midsized branch networks over the past decade. A look at branching trends between 2001 and 2003 reveals that banks with large networks grew slowly and strategically during this period as they adjusted their branch holdings within existing markets, while institutions with midsized branch networks expanded more aggressively.Branch banks

Financial market evolution and the interest sensitivity of output

Interest rates ; Gross national product ; Money market

The challenges of risk management in diversified financial companies

In recent years, financial institutions and their supervisors have placed increased emphasis on the importance of measuring and managing risk on a firmwide basis—a coordinated process referred to as consolidated risk management. Although the benefits of this type of risk management are widely acknowledged, few if any financial firms have fully developed systems in place today, suggesting that significant obstacles have led them to manage risk in a more segmented fashion. In this article, the authors examine the economic rationale behind consolidated risk management. Their goal is to detail some of the key issues that supervisors and practitioners have confronted in assessing and developing consolidated risk management systems. In doing so, the authors clarify why implementing consolidated risk management involves significant conceptual and practical difficulties. They also suggest areas in which additional research could help resolve some of these difficulties.Risk management ; Financial institutions ; Bank supervision

Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations

Bank supervisors need timely and reliable information about the financial condition and risk profile of banks. A key source of this information is the on-site, full-scope bank examination. This article evaluates the frequency with which supervisors examine banks by assessing the decay rate of the private supervisory information gathered during examinations. The analysis suggests that this information ceases to provide a useful picture of a bank's current condition after six to twelve quarters. The decay rate appears to be faster in years when the banking industry experiences financial difficulties, and it is significantly faster for troubled banks than for healthy ones. Thus, the analysis suggests that the annual examination frequency currently mandated by law is reasonable, particularly during times of financial stress for the banking industry.Bank supervision ; Banking law