On the Complexity of Chore Division

We study the proportional chore division problem where a protocol wants to divide an undesirable object, called chore, among $n$ different players. The goal is to find an allocation such that the cost of the chore assigned to each player be at most $1/n$ of the total cost. This problem is the dual variant of the cake cutting problem in which we want to allocate a desirable object. Edmonds and Pruhs showed that any protocol for the proportional cake cutting must use at least $\Omega(n \log n)$ queries in the worst case, however, finding a lower bound for the proportional chore division remained an interesting open problem. We show that chore division and cake cutting problems are closely related to each other and provide an $\Omega(n \log n)$ lower bound for chore division

The Satisfiability Threshold of Random 3-SAT Is at Least 3.52

We prove that a random 3-SAT instance with clause-to-variable density less than 3.52 is satisfiable with high probability. The proof comes through an algorithm which selects (and sets) a variable depending on its degree and that of its complement

Jointly Optimal Channel and Power Assignment for Dual-Hop Multi-channel Multi-user Relaying

We consider the problem of jointly optimizing channel pairing, channel-user assignment, and power allocation, to maximize the weighted sum-rate, in a single-relay cooperative system with multiple channels and multiple users. Common relaying strategies are considered, and transmission power constraints are imposed on both individual transmitters and the aggregate over all transmitters. The joint optimization problem naturally leads to a mixed-integer program. Despite the general expectation that such problems are intractable, we construct an efficient algorithm to find an optimal solution, which incurs computational complexity that is polynomial in the number of channels and the number of users. We further demonstrate through numerical experiments that the jointly optimal solution can significantly improve system performance over its suboptimal alternatives.Comment: This is the full version of a paper to appear in the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Special Issue on Cooperative Networking - Challenges and Applications (Part II), October 201

Fixed-Parameter Tractability of Directed Multiway Cut Parameterized by the Size of the Cutset

Given a directed graph $G$, a set of $k$ terminals and an integer $p$, the \textsc{Directed Vertex Multiway Cut} problem asks if there is a set $S$ of at most $p$ (nonterminal) vertices whose removal disconnects each terminal from all other terminals. \textsc{Directed Edge Multiway Cut} is the analogous problem where $S$ is a set of at most $p$ edges. These two problems indeed are known to be equivalent. A natural generalization of the multiway cut is the \emph{multicut} problem, in which we want to disconnect only a set of $k$ given pairs instead of all pairs. Marx (Theor. Comp. Sci. 2006) showed that in undirected graphs multiway cut is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) parameterized by $p$. Marx and Razgon (STOC 2011) showed that undirected multicut is FPT and directed multicut is W[1]-hard parameterized by $p$. We complete the picture here by our main result which is that both \textsc{Directed Vertex Multiway Cut} and \textsc{Directed Edge Multiway Cut} can be solved in time $2^{2^{O(p)}}n^{O(1)}$, i.e., FPT parameterized by size $p$ of the cutset of the solution. This answers an open question raised by Marx (Theor. Comp. Sci. 2006) and Marx and Razgon (STOC 2011). It follows from our result that \textsc{Directed Multicut} is FPT for the case of $k=2$ terminal pairs, which answers another open problem raised in Marx and Razgon (STOC 2011)

Parameterized Complexity of Problems in Coalitional Resource Games

Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve on their own. Previous work has shown problems in coalitional games to be computationally hard. Wooldridge and Dunne (Artificial Intelligence 2006) studied the classical computational complexity of several natural decision problems in Coalitional Resource Games (CRG) - games in which each agent is endowed with a set of resources and coalitions can bring about a set of goals if they are collectively endowed with the necessary amount of resources. The input of coalitional resource games bundles together several elements, e.g., the agent set Ag, the goal set G, the resource set R, etc. Shrot, Aumann and Kraus (AAMAS 2009) examine coalition formation problems in the CRG model using the theory of Parameterized Complexity. Their refined analysis shows that not all parts of input act equal - some instances of the problem are indeed tractable while others still remain intractable. We answer an important question left open by Shrot, Aumann and Kraus by showing that the SC Problem (checking whether a Coalition is Successful) is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the size of the coalition. Then via a single theme of reduction from SC, we are able to show that various problems related to resources, resource bounds and resource conflicts introduced by Wooldridge et al are 1. W[1]-hard or co-W[1]-hard when parameterized by the size of the coalition. 2. para-NP-hard or co-para-NP-hard when parameterized by |R|. 3. FPT when parameterized by either |G| or |Ag|+|R|.Comment: This is the full version of a paper that will appear in the proceedings of AAAI 201