Institutional Design of the Member States for the Ex Post Subsidiarity Scrutiny

This paper analyses subsidiarity action introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the adjustment of national provisions to accommodate this new competence of national Parliaments. According to Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States may notify an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of national Parliament according to the their legal order. As this paper claims, however, the procedures for lodging the subsidiarity action vary at the national level, depending on the parliament – government relations in EU affairs. The paper begins by outlining the adjustments of national Parliaments for effective participation in European integration. Further, the paper explores the subsidiarity action of national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and advances the argument that subsidiarity action is not very innovative from the perspective of Article 263 TFEU, yet the core issue is the reference to the national legal order regulation of the notification process by the Member States. The paper then examines and compares national level arrangements for subsidiarity action, depending on the strength of a national Parliament in EU affairs in relation to its government. The paper concludes by maintaining that there is a divergence in national regulations of subsidiarity action, but evidently the design of ex post subsidiarity review at the national level does not enhance the role of weak national Parliaments.This paper analyses subsidiarity action introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the adjustment of national provisions to accommodate this new competence of national Parliaments. According to Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States may notify an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of national Parliament according to the their legal order. As this paper claims, however, the procedures for lodging the subsidiarity action vary at the national level, depending on the parliament – government relations in EU affairs. The paper begins by outlining the adjustments of national Parliaments for effective participation in European integration. Further, the paper explores the subsidiarity action of national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and advances the argument that subsidiarity action is not very innovative from the perspective of Article 263 TFEU, yet the core issue is the reference to the national legal order regulation of the notification process by the Member States. The paper then examines and compares national level arrangements for subsidiarity action, depending on the strength of a national Parliament in EU affairs in relation to its government. The paper concludes by maintaining that there is a divergence in national regulations of subsidiarity action, but evidently the design of ex post subsidiarity review at the national level does not enhance the role of weak national Parliaments.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Henri Temianka Correspondence; (granat)

This collection contains material pertaining to the life, career, and activities of Henri Temianka, violin virtuoso, conductor, music teacher, and author. Materials include correspondence, concert programs and flyers, music scores, photographs, and books.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_correspondence/3535/thumbnail.jp

The parliamentary politics of the rule of law crisis in the EU

This article studies the positions of political parties around the rule of law crisis in the European Union (EU). What factors explain their position in this crisis? The theoretical expectations focus on populism and government status as the drivers of party positions towards a Member State violating the rule of law. This article assesses these expectations through a comparative case study of the actions of different EU political parties during the first term of the Law and Justice government in Poland (2015–2019). The article examines the relevant documents such as debates and resolutions of parliaments within the EU. It concludes that populist parties are more likely to support the Law and Justice party than mainstream parties, and that parties in government are less likely to challenge Law and Justice than opposition parties. These findings provide important insights into the dynamics of parties’ positioning on the rule of law crisis