Volatility and unpredictability

Interest rates

The baby boom, the housing market and the stock market

Housing ; Stock exchanges ; Population

Exchange Rate Regime Credibility, the Agency Cost of Capital and Devaluation

When a country abandons a fixed, or target zone exchange regime it usually claims that the regime was "fundamentally" sound but that it was undermined by pernicious speculation. The validity of the claim is impossible to assess using only observable data-there always exists a future path of current account surpluses that would make the regime sound, and speculators' (investors'?) motives are unobservable. This paper analyzes the crucial role of imperfect credibility in a currency crisis with a stochastic dynamic rational expectations regime switch model. The exchange regime is sound, e.g., a currency board-the only market failure is that the Central Bank cannot make a credible commitment to maintain the regime. The paper has two innovations: (1) It specifies the cost of imperfect credibility, and (2) It quantifies the cost of imperfect credibility. Imperfect credibility generates small (but costly) average interest rate differentials. Imperfect credibility cannot generate large interest differentials, but a surprisingly small "fundamental" currency overvaluation added to the basic specification generates large interest rate differentials. The paper's main result- that a lack of credibility cannot generate large interest rate differentials in a sound regime-is robust. The model in the paper is stylized, but the results are rich. The policy maker (Central Bank) and investors optimize. Investors fear devaluation and the Bank cannot make a credible commitment to allay their fears. Investors demand an agency currency premium. There is no pernicious speculation-the premium fairly prices the country's assets but it increases the country's cost of capital. The Bank abandons the regime when the expected present value of the agency cost of capital outweighs the expected present value of the benefit from remaining in the regime. The model generates multiple rational expectations equilibria and a variety of patterns linking the exchange rate to the interest rate differential. I parameterized the model using estimates of the exchange rate process for Hong Kong. The model generated agency currency premiums average ½%. The model generated interest rate differentials are consistent with the interest differentials in Hong Kong before the Asian financial crisis in July of 1997. After July 1997 a lack of credibility is not sufficient to explain the observed interest rate differentials of 4-6%.balance of payments crisis, credibility, multiple equilibria

Dollarization: An Irreversible Decision

If dollarization is a credible commitment to maintain a fixed exchange rate, then it is an irreversible decision. This paper explicitly models the unique feature -- irreversibility -- of a dollarization policy. In addition, it is the first paper to recognize that if a dollarization is a potential exchange rate regime choice, then the equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium. The case of Argentina's possible dollarization is considered. I compute Nash equilibria and the transition probabilities that a country will move from a currency board regime to dollarizing, or floating, in one year, or two years, out to seven years. I model shocks to the exchange rate as a jump-diffusion process. The jumps represent large "asymmetric" shocks to the exchange rate -- such as Brazil's 1999 devaluation. The probability of dollarization is inversely related to the jump probability.

Gestalt money

Money supply

Attitudes of Californians Toward Effective Correctional Policies (FOCUS)

Over the past several decades, California has experimented with a variety of sentencing policies to reduce crime. Most of those reforms have emphasized punishment rather than rehabilitation. Survey data reported in this publication suggest that the state's public is looking for a reconsideration of these policies

A Survey of Mental Health Care Delivery to Youth in the California Juvenile Justice System

From April through September, 2003, NCCD contacted 51 California county probation departments and 35 mental health departments to assess how each county's probationdepartment identifies, assesses, and provides care to youth with mental health issues. This is a preliminary report