Solving the G-problems in less than 500 iterations: Improved efficient constrained optimization by surrogate modeling and adaptive parameter control

Constrained optimization of high-dimensional numerical problems plays an important role in many scientific and industrial applications. Function evaluations in many industrial applications are severely limited and no analytical information about objective function and constraint functions is available. For such expensive black-box optimization tasks, the constraint optimization algorithm COBRA was proposed, making use of RBF surrogate modeling for both the objective and the constraint functions. COBRA has shown remarkable success in solving reliably complex benchmark problems in less than 500 function evaluations. Unfortunately, COBRA requires careful adjustment of parameters in order to do so. In this work we present a new self-adjusting algorithm SACOBRA, which is based on COBRA and capable to achieve high-quality results with very few function evaluations and no parameter tuning. It is shown with the help of performance profiles on a set of benchmark problems (G-problems, MOPTA08) that SACOBRA consistently outperforms any COBRA algorithm with fixed parameter setting. We analyze the importance of the several new elements in SACOBRA and find that each element of SACOBRA plays a role to boost up the overall optimization performance. We discuss the reasons behind and get in this way a better understanding of high-quality RBF surrogate modeling

Portfolio saliency and ministerial turnover: Dynamics in Scandinavian postwar cabinets

© 2013 The Author(s) Scandinavian Political Studies © 2013 Nordic Political Science Association. This is the accepted version of the following article: Hansen, M. E., Klemmensen, R., Hobolt, S. B. and Bäck, H. (2013), Portfolio Saliency and Ministerial Turnover: Dynamics in Scandinavian Postwar Cabinets. Scandinavian Political Studies, 36: 227–248, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9477.12004/abstract.Why do certain ministers remain in their post for years while others have their time in office cut short? Drawing on the broader literature on portfolio allocation, this article argues that the saliency of individual portfolios shapes ministerial turnover. The main argument is that ministerial dismissals are less likely to occur the higher the saliency attributed to the ministerial portfolio since ministers appointed to important posts are more likely to have been through extensive screening before appointment. Importantly, it is also posited in the article that the effect of portfolio salience is conditioned by government approval ratings: when government ratings are on the decline, prime ministers are less likely to reshuffle or fire important ministers than when approval ratings are improving. To test these claims, Cox proportional hazards models are applied to a new dataset on ministerial turnover in Scandinavia during the postwar period. The results strongly support the proposition that portfolio saliency matters for ministerial survival, and that this effect is moderated by government popularity