Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and anomalism (they interact but not through deterministic laws). I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualist views, the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of predicting mind-body associations)

Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism

Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much easier to explain on the intermodal view

Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality

This paper asks whether phenomenal intentionality (intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone) has a relational structure of the sort envisaged in Russell’s theory of acquaintance. I put forward three arguments in favor of a relation view: one phenomenological, one linguistic, and one based on the view’s ability to account for the truth conditions of phenomenally intentional states. I then consider several objections to the relation view. The chief objection to the relation view takes the form of a dilemma between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the properties constitutive of the contents of phenomenally intentional states on this view: the Aristotelian view seems unable to account for all the apparent contents of phenomenally intentional states, but the Platonic view seems to be ontologically unacceptable. I also consider other objections from physicalism, phenomenology, and epistemology

The Conformal Characters

We revisit the study of the multiplets of the conformal algebra in any dimension. The theory of highest weight representations is reviewed in the context of the Bernstein-Gelfand-Gelfand category of modules. The Kazhdan-Lusztig polynomials code the relation between the Verma modules and the irreducible modules in the category and are the key to the characters of the conformal multiplets (whether finite dimensional, infinite dimensional, unitary or non-unitary). We discuss the representation theory and review in full generality which representations are unitarizable. The mathematical theory that allows for both the general treatment of characters and the full analysis of unitarity is made accessible. A good understanding of the mathematics of conformal multiplets renders the treatment of all highest weight representations in any dimension uniform, and provides an overarching comprehension of case-by-case results. Unitary highest weight representations and their characters are classified and computed in terms of data associated to cosets of the Weyl group of the conformal algebra. An executive summary is provided, as well as look-up tables up to and including rank four.Comment: 41 pages, many figure

Permutations of Massive Vacua

We discuss the permutation group G of massive vacua of four-dimensional gauge theories with N=1 supersymmetry that arises upon tracing loops in the space of couplings. We concentrate on superconformal N=4 and N=2 theories with N=1 supersymmetry preserving mass deformations. The permutation group G of massive vacua is the Galois group of characteristic polynomials for the vacuum expectation values of chiral observables. We provide various techniques to effectively compute characteristic polynomials in given theories, and we deduce the existence of varying symmetry breaking patterns of the duality group depending on the gauge algebra and matter content of the theory. Our examples give rise to interesting field extensions of spaces of modular forms.Comment: 44 pages, 1 figur

Consciousness and intentionality

Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it's like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, roughly the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness