2,674 research outputs found
Rationalizing the UTMS spectrum bids: the case of the UK auction
This paper considers bidder behaviour in the United Kingdomâs UMTS spectrum
auction. Evidence is reviewed which shows that some bidders in this auction did
not bid straightforwardly in accordance with fixed valuations of the licenses. We
go on to consider more speculative hypotheses about biddersâ behaviour, such as
the hypotheses that bidders revised their valuations in the light of other biddersâ
behaviour, or that biddersâ valuations of licenses depended on which other companies
appeared likely to win a license. We find weak evidence in favor of some of these
hypotheses, but no hypothesis is supported by strong direct evidence. We conclude
that the rationalization of bidding in the United Kingdomâs UMTS auction remains
problematic. As a consequence we are cautious regarding the success of the auction
in achieving an efficient allocation of licenses
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types
We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding votersâ knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, votersâ behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in which votersâ behavior can depend on their beliefs. The Pareto improvement is achieved for all possible beliefs. The mechanism that we use to demonstrate this result is simple and intuitive, and the Pareto improvement result extends to all equilibria of the mechanism that satisfy a mild refinement. We also show that the result only holds for votersâ interim expected utilities, not for their ex post expected utilities.robust mechanism design; dominant strategies; voting; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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