Structural Separation and Access in Telecommunications Markets

This paper presents a basic framework to assess whether structural (vertical) separation is desirable. It is discussed within the setting of fixed telecommunications markets. From an economist’s perspective, the key question that underlies the case for structural separation is: is there a persistent bottleneck? The obvious candidate is the ‘local loop’, or local access network. If yes then it makes sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation. The framework provides a set of options that the regulator can use strategically, by using the threat of a break-up to influence an incumbent’s competitive stance in the wholesale market.

Entry Deterrence and Signaling in Markets for Search Goods

This paper studies entry in markets for search goods. Signaling through prices is studied when an entrant s quality is (i) private information; and (ii) common information of entrant and incumbent. When consumers visit a store, they observe quality and can switch before purchasing. When switching costs are low, an entrant can signal high quality by setting a sufficiently high price; consumers who find out that quality is low switch to the incumbent. Entry may be facilitated when switching costs are sufficiently low, or when the incumbent knows the entrant s type.

Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms

This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, each firm's manager can impose a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and produce the good. Quality is determined by his effort level, which depends on his private benefits. The managers compete on a product market by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management strategy are discussedOligopoly;Competition;Product Differentiation;Organizational Structure;Corporate Strategy;business economics

Optimal controller/observer gains of discounted-cost LQG systems

The linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control paradigm is well-known in literature. The strategy of minimizing the cost function is available, both for the case where the state is known and where it is estimated through an observer. The situation is different when the cost function has an exponential discount factor, also known as a prescribed degree of stability. In this case, the optimal control strategy is only available when the state is known. This paper builds on from that result, deriving an optimal control strategy when working with an estimated state. Expressions for the resulting optimal expected cost are also given

Technological change in markets with network externalities

Technological Change;Externalities

New Competition in Telecommunications Markets: Regulatory Pricing Principles

Launching and stimulating competition in telecommunications markets is an important policy goal. It contains two elements: to encourage entry and to make competition effective such that consumers benefit. The first one requires that entrants can make profits after investing in infrastructure so that they have an incentive to invest. The second one requires prices to be sufficiently low so that consumers enjoy higher net utilities. At a first glance, these two elements seem difficult to achieve at the same time. In this paper, we consider price regulation in the retail and wholesale market and answer to what extent such regulatory policy can stimulate competition. Our main finding is that, in the short run, asymmetric access price regulation is an effective instrument to make the entrant and consumers better off.

Innovation, convergence and the role of regulation in the Netherlands and beyond

In the light of converging services for voice, data, and video, this paper discusses the challenges for telecommunications regulation from a European perspective. The Netherlands, a country with excellent conditions for facilities-based competition, is discussed as a case in point. With dynamic issues at the heart of the debate, the role of regulation and government intervention more generally is to create and possibly to sustain conditions among operators to upgrade their networks and to provide innovative services. A fresh look at current regulation suggests that an overhaul may be needed.

Broadband Access in Europe: Challenges for Policy and Regulation

Telekommunikation, Regulierung, Breitbandkommunikation, Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, Telecommunications, Regulation, Broadband telecommunications, European Economic and Monetary Union