Exclusive contracts with vertically differentiated products

In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to deal exclusively with retailers. If the extent of consumers' heterogeneity is small, manufacturers offer exclusive contracts unilaterally. On the other hand, if consumers' valuations differ significantly both manufacturers engage in exclusive contracting

Strange Particle Production in Nuclear Collisions at CERN-NA49

In order to quantify isospin effects in the comparison of elementary to nuclear collisions, p-p and n-p interactions have been studied in the NA49 experiment in addition to p-Pb and Pb-Pb reactions. Together with first measurements of cascade hyperon and Omega production in p-p collisions, isospin-corrected K/pi ratios and cascade yields are discussed. The Antiomega/Omega ratio in p-p collisions is found to be less than 0.5 with 95% confidence level.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figures, Proceedings of "Rencontres de Moriond, 2002

Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic industries

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium

Reciprocally Exclusive Contracts and Endogenous Quality

Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible contracts, exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, regardless of the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make the choice of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions for qualities under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our final proposition shows that in this case the choice of quality depends exclusively on the valuation of the median consumer

Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

In this article we examine the eects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We nd that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the other consumer groups

The Role of Price Floor in a Differentiated Product Retail Market

The ability of a manufacturer to enhance competition among its retailers by imposing a price floor was recently introduced in the literature. The purpose of this article is to revisit this anti-collusive explanation of the retail price maintenance in a more general model in which we introduce asymmetric retailers. We find that a manufacturer can amplify the retail market’s competition by imposing a price foor when retailers sell differentiated products. This result contradicts the prevailing concept of retail price maintenance

Competitors are welcome: why incumbents might embrace entrants?

In this article we show that the price and the profit of an incumbent firm may increase after a new firm enters its market. Our analysis suggests that a well-established firm after competition emerges on its market might benefit from excluding some consumers from the low-end segment and concentrate only on its loyal consumers