Multivalent cyclodextrin receptors in solution and at surfaces

This thesis deals with multivalent ß-cyclodextrin (CD) host-guest interactions in solution and at interfaces

AC loss in large-scale superconducting cables

A review is given of recent work on ac losses, carried out at our institute. The emphasis is on large-scale conductors for fusion applications, such as the `cable-in-conduit¿ prototype conductors to be used for NET. Calculation methods for the ac losses are presented together with some experimental results

DSpace@Cambridge: implementing long-term digital preservation

This article describes one approach towards digital preservation and long-term accessibility of content in DSpace@Cambridge anno 2005.DSpace@Cambridge is an institutional archive set up to deal with the long-term preservation of information in a wide range of formats over an indefinite period of time. In this paper we look at some long-term digital preservation strategies, as they are currently implemented in our archive. We describe the value of documentation of file format specifications for future data accessibility. We examine the impact and usefulness of constant concurrent data migration to several different formats. We illustrate our approach with case studies of applying these principles to chemical and archeological scientific data

Defining Original Presentism

It is surprisingly hard to define presentism. Traditional definitions of the view, in terms of tensed existence statements, have turned out not to to be capable of convincingly distinguishing presentism from eternalism. Picking up on a recent proposal by Tallant, I suggest that we need to locate the break between eternalism and presentism on a much more fundamental level. The problem is that presentists have tried to express their view within a framework that is inherently eternalist. I call that framework the Fregean nexus, as it is defined by Frege’s atemporal understanding of predication. In particular, I show that the tense-logical understanding of tense which is treated as common ground in the debate rests on this very same Fregean nexus, and is thus inadequate for a proper definition of presentism. I contrast the Fregean nexus with what I call the original temporal nexus, which is based on an alternative, inherently temporal form of predication. Finally, I propose to define presentism in terms of the original temporal nexus, yielding original presentism. According to original presentism, temporal propositions are distinguished from atemporal ones not by aspects of their content, as they are on views based on the Fregean nexus, but by their form—in particular, by their form of predication