463 research outputs found
Fenomenologia a projekt naturalizacji
[Phenomenology and the project of naturalization] In recent years more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciliating phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? In their long introduction to the book Naturalizing Phenomenology published by Stanford University Press in 1999, the four co-editors, Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy set out to delineate what might be seen as a kind of manifesto for this new approach. An examination of this introduction is consequently a good starting point for a discussion of the issue
Causation, Constitution and Context:Comment on âSeeing mental states: An experimental strategy for measuring the observability of other mindsâ by Cristina Becchio et al.
Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Selfhood:A reply to some critics
Review of Philosophy and Psychology has lately published a number of papers that in various ways take issue with and criticize my work on the link between consciousness, self-consciousness and selfhood. In the following contribution, I reply directly to this new set of objections and argue that while some of them highlight ambiguities in my (earlier) work that ought to be clarified, others can only be characterized as misreadings
Brain, Mind, World: Predictive coding, neo-Kantianism, and transcendental idealism
Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In this paper, I will first argue that some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserlâs endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserlâs transcendental idealism? Can contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind profit from a closer engagement with the history of philosophy? There are many reasons why this question ought to be answered affirmatively. Fundamental reflections on, and analyses of, the mind-world relationship are not a new thing. and it would be counterproductive to ignore resources found in the tradition. Doing so might make one miss out on important insights that in the best of circumstances would end up being rediscovered decades or centuries later. In the following contribution, I would like to exemplify this assessment by arguing that there are interesting similarities between the predictive coding framework that is currently in vogue in cognitive neuroscience and ideas found in, and developed by, German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. The point of this comparison will not simply be historical, however. As we shall see, some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to raise certain questions and harbour certain doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. As I will argue, some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserlâs endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserlâs transcendental idealism?</p
INTENTIONNALITĂ ET EXPĂRIENCE
Since the publication of Chalmerâs influential work, The Conscious Mind (1996), it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called âhard problemâ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the âeasy problems of consciousnessâ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjectivity and experience if we ignore intentionality, or do we not run the risk of thereby reinstating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores everything captured by the phrase âbeing-in-the-worldâ? In my article, I will inquire whether phenomenal consciousness and intentionality are two sides of the same coin that cannot be separated without committing a fallacy of division.Seit der Veröffentlichung von Chalmers einflussreichem Werk The Conscious Mind (1996) war es ĂŒblich, die philosophischen Probleme des Bewusstseins in zwei Gruppen zu teilen. WĂ€hrend sich das sogenannte âschwere Problem des Bewusstseinsâ auf die Natur des phĂ€nomenalen Bewusstseins und die Perspektive der ersten Person bezieht, befasst sich das âleichte Problem des Bewusstseinsâ vor allem mit dem Begriff der IntentionalitĂ€t. Doch es stellt sich die Frage, ob es tatsĂ€chlich möglich ist, IntentionalitĂ€t eingehend zu erforschen, ohne dabei die erfahrungsbezogenen Dimensionen zu berĂŒcksichtigen? Und vice versa, ist es möglich, die Natur der SubjektivitĂ€t und der Erfahrung zu verstehen, wenn man die IntentionalitĂ€t ignoriert, ohne sich dem Risiko auszusetzen, den cartesianischen Dualismus von âSubjektâ und âWeltâ wieder ins Leben zu rufen, das alles ignoriert, was mit dem âIn-der-Welt-seinâ-Syntagma umschrieben ist? In meinem Artikel untersuche ich, ob das phĂ€nomenale Bewusstsein und die IntentionalitĂ€t nicht zwei Seiten einer und derselben Medaille sind, die nicht zertrennt werden können, ohne dass bei der Teilung ein Fehler begangen wird.Depui la parution, en 1996, de lâouvrage influent de Chalmer The Conscious Mind, on divise habituellement les problĂšmes philosophiques de la conscience en deux groupes. Tandis que les problĂšmes dits «ardus» concernent la nature de la conscience phĂ©nomĂ©nale et la perspective de la premiĂšre personne, les problĂšmes «faciles» concernent principalement la notion dâintentionnalitĂ©. Or, est-il vraiment possible dâĂ©tudier lâintentionnalitĂ© Ă fond sans prendre en considĂ©ration la dimension expĂ©riencielle ? Et vice versa, est-il possible de comprendre la nature de la subjectivitĂ© et de lâexpĂ©rience sans tenir compte de lâintentionnalitĂ©, ou bien ne court-on pas le risque de reconstituer ainsi un dualisme cartĂ©sien sujet-monde, qui ignore tout ce quâimplique le syntagme «ĂȘtre-dans-le-monde» ? Dans mon article, je me pencherai sur la question de savoir si la conscience phĂ©nomenale et lâintentionnalitĂ© constituent en fait deux faces dâune mĂȘme mĂ©daille, que lâon ne peut sĂ©parer sans commettre une erreur de division
Collective intentionality and plural pre-reflective self-awareness
In several recent texts, Hans Bernhard Schmid has argued that a proper understanding of collective intentionality and weâidentity requires a convincing account of the âsense of âusââ and that headway can be made regarding the latter by drawing on classical theories of selfâawareness (Schmid 2009, 2014a, 2014b). More specifically, Schmid argues that the âsense of âusââ amounts to a form of plural preâreflective selfâawareness, and as he writes, âPlural preâreflective selfâawareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular preâreflective selfâawareness plays in the individual mindâ (Schmid 2014a, 7). At the same time, however, Schmid also acknowledges that âthere are important differences to consider,â in âspite of the striking similarities between the plural and the singular mindâ (Schmid 2014a, 7). The aim of the following contribution is to assess these claims. How helpful is the appeal to preâreflective selfâawareness, and might the differences between the singular and the plural case ultimately overshadow their similarities
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