Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions

This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a promotion affects both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation significantly, though in two different ways: An expected promotion increases extrinsic motivation whereas intrinsic motivation is highest subsequent to a realized promotion. The relationship between extrinsic motivation and expected promotions implies that promotions have a clear incentive effect, consistent with a key – not yet tested – prediction of the tournament model

The Effects of Performance Measurement and Compensation on Motivation

This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance measurement and compensation system affect the motivation of employees. Our survey results demonstrate a positive relationship between the perceived characteristics of the complete compensation system and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is not affected by the design of monetary compensation, but by promotion opportunities. The compensation system also significantly affects work satisfaction and turnover intent. Our results have both managerial as well as policy implications

Real-world Data of Nivolumab for Patients With Advanced Renal Cell Carcinoma in the Netherlands:An Analysis of Toxicity, Efficacy, and Predictive Markers

Background: Nivolumab, a programmed death 1 inhibitor, has been approved as second-line treatment for advanced renal cell carcinoma (RCC) in Europe since 2016. We investigated the toxicity and efficacy of nivolumab as well as potential predictive biomarkers in the Dutch population. Patients and Methods: This was a retrospective, multicenter study of the Dutch national registry of nivolumab for the treatment of advanced RCC. The main outcome parameters included toxicity, objective response rate (ORR), overall survival (OS), progression-free survival (PFS), time to progression (TTP), and time to treatment failure (TTF). In addition, potential predictive and prognostic biomarkers for outcomes were evaluated. Results: Data on 264 patients were available, of whom 42% were International Metastatic RCC Database Consortium (IMDC) poor risk at start of nivolumab, 16% had ≥ 3 lines of previous therapy, 7% had non–clear-cell RCC, 11% had brain metastases, and 20% were previously treated with everolimus. Grade 3/4 immune-related adverse events occurred in 15% of patients. The median OS was 18.7 months (95% confidence interval, 13.7-23.7 months). Progression occurred in 170 (64.4%) of 264 patients, with a 6-and 12-months TTP of 49.8% and 31.1%, respectively. The ORR was 18.6% (49 of 264; 95% confidence interval, 14%-23%). Elevated baseline lymphocytes were associated with improved PFS (P =.038) and elevated baseline lactate dehydrogenase with poor OS, PFS, and TTF (P =.000). On-treatment increase in eosinophils by week 8 predicted improved OS (P =.003), PFS (P =.000), and TTF (P =.014), whereas a decrease of neutrophils was associated with significantly better TTF (P =.023). Conclusions: The toxicity and efficacy of nivolumab for metastatic RCC after previous lines of therapy are comparable with the results in the pivotal phase III trial and other real-world data. On-treatment increase in eosinophil count is a potential biomarker for efficacy and warrants further investigation

Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions

This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a promotion affects both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation significantly, though in two different ways: An expected promotion increases extrinsic motivation whereas intrinsic motivation is highest subsequent to a realized promotion. The relationship between extrinsic motivation and expected promotions implies that promotions have a clear incentive effect, consistent with a key – not yet tested – prediction of the tournament model. This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in Kyklos International Review for Social Science , 2006, 59(3), 441-59.promotions; incentives; tournament model; internal labor market; extrinsic motivation; intrinsic motivation

The Effects of Performance Measurement and Compensation on Motivation

This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance measurement and compensation system affect the motivation of employees. Our survey results demonstrate a positive relationship between the perceived characteristics of the complete compensation system and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is not affected by the design of monetary compensation, but by promotion opportunities. The compensation system also significantly affects work satisfaction and turnover intent. Our results have both managerial as well as policy implications. This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in De Economist , 2005, 153(3), 303-29.Performance measurement; Compensation; Promotions; Intrinsic Motivation; Extrinsic Motivation.

How Do Nutritional Warning Labels Affect Prices?

Obesity is increasing worldwide and in many countries, the problem is particularly serious among lower income groups. To fight obesity, front-of-pack nutritional warning labels are a prominent regulatory tool that have been implemented or are currently debated in many countries. Existing studies document that warning labels incentivize consumers to substitute away from unhealthy products. However, not much is known about manufacturers’ price re-optimizations in response to consumers’ (dis-)utility for warning labels. Using household purchase data in the cereal category, this paper studies the adjustments of prices after the mandatory introduction of warning labels in Chile. Our model shows that warning labels lead to higher prices of labeled cereals, as is also observed in data. In contrast, prices of unlabeled products tend to drop or at least increase less, incentivizing price sensitive consumers to remain in the category. We decompose post-labeling market share adjustments into a pure label effect that fixes prices at initial levels after regulation and a total effect that accounts for price re-optimizations. Our findings point to self-enforcing effects of a warning label regulation as the price adjustments amplify the policy-maker’s goal of reducing unhealthy nutritional intake, especially because market forces incentivize low-income segments to choose healthier alternatives

How Do Nutritional Warning Labels Affect Prices?

Obesity is increasing worldwide and in many countries, the problem is particularly serious among lower income groups. To fight obesity, front-of-pack nutritional warning labels are a prominent regulatory tool that have been implemented or are currently debated in many countries. Existing studies document that warning labels incentivize consumers to substitute away from unhealthy products. However, not much is known about manufacturers’ price re-optimizations in response to consumers’ (dis-)utility for warning labels. Using household purchase data in the cereal category, this paper studies the adjustments of prices after the mandatory introduction of warning labels in Chile. Our model shows that warning labels lead to higher prices of labeled cereals, as is also observed in data. In contrast, prices of unlabeled products tend to drop or at least increase less, incentivizing price sensitive consumers to remain in the category. We decompose post-labeling market share adjustments into a pure label effect that fixes prices at initial levels after regulation and a total effect that accounts for price re-optimizations. Our findings point to self-enforcing effects of a warning label regulation as the price adjustments amplify the policy-maker’s goal of reducing unhealthy nutritional intake, especially because market forces incentivize low-income segments to choose healthier alternatives