HeMIS: Hetero-Modal Image Segmentation

We introduce a deep learning image segmentation framework that is extremely robust to missing imaging modalities. Instead of attempting to impute or synthesize missing data, the proposed approach learns, for each modality, an embedding of the input image into a single latent vector space for which arithmetic operations (such as taking the mean) are well defined. Points in that space, which are averaged over modalities available at inference time, can then be further processed to yield the desired segmentation. As such, any combinatorial subset of available modalities can be provided as input, without having to learn a combinatorial number of imputation models. Evaluated on two neurological MRI datasets (brain tumors and MS lesions), the approach yields state-of-the-art segmentation results when provided with all modalities; moreover, its performance degrades remarkably gracefully when modalities are removed, significantly more so than alternative mean-filling or other synthesis approaches.Comment: Accepted as an oral presentation at MICCAI 201

Ectromelia Virus Encodes a Novel Family of F-Box Proteins That Interact with the SCF Complex

Poxviruses are notorious for encoding multiple proteins that regulate cellular signaling pathways, including the ubiquitin-proteasome system. Bioinformatics indicated that ectromelia virus, the causative agent of lethal mousepox, encoded four proteins, EVM002, EVM005, EVM154, and EVM165, containing putative F-box domains. In contrast to cellular F-box proteins, the ectromelia virus proteins contain C-terminal F-box domains in conjunction with N-terminal ankyrin repeats, a combination that has not been previously reported for cellular proteins. These observations suggested that the ectromelia virus F-box proteins interact with SCF (Skp1, cullin-1, and F-box) ubiquitin ligases. We focused our studies on EVM005, since this protein had only one ortholog in cowpox virus. Using mass spectrometry, we identified cullin-1 as a binding partner for EVM005, and this interaction was confirmed by overexpression of hemagglutinin (HA)-cullin-1. During infection, Flag-EVM005 and HA-cullin-1 colocalized to distinct cellular bodies. Significantly, EVM005 coprecipitated with endogenous Skp1, cullin-1, and Roc1 and associated with conjugated ubiquitin, suggesting that EVM005 interacted with the components of a functional ubiquitin ligase. Interaction of EVM005 with cullin-1 and Skp1 was abolished upon deletion of the F-box, indicating that the F-box played a crucial role in interaction with the SCF complex. Additionally, EVM002 and EVM154 interacted with Skp1 and conjugated ubiquitin, suggesting that ectromelia virus encodes multiple F-box-containing proteins that regulate the SCF complex. Our results indicate that ectromelia virus has evolved multiple proteins that interact with the SCF complex

Age-specific vaccine effectiveness of seasonal 2010/2011 and pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 vaccines in preventing influenza in the United Kingdom

An analysis was undertaken to measure age-specific vaccine effectiveness (VE) of 2010/11 trivalent seasonal influenza vaccine (TIV) and monovalent 2009 pandemic influenza vaccine (PIV) administered in 2009/2010. The test-negative case-control study design was employed based on patients consulting primary care. Overall TIV effectiveness, adjusted for age and month, against confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm 2009 infection was 56% (95% CI 42–66); age-specific adjusted VE was 87% (95% CI 45–97) in <5-year-olds and 84% (95% CI 27–97) in 5- to 14-year-olds. Adjusted VE for PIV was only 28% (95% CI x6 to 51) overall and 72% (95% CI 15–91) in <5-year-olds. For confirmed influenza B infection, TIV effectiveness was 57% (95% CI 42–68) and in 5- to 14-year-olds 75% (95% CI 32–91). TIV provided moderate protection against the main circulating strains in 2010/2011, with higher protection in children. PIV administered during the previous season provided residual protection after 1 year, particularly in the <5 years age group

Zijn complotdenkers psychotisch? Een vergelijking tussen complottheorieën en paranoïde wanen

Complotdenken komt veel voor in onzekere omstandigheden. Het geeft mensen houvast, zekerheid, morelesuperioriteit en sociale steun. Extreem complotdenken lijkt te passen binnen de gangbare psychiatrische definities van paranoïde wanen, maar toch zijn er ook belangrijke verschillen. Om onderscheid te kunnen maken met complotdenken behoeven gangbare definities van wanen verdieping. In plaats van de sterke focus op de foutieve inhoud van waanideeën zou er meer aandacht moeten zijn voor de onderliggende idiosyncratische, veranderde vorm van de werkelijkheidsbeleving.Security and Global Affair

Three-dimensional coherent X-ray diffraction imaging of a ceramic nanofoam: determination of structural deformation mechanisms

Ultra-low density polymers, metals, and ceramic nanofoams are valued for their high strength-to-weight ratio, high surface area and insulating properties ascribed to their structural geometry. We obtain the labrynthine internal structure of a tantalum oxide nanofoam by X-ray diffractive imaging. Finite element analysis from the structure reveals mechanical properties consistent with bulk samples and with a diffusion limited cluster aggregation model, while excess mass on the nodes discounts the dangling fragments hypothesis of percolation theory.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, 30 reference

Are conspiracy theorists psychotic?:A comparison between conspiracy theories and paranoid delusions

Achtergrond Complottheorieën zijn populair tijdens de coronapandemie. Complotdenken wordt gekenmerkt door de sterke overtuiging dat een bepaalde, als onrechtvaardig ervaren situatie, het resultaat is van een doelbewuste samenzwering van een groep mensen met kwade bedoelingen. Complotdenken lijkt veel overeenkomsten te hebben met paranoïde wanen.Doel Verkennen van aard, gevolgen en sociaalpsychologische dimensies van complotdenken en beschrijven van overeenkomsten en verschillen met paranoïde wanen.Methode Kritisch beschouwen van relevante literatuur over complotdenken en paranoïde wanen.Resultaten Complotdenken voorziet in epistemische, existentiële en sociale behoeften. Het geeft duidelijkheid in onzekere tijden en aansluiting bij een groep van gelijkgestemden. Bij zowel complotdenken als paranoïde wanen gaat het om een onjuiste, hardnekkige en soms bizarre overtuiging. In tegenstelling tot complotdenkers zijn mensen met een paranoïde waan echter vrijwel altijd alleen het doelwit van de veronderstelde samenzwering en staan ze grotendeels alleen in hun overtuiging. Tevens zijn complotideeën minder gebaseerd op ongewone ervaringen van het zelf, de werkelijkheid of intermenselijke contacten. Conclusies Complotdenken komt veel voor in onzekere omstandigheden. Het geeft mensen houvast, zekerheid, morele superioriteit en sociale steun. Extreem complotdenken lijkt te passen binnen de gangbare psychiatrische definities van paranoïde wanen, maar toch zijn er ook belangrijke verschillen. Om onderscheid te kunnen maken met complotdenken behoeven gangbare definities van wanen verdieping. In plaats van de sterke focus op de foutieve inhoud van waanideeën zou er meer aandacht moeten zijn voor de onderliggende idiosyncratische, veranderde vorm van de werkelijkheidsbeleving.BACKGROUND: Conspiracy theories are popular during the COVID-19 pandemic. Conspiratorial thinking is characterised by the strong conviction that a certain situation that one sees as unjust is the result of a deliberate conspiracy of a group of people with bad intentions. Conspiratorial thinking appears to have many similarities with paranoid delusions.AIM: To explore the nature, consequences, and social-psychological dimensions of conspiratorial thinking, and describe similarities and differences with paranoid delusions.METHOD: Critically assessing relevant literature about conspiratorial thinking and paranoid delusions.RESULTS: Conspiratorial thinking meets epistemic, existential, and social needs. It provides clarity in uncertain times and connection with an in-group of like-minded people. Both conspiratorial thinking and paranoid delusions involve an unjust, persistent, and sometimes bizarre conviction. Unlike conspiracy theorists, people with a paranoid delusion are almost always the only target of the presumed conspiracy, and they usually stand alone in their conviction. Furthermore, conspiracy theories are not based as much on unusual experiences of their inner self, reality, or interpersonal contacts. CONCLUSIONS Conspirational thinking is common in uncertain circumstances. It gives grip, certainty, moral superiority and social support. Extreme conspirational thinking seems to fit current psychiatric definitions of paranoid delusions, but there are also important differences. To make a distinction with regard to conspiratorial thinking, deepening of conventional definitions of delusions is required. Instead of the strong focus on the erroneous content of delusions, more attention should be given to the underlying idiosyncratic, changed way of experiencing reality.</p

Are conspiracy theorists psychotic?:A comparison between conspiracy theories and paranoid delusions

Achtergrond Complottheorieën zijn populair tijdens de coronapandemie. Complotdenken wordt gekenmerkt door de sterke overtuiging dat een bepaalde, als onrechtvaardig ervaren situatie, het resultaat is van een doelbewuste samenzwering van een groep mensen met kwade bedoelingen. Complotdenken lijkt veel overeenkomsten te hebben met paranoïde wanen.Doel Verkennen van aard, gevolgen en sociaalpsychologische dimensies van complotdenken en beschrijven van overeenkomsten en verschillen met paranoïde wanen.Methode Kritisch beschouwen van relevante literatuur over complotdenken en paranoïde wanen.Resultaten Complotdenken voorziet in epistemische, existentiële en sociale behoeften. Het geeft duidelijkheid in onzekere tijden en aansluiting bij een groep van gelijkgestemden. Bij zowel complotdenken als paranoïde wanen gaat het om een onjuiste, hardnekkige en soms bizarre overtuiging. In tegenstelling tot complotdenkers zijn mensen met een paranoïde waan echter vrijwel altijd alleen het doelwit van de veronderstelde samenzwering en staan ze grotendeels alleen in hun overtuiging. Tevens zijn complotideeën minder gebaseerd op ongewone ervaringen van het zelf, de werkelijkheid of intermenselijke contacten. Conclusies Complotdenken komt veel voor in onzekere omstandigheden. Het geeft mensen houvast, zekerheid, morele superioriteit en sociale steun. Extreem complotdenken lijkt te passen binnen de gangbare psychiatrische definities van paranoïde wanen, maar toch zijn er ook belangrijke verschillen. Om onderscheid te kunnen maken met complotdenken behoeven gangbare definities van wanen verdieping. In plaats van de sterke focus op de foutieve inhoud van waanideeën zou er meer aandacht moeten zijn voor de onderliggende idiosyncratische, veranderde vorm van de werkelijkheidsbeleving.BACKGROUND: Conspiracy theories are popular during the COVID-19 pandemic. Conspiratorial thinking is characterised by the strong conviction that a certain situation that one sees as unjust is the result of a deliberate conspiracy of a group of people with bad intentions. Conspiratorial thinking appears to have many similarities with paranoid delusions.AIM: To explore the nature, consequences, and social-psychological dimensions of conspiratorial thinking, and describe similarities and differences with paranoid delusions.METHOD: Critically assessing relevant literature about conspiratorial thinking and paranoid delusions.RESULTS: Conspiratorial thinking meets epistemic, existential, and social needs. It provides clarity in uncertain times and connection with an in-group of like-minded people. Both conspiratorial thinking and paranoid delusions involve an unjust, persistent, and sometimes bizarre conviction. Unlike conspiracy theorists, people with a paranoid delusion are almost always the only target of the presumed conspiracy, and they usually stand alone in their conviction. Furthermore, conspiracy theories are not based as much on unusual experiences of their inner self, reality, or interpersonal contacts. CONCLUSIONS Conspirational thinking is common in uncertain circumstances. It gives grip, certainty, moral superiority and social support. Extreme conspirational thinking seems to fit current psychiatric definitions of paranoid delusions, but there are also important differences. To make a distinction with regard to conspiratorial thinking, deepening of conventional definitions of delusions is required. Instead of the strong focus on the erroneous content of delusions, more attention should be given to the underlying idiosyncratic, changed way of experiencing reality.</p

The effect of incorrect prior information on trust behavior in adolescents

During adolescence, social cognition and the brain undergo major developments. Social interactions become more important, and adolescents must learn that not everyone can be trusted equally. Prior knowledge about the trustworthiness of an interaction partner may affect adolescents' expectations about the partner. However, the expectations based on prior knowledge can turn out to be incorrect, causing the need to respond adaptively during the interaction. In the current fMRI study, we investigated the effect of incorrect prior knowledge on adolescent trust behavior and on the neural processes of trust. Thirty-three adolescents (Mage = 17.2 years, SDage = 0.5 years) played two trust games with partners whose behavior was preprogrammed using an algorithm that modeled trustworthy behavior. Prior to the start of both games, participants received information suggesting that the partner in one game was untrustworthy (raising incorrect expectations) and the partner in the other game trustworthy (raising correct expectations). Results indicated that participants adapted their trust behavior following incorrect prior expectations. No evidence for a change in trust behavior was shown when prior expectations were correct. fMRI analyses revealed that when receiving the partner's response, activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and in the superior parietal gyrus were increased when participants had incorrect expectations about the partner compared to when participants had correct expectations. When making trust decisions, no significant differences in neural activity were found when comparing the two games. This study provides insight into how adolescent trust behavior and neural mechanisms are affected by expectations and provides an increased understanding of the factors that influence adolescent social interaction