On Negation. What do we need to “say no”?

By looking at first-language learning, we can see three broad categories in the acquisition of negation (see DIMROTH 2010 for a review):1) rejection/refusal; 2) disappearance/ non-existence/unfulfilled expectation; 3) denial. Denial is the most complex form of negation and the last to be acquired. I present the hypothesis that denial relies on false belief understanding. Evidence from normally developed and from Autistic subjects confirms this hypothesis. Competence in linguistic denial is usually acquired by the age of 2 years and a half and 3 years. According to this hypothesis, the attribution of false belief understanding could be lowered to the age of about 2 and a half years. Hence, psycholinguistic studies on linguistic negation add further evidence that shows that the false belief test is not a reliable proof of a complex mindreading ability

Is displacement possible without language? Evidence from preverbal infants and chimpanzees

Is displacement possible without language? This question was addressed in a recent work by Liszkowski and colleagues (Liszkowski, Schafer, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). The authors carried out an experiment to demonstrate that 12-month-old prelinguistic infants can communicate about absent entities by using pointing gestures, while chimpanzees cannot. The main hypothesis of their study is that displacement does not depend on language but is, however, exclusively human and instead depends on species-specific social-cognitive human skills. Against this hypothesis, we will argue that a symbolic representation is needed to intentionally communicate absence and that this symbolic representation is tied to language. Moreover, data on the expression of displacement in home-sign systems will be taken into consideration. In light of this data, and in opposition to Liszkowski et al.’s (2009) claim, this paper will argue that displacement gestures are not foundational to language. Instead, they predate and predict the expression of complex forms of negation because they are specifically foundational to them

The paradigmatic body : embodied simulation, intersubjectivity, the bodily self, and language

In this paper we propose a way in which cognitive neuroscience could provide new insights on three aspects of social cognition: intersubjectivity, the human self, and language. We emphasize the crucial role of the body, conceived as the constitutive source of pre-reflective consciousness of the self and of the other. We provide a critical view of contemporary social cognitive neuroscience, arguing that the brain level of description is a necessary but not sufficient condition for studying intersubjectivity, the human self, and language; which are only properly visible if coupled with a full appreciation of their intertwined relationship with the body. We introduce mirror mechanisms and embodied simulation and discuss their relevance to a new account of intersubjectivity and the human self. In this context, we focus on a specifically human modality of intersubjectivity: language. Aspects of social cognition related to language are discussed in terms of embodiment, while emphasizing the progress and limitations of this approach. We argue that a key aspect of human language consists in its decoupling from its usual denotative role, hence manifesting its power of abstraction. We discuss these features of human language as instantiations of the Greek notion of paradeigma, originally explored by Aristotle to refer to a typical form of rhetorical reasoning and relate it to embodied simulation. Paradigmatic knowledge connects the particular with the particular, moving from the contingent particular situation to an exemplary case. Similarly, embodied simulation is the suspension of the “concrete” application of a process: reuse of motor knowledge in the absence of the movement it realizes is an example of “paradigmatic knowledge.” This new epistemological approach to intersubjectivity generates predictions about the intrinsic functional nature of our social cognitive operations, cutting across, and not subordinated to, a specific ontology of mind

The paradigmatic body : embodied simulation, intersubjectivity, the bodily self, and language

In this paper we propose a way in which cognitive neuroscience could provide new insights on three aspects of social cognition: intersubjectivity, the human self, and language. We emphasize the crucial role of the body, conceived as the constitutive source of pre-reflective consciousness of the self and of the other. We provide a critical view of contemporary social cognitive neuroscience, arguing that the brain level of description is a necessary but not sufficient condition for studying intersubjectivity, the human self, and language; which are only properly visible if coupled with a full appreciation of their intertwined relationship with the body. We introduce mirror mechanisms and embodied simulation and discuss their relevance to a new account of intersubjectivity and the human self. In this context, we focus on a specifically human modality of intersubjectivity: language. Aspects of social cognition related to language are discussed in terms of embodiment, while emphasizing the progress and limitations of this approach. We argue that a key aspect of human language consists in its decoupling from its usual denotative role, hence manifesting its power of abstraction. We discuss these features of human language as instantiations of the Greek notion of paradeigma, originally explored by Aristotle to refer to a typical form of rhetorical reasoning and relate it to embodied simulation. Paradigmatic knowledge connects the particular with the particular, moving from the contingent particular situation to an exemplary case. Similarly, embodied simulation is the suspension of the “concrete” application of a process: reuse of motor knowledge in the absence of the movement it realizes is an example of “paradigmatic knowledge.” This new epistemological approach to intersubjectivity generates predictions about the intrinsic functional nature of our social cognitive operations, cutting across, and not subordinated to, a specific ontology of mind

Introduzione

In this Introduction, we provide an overview of the papers included in the special issue of the e-journal Esercizi Filosofici, entitled “La dimensione pragmatica in filosofia, linguistica e semiotica” (The pragmatic dimension in philosophy, linguistics, and semiotics). The paper is divided into three parts, which are concerned with the application of pragmatics to philosophy, linguistics and semiotics respectively

The role of Embodied Cognition in action language comprehension in L1 and L2

In this study we carried out a behavioral experiment comparing action language comprehension in L1 (Italian) and L2 (English). Participants were Italian native speakers who had acquired the second language late (after the age of 10). They performed semantic judgments on L1 and L2 literal, idiomatic and metaphorical action sentences after viewing a video of a hand performing an action that was related or unrelated to the verb used in the sentence. Results showed that responses to literal and metaphorical L1 sentences were faster when the action depicted was related to the verb used rather than when the action depicted was unrelated to the verb used. No diferences were found for the idiomatic condition. In L2 we found that all responses to the three conditions were facilitated when the action depicted was related to the verb used. Moreover, we found that the diference between the unrelated and the related modalities was greater in L2 than in L1 for the literal and the idiomatic condition but not for the metaphorical condition. These fndings are consistent with the embodied cognition hypothesis of language comprehension