Disentangling Causal Pluralism

Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely out of the egg, the term ‘causal pluralism’ already covers diverse meanings. This creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible positions within them. In this paper, I argue for a general distinction between conceptual causal pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and epistemological-methodological causal pluralism. I mainly focus on metaphysical approaches to causation and discern herein four possible positions: metaphysical causal constructivism, metaphysical causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism, and strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Each of these positions are further related to their most obvious conceptual counterpart, specifically conceptual causal monism or conceptual causal pluralism

Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?

In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted

Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies

The news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 countries

This article analyzes the news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary\ud (EP) elections in all 25 member states of the European Union (EU). It\ud provides a unique pan-European overview of the campaign coverage based\ud on an analysis of three national newspapers and two television newscasts in\ud the two weeks leading up to the elections. On average, the elections were\ud more visible in the new 10 member states than in the 15 old EU member\ud states. The political personalities and institutional actors featured in news\ud stories about the elections were generally national political actors and not EU\ud actors. When it was evaluative, the news in the old EU-15 was generally\ud negative towards the EU, while in the new countries a mixed pattern was\ud found. The findings of the study are discussed in the light of the literature on\ud the EU’s legitimacy and communication deficit

Causal pluralism and scientific knowledge: an underexposed problem

Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology is heavily underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemological-methodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its own and to demonstrate how epistemological- methodological causal pluralism differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend epistemological- methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within singular domains

The EU as a public sphere

This Living Review takes stock of our current theoretical and empirical knowledge with respect to a European public sphere. It first provides a discussion of the notion of a public sphere and the virtual incompatibility between the notion of a public sphere in the nation state and the current state of European integration. It is then argued why a notion of a (Europeanized national) public space for debate between citizens and with power-holders is important for the legitimacy and accountability of the EU. A three-fold typology is proposed that organizes previous research on the European public sphere: the Utopian, the Elitist and the Realist perspective. The diverging conclusions stemming from extant research are reviewed in the light of the methodological pluralism in the studies. It is demonstrated that most signs of Europeanization of national public spheres stem from studies focusing on the quality broadsheet press, whereas studies focusing on the popular press, television and new media provide little evidence (yet) of a Europeanization trend. The review looks ahead in both theoretical and methodological terms and also assesses the consequences of the (absence of) a European public sphere and current policy initiatives in this area

The external ear canal of cetaceans, vestigial or not?

Cetaceans descend from land mammals. Consequently, their hearing apparatus basically consists of the same anatomical components. Whales, as land mammals, feature an outer, middle and inner ear. However, these structures show strong evolutionary adaptations to underwater hearing. In addition, other morphological elements, such as the mandibles and the associated acoustic fat, have acquired an acoustical function in the propagation of sound waves to the middle ear. The original function of other structures such as the external auditory canal is therefore questioned. How cetaceans hear is not yet fully understood. However, it is essential to clarify this in order to assess the impact of anthropogenic underwater sound, since high-energy underwater sound may lead to physical trauma and hearing loss, physiological stress and behavioral changes. In this study, the external ear canal of a white-beaked dolphin (Lagenorhynchus albirostris) and a common minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata) are described and compared based on histological cross sections. These external ear canals seemed rudimentary, with a small to absent lumen. However, the blood supply, well-developed muscles, active glands and numerous nerve fibres could indicate some functionality. Moreover, the presence of numerous structures with a morphological similarity to lamellar corpuscles also could advert to a functional structure. Although the function of these potential mechanoreceptors is not known, they could play a part in pressure perception in these diving mammals