ŽMOGAUS TEISĖS IR ASMENS VARDAS: TEISĖS TENDENCIJOS IR IŠŠŪKIAI

This article explains the recent evolution in the recognition and use of a person‘s own name in international human rights. It examines the historical reasons why this central aspect of individual identity was initially largely omitted from earlier treaties because of the different traditions on whether individuals could freely assert their identity through the use of their own name and surname, particularly in Europe where common law and civil approaches on the matter were significantly different. It shows how there has been significant changes in recent jurisprudence internationally and in Europe that have focused increasingly on the importance of an individual’s identity, and that this means vulnerable segments of society such as children, women and minorities must generally be entitled to have their own names recognised and used by state authorities, rather than having authorities impose an officially acceptable version.Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama, kaip pastaruoju metu tarptautinėje žmogaus teisių teisėje vystėsi asmens vardo pripažinimo ir naudojimo koncepcija. Straipsnyje taip pat nagrinėjamos istorinės priežastys, paaiškinančios, kodėl šis centrinis asmens tapatybės aspektas iš pradžių sutartyse buvo praleidžiamas. Manoma, kad tokia situacija susiklostė dėl skirtingų tradicijų, lėmusių asmens teisę laisvai išreikšti savo tapatybę per savo vardo ir pavardės naudojimą. Ypač Europoje bendrosios teisės požiūris šiuo klausimu labai skyrėsi nuo civilinės teisės krypties. Straipsnyje aptariami svarbiausi pastarojo laikotarpio pasaulio ir Europos jurisprudencijos pokyčiai, atskleidžiantys, kad vis daugiau dėmesio skiriama asmens tapatybės svarbai. Tai reiškia, kad labiausiai pažeidžiamų visuomenės grupių, tokių kaip antai vaikai, moterys ir mažumos, atstovai turi turėti teisę, kad jų vardai valstybės valdžios institucijose būtų pripažįstami ir naudojami, o nebūtų verčiami priimti valstybės institucijos nustatytą oficialiai priimtiną vardo variantą

Human rights and a person's name : legal trends and challenges

The absence of a specific right to one’s own name in early international human rights treaties seems perplexing in the twenty-first century until one appreciates the historical and legal contexts which initially made this omission almost unavoidable. The growing importance of human rights in international law, of the obligation to recognize and respect individual identity, as well as the generality of certain human rights standards such as the prohibition of discrimination, the right to private life, and the right to a name, have led to an evolution in the understanding and interpretation of these standards in more recent years. It is now increasingly accepted in international law and state practice that individuals are generally entitled to state recognition and use of their own names—including names in a language which may not be official.http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/index.htmlhb201

Langues officielles versus droits linguistiques : l’un exclut-il l’autre ?

Il est souvent pris pour acquis dans de nombreux pays que le choix d’une langue officielle relève uniquement de la prérogative de l’État, ce que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et le Comité des droits de l’homme de l’ONU semblent avoir tous deux confirmé à quelques reprises. Il demeure néanmoins un point de litige à la fois fondamental et pourtant très mal compris, souvent tant par les gouvernements en cause que les juristes eux-mêmes : que se passe-t-il lorsque les textes de loi portant sur le choix d’une ou quelques langue(s) officielle(s) excluent, ou même dans certains cas extrêmes « criminalisent »l’utilisation d’une autre langue, même dans un contexte familial ou privé ? Cet article tente de répondre à cette question en démontrant comment et pourquoi – si le choix d’une langue officielle relève bel et bien de la prérogative de l’État – cela ne permet pas pour autant à un gouvernement de faire fi du droit international, et en particulier des droits de l’homme. Ainsi, là où la mise d’un œuvre d’un droit fondamental comme la liberté d’expression ou l’interdiction de la discrimination fondée sur la langue aurait indirectement pour effet de créer un « droit linguistique », ce droit primerait sur la disposition nationale en matière de langue officielle. Un tel résultat, s’il est en train de s’établir au niveau de la jurisprudence internationale, n’en demeure pas moins difficile à accepter pour certains intervenants.Several countries take for granted the fact that the choice of an official language is a State exclusive prerogative. This was confirmed by both the European Court of Human Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee on several occasions. There remains however a matter of dispute altogether fundamental and yet often quite misunderstood by some governments as well as by jurists themselves. Indeed, what happens when legislations on the choice of one or more official language(s) exclude or even in some extreme cases « criminalise »the use of another language even within a domestic or private context? This paper attempts to provide an answer to this question by establishing how and why – although the choice of an official language indeed constitutes a prerogative of the State– it doesn’t imply a government to trespass the international law, especially the human rights. Thus, wherever the implementation of a fundamental right such as freedom of expression or forbiddance of discrimination based on language would have the indirect effect of creating a « linguistic right », this right would prevail on the national stipulations regarding official language(s). The resulting establishment of a jurisprudence at the international level remains, however a matter some stakeholders have difficulty to agree upon

Langues officielles versus droits linguistiques : l’un exclut-il l’autre ?

Several countries take for granted the fact that the choice of an official language is a State exclusive prerogative. This was confirmed by both the European Court of Human Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee on several occasions. There remains however a matter of dispute altogether fundamental and yet often quite misunderstood by some governments as well as by jurists themselves. Indeed, what happens when legislations on the choice of one or more official language(s) exclude or even in some extreme cases « criminalise »the use of another language even within a domestic or private context? This paper attempts to provide an answer to this question by establishing how and why – although the choice of an official language indeed constitutes a prerogative of the State– it doesn’t imply a government to trespass the international law, especially the human rights. Thus, wherever the implementation of a fundamental right such as freedom of expression or forbiddance of discrimination based on language would have the indirect effect of creating a « linguistic right », this right would prevail on the national stipulations regarding official language(s). The resulting establishment of a jurisprudence at the international level remains, however a matter some stakeholders have difficulty to agree upon

Langues officielles versus droits linguistiques : l’un exclut-il l’autre ?

Il est souvent pris pour acquis dans de nombreux pays que le choix d’une langue officielle relève uniquement de la prérogative de l’État, ce que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et le Comité des droits de l’homme de l’ONU semblent avoir tous deux confirmé à quelques reprises. Il demeure néanmoins un point de litige à la fois fondamental et pourtant très mal compris, souvent tant par les gouvernements en cause que les juristes eux-mêmes : que se passe-t-il lorsque les textes de loi portant sur le choix d’une ou quelques langue(s) officielle(s) excluent, ou même dans certains cas extrêmes « criminalisent »l’utilisation d’une autre langue, même dans un contexte familial ou privé ? Cet article tente de répondre à cette question en démontrant comment et pourquoi – si le choix d’une langue officielle relève bel et bien de la prérogative de l’État – cela ne permet pas pour autant à un gouvernement de faire fi du droit international, et en particulier des droits de l’homme. Ainsi, là où la mise d’un œuvre d’un droit fondamental comme la liberté d’expression ou l’interdiction de la discrimination fondée sur la langue aurait indirectement pour effet de créer un « droit linguistique », ce droit primerait sur la disposition nationale en matière de langue officielle. Un tel résultat, s’il est en train de s’établir au niveau de la jurisprudence internationale, n’en demeure pas moins difficile à accepter pour certains intervenants.Several countries take for granted the fact that the choice of an official language is a State exclusive prerogative. This was confirmed by both the European Court of Human Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee on several occasions. There remains however a matter of dispute altogether fundamental and yet often quite misunderstood by some governments as well as by jurists themselves. Indeed, what happens when legislations on the choice of one or more official language(s) exclude or even in some extreme cases « criminalise »the use of another language even within a domestic or private context? This paper attempts to provide an answer to this question by establishing how and why – although the choice of an official language indeed constitutes a prerogative of the State– it doesn’t imply a government to trespass the international law, especially the human rights. Thus, wherever the implementation of a fundamental right such as freedom of expression or forbiddance of discrimination based on language would have the indirect effect of creating a « linguistic right », this right would prevail on the national stipulations regarding official language(s). The resulting establishment of a jurisprudence at the international level remains, however a matter some stakeholders have difficulty to agree upon

Lingua, diritti e opportunità: O della lingua nell’inclusione e nell’esclusione delle popolazioni indigene*

Nel corso della storia, nella maggior parte del mondo, i popoli indigeni sono stati soggiogati e marginalizzati dagli stati europei e coloniali, spesso attraverso misure legali che hanno portato alla loro esclusione e privazione dei diritti. Uno dei mezzi utilizzati in questi processi è stata l’imposizione della lingua dei conquistatori e pertanto l’eliminazione delle lingue indigene dalle sfere pubbliche. Questo articolo si pone l’obiettivo, da un lato, di illustrare l’uso della lingua come mezzo di marginalizzazione dei popoli indigeni e, dall’altro, di esaminare il mutato apprezzamento dell’impatto di un numero di disposizioni in materia di diritti umani sull’uso della lingua. Questo articolo fornisce inoltre una spiegazione del motivo per cui la lingua stessa e ulteriori standard sui diritti umani, in modo particolare il divieto di discriminazione in base alla lingua e in altre aree di preferenza nazionale, potrebbero costituire un potenziale significativo per la protezione di un numero di aree di interesse di particolare significato per i popoli indigeni. Si conclude pertanto che questo non solo rappresenti un potenziale in termini di cultura, identità o istruzione, ma che possa anche conferire pieni poteri ai popoli indigeni perfino in termini di opportunità di lavoro e di rappresentanza in istituzioni nazionali