The Soviet Union and China in the 1980s: reconciliation and divorce

This article discusses Soviet and Chinese reforms and foreign policies in the 1980s in comparative perspective, in the light of recent archival findings. Ideological rivalry, the main driver of the Sino-Soviet tensions, disappeared and new interests of Beijing and Moscow pushed the two communist countries towards normalisation of relations. The role of geopolitics, security interests, and memories of the past played the role in the Sino-Soviet relations, but this role was secondary to the strategies of reforms and modernisation. Ultimately, the reformist aspirations in both countries pulled them towards the US-led global capitalist system, not towards each other. The article argues that key policy choices by Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev, which made possible China’s rise and the Soviet Union’s collapse, can be better understood in the comparative perspective

American Culture and Anti-Americanism in Russia

The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.The Slavic Center is organizing a symposium on “American Culture and Anti-Americanism in Russia” to be held on 7 May 2004 from 2:30-5:00 at the Mershon Center. This event is part of a series of symposia exploring the impact of American culture on various regions of the world. Each of the five area studies centers at OSU, in cooperating with the Mershon Center, will host a meeting dealing with its respective region. Last quarter the Middle East Center organized such a symposium. This quarter the Slavic Center invites a former diplomat, a sociologist, and a political scientist to participate in a panel focused on the impact of American culture on Russian culture and anti- Americanism emerging since the end of the Cold War.Ohio State University. Center for Slavic and East European StudiesOhio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent webpage, event summary, phot

An abiding antagonism: realism, idealism, and the mirage of western-Russian partnership after of the Cold War

Europe’s security environment is critically dependent on nature of the relationship between Russia and the broader west. What are the obstacles in the way of a stable partnership? Against the conventional wisdom that foregrounds domestic politics, we establish the importance of an abiding clash of definitions of national interest on both sides. The US and Russian strategic perspectives draw on the modern historical experience of both sides, are consistent with well-established international relations theories and are independent of particular personalities such as Putin’s. We demonstrate that though personalities, ideas, and contingency played their roles, these basic clashing perspectives existed even during the euphoric days of the Cold War’s end. Success in negotiating an improvement of US-Russian relations will require a pragmatic compromise between deeply divergent interests. Stable economic and political relations may be possible, but the first step in attaining it is recognizing the scale of the challenge

‘Do not think I am soft …’: Leonid Brezhnev

Leonid Brezhnev stood at the helm of the Soviet Union when that country was at the peak of its power. The summits where Brezhnev negotiated with US presidents and other Western leaders were milestones of world diplomacy. Yet when Brezhnev died in November 1982 at the age of 75, there was not a comprehensive biography of the man. And so it has remained since. Simply put, Brezhnev’s personality has failed to attract historians. Russian historian Dmitry Volkogonov in his essay on Brezhnev portrayed him as the blandest and most one-dimensional of all Soviet leaders, to whom he attributed ‘the psychology of a middle-rank party bureaucrat — vainglorious, cautious, conservative personality’. A few ripples of revisionism have perturbed the quiet pond of historiography about his years: historians began to argue that ‘early’ Brezhnev was an energetic and effective leader, promoted a set of strategic policies in domestic and foreign affairs, and deserves more than a footnote in the study of Soviet leadership. Still, even though the Brezhnev years are better researched, the personality is not.

With his back against the wall: Gorbachev, Soviet demise, and German reunification

This article argues that Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage conducted their policy on the German Question in the situation of the rapidly accelerating Soviet political and financial crisis. Therefore, their foreign policy can only be understood through the prism of domestic concerns and circumstances