The structure of ownership and corporate governance: The case of Chinese listed companies

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.Modern companies have made a great contribution to the development of the economy. However, the company is not a perfect organization - modern companies, particularly listed companies, suffer from agency problems, in the form of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and shareholders and other stakeholders. ' These agency problems form the core subject matter of the corporate governance debates that have attracted the attention of governments, international organizations, and scholars in the fields of economics, law, politics, management and other areas. The type of agency problem that arises is determined by the structure of share ownership. Where the structure of share ownership is concentrated, the agency problem takes the form of a conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, whereas where the structure of share ownership is dispersed the agency problem takes the form of a conflict between management and shareholders. The appropriate model of corporate governance follows from this. The structure of share ownership is concentrated in some countries or regions of the world and dispersed in others, depending on the economic, political, legal, historical and cultural circumstances. There is no single perfect model of corporate governance, but different models appropriate to different countries or regions, in the light of the structure of share ownership. The case of Chinese listed companies will be examined to illustrate the argument, and in particular to contrast it with the "law matters" and the "politics matters" theories. The major problem of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies is the agency problem characteristic of concentrated ownership, of a conflict between the majority shareholder and minority shareholders. The problem in China is compounded by the fact that the majority shareholder is in most cases the state. Although the structure of ownership is affected by many factors, such as the economy, politics, law, culture and history, today the main determinant of the development of the economy will be the change of the structure of share ownership from concentrated share ownership by the state to relatively dispersed ownership

Trajectory planning of jumping over an obstacle for one-legged jumping robot

For one-legged passive jumping robot, a trajectory planning strategy is developed to jump over an obstacle integrating three various dynamics among jumping process. Manipulability ellipsoids are effective tools to perform task space analysis and motion optimization of redundant manipulators. Jumping robot can be considered as a redundant manipulator with a load held at the end-effector. The concept of inertia matching ellipsoid and directional manipulability is extended to optimize the take-off posture of jumping robot, and the optimized results have been used to plan jumping trajectory. Aimed at the sensitivity of a trajectory to constraint conditions on point-to-point motion planning, the 6th order polynomial function is proposed to plan jumping motion having a better robustness to the parameters change of constraint conditions than traditional 5th order polynomial function. In order to lift the foot over the obstacle, correction functions are constructed under unchanged boundary constraint conditions. Furthermore, the body posture is controlled based on internal motion dynamics and steady-state consecutive jumping motion principle. A prototype model is designed, and the effectiveness of the proposed method is confirmed via simulations performed on parameters of designed prototype

The structure of ownership and corporate governance : the case of Chinese listed companies

Modern companies have made a great contribution to the development of the economy. However, the company is not a perfect organization - modern companies, particularly listed companies, suffer from agency problems, in the form of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and shareholders and other stakeholders. ' These agency problems form the core subject matter of the corporate governance debates that have attracted the attention of governments, international organizations, and scholars in the fields of economics, law, politics, management and other areas. The type of agency problem that arises is determined by the structure of share ownership. Where the structure of share ownership is concentrated, the agency problem takes the form of a conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, whereas where the structure of share ownership is dispersed the agency problem takes the form of a conflict between management and shareholders. The appropriate model of corporate governance follows from this. The structure of share ownership is concentrated in some countries or regions of the world and dispersed in others, depending on the economic, political, legal, historical and cultural circumstances. There is no single perfect model of corporate governance, but different models appropriate to different countries or regions, in the light of the structure of share ownership. The case of Chinese listed companies will be examined to illustrate the argument, and in particular to contrast it with the "law matters" and the "politics matters" theories. The major problem of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies is the agency problem characteristic of concentrated ownership, of a conflict between the majority shareholder and minority shareholders. The problem in China is compounded by the fact that the majority shareholder is in most cases the state. Although the structure of ownership is affected by many factors, such as the economy, politics, law, culture and history, today the main determinant of the development of the economy will be the change of the structure of share ownership from concentrated share ownership by the state to relatively dispersed ownership.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

GWASpro: A High-Performance Genome-Wide Association Analysis Server

We present GWASpro, a high-performance web server for the analyses of large-scale genome-wide association studies (GWAS). GWASpro was developed to provide data analyses for large-scale molecular genetic data, coupled with complex replicated experimental designs such as found in plant science investigations, and to overcome the steep learning curves of existing GWAS software tools. GWASpro supports building complex design matrices, by which complex experimental designs that may include replications, treatments, locations and times, can be accounted for in the linear mixed model (LMM). GWASpro is optimized to handle GWAS data that may consist of up to 10 million markers and 10,000 samples from replicable lines or hybrids. GWASpro provides an interface that significantly reduces the learning curve for new GWAS investigators

Type-I-IFN-Stimulated Gene TRIM5γ Inhibits HBV Replication by Promoting HBx Degradation

To understand the molecular mechanisms that mediate the anti-hepatitis B virus (HBV) effect of interferon (IFN) therapy, we conduct highthroughput bimolecular fluorescence complementation screening to identify potential physical interactions between the HBx protein and 145 IFNstimulated genes (ISGs). Seven HBx-interacting ISGs have consistent and significant inhibitory effects on HBV replication, among which TRIM5g suppresses HBV replication by promoting K48-linked ubiquitination and degradation of the HBx protein on the K95 ubiquitin site. The B-Box domain of TRIM5g under overexpression conditions is sufficient to trigger HBx degradation and is responsible both for interacting with HBx and recruiting TRIM31, which is an ubiquitin ligase that triggers HBx ubiquitination. High expression levels of TRIM5g in IFN-a-treated HBV patients might indicate a better therapeutic effect. Thus, our studies identify a crucial role for TRIM5g and TRIM31 in promoting HBx degradation, which may facilitate the development of therapeutic agents for the treatment of patients with IFN-resistant HBV infection