Local government in Ethiopia: adequately empowered?

Magister Legum - LL

Local government in Ethiopia: still an apparatus of control?

Historically, local authorities in Ethiopia enjoyed wide political, administrative, judicial, and financial autonomy. However, from the 1850s a process of territorial expansion and centralisation was initiated in the country. The centralisation process reached its zenith under the rule of Colonel Mengistu in the 1980s. This centralisation gradually diminished the autonomy of local authorities which incrementally became structures of control of the central government. Local authorities were used to actively suppress resistance against the central government, extract revenue in the form of tax and tribute, mobilise free labour, and even act as agents to conscript for the army. This policy and practice continued until Colonel Mengistu was ousted by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991. Soon after seizing power, the EPRDF declared its intention to reverse the century-long centralised rule and introduced a semi-federal structure in the country in 1991. Ethiopia officially became a federal country in 1995 following the promulgation of a new Constitution. In 2001 a local level decentralisation programme was initiated. The decentralisation programme included the establishment of elected local government structures and the devolution of certain political, administrative and financial powers to local government. This paper seeks to demonstrate how local authorities were used as a means of control in the past. While a decentralised system of governance has formally been introduced in Ethiopia, this paper argues that local authorities still remain instruments of political control by the central government. In so doing it highlights the factors that continue the trend of central control of local government despite extensive formal decentralisation.Department of HE and Training approved lis

Decentralisation, development and accommodation of ethnic minorities: the case of Ethiopia

Doctor Legum - LLDDecentralisation of political, financial, and administrative powers to sub-national units has been, and remains to be, a major trend in both developing and developed states. Very often decentralisation is not optional for a state. However, a state has the option to choose what to achieve through its decentralisation programme. After choosing what it intends to achieve through its decentralisation programme, a state may design it in such a way that it may attain the intended purpose. Many countries design their decentralisation programmes with the purpose of ‘deepening’ democracy and empowering their citizens. Other states decentralise power with the purpose of achieving development. They do so based on the postulate that development is preferable when it is achieved through the participation of those who benefit from it and that decentralisation enhances the extent and quality of citizen’s direct and indirect participation. States also decentralise powers based on the assumption that decentralisation brings efficiency in planning and implementing development projects. Several states also use their decentralisation programme to respond to the ethnic, religious, or other diversities of their people. They use territorial and non-territorial arrangement to accommodate the diversity of their people. Therefore, in some cases they create ethnically structured regional and local units and transfer to such unit political powers including the power to decide on cultural matters. Like in so many countries, the wind of decentralisation has blown over Ethiopia. The country has been implementing a decentralisation programme starting from 1991. Ethiopia has selected to achieve two principal purposes through its decentralisation programme namely, to achieve development and to respond to the ethnic diversity of its people. It is axiomatic that the success of a decentralisation programme, whether for achieving development or accommodating ethnic diversity, is greatly impacted on by its institutional design. This thesis, therefore, examines whether Ethiopia’s decentralisation programme incorporates the institutional features that are likely to impact the success of the decentralisation programme for achieving its intended purposes

Constitutionalism and electoral authoritarianism in Ethiopia: From EPRDF to EPP

Ethiopia has had little experience of democratic political systems. For centuries it was a monarchy, ruled by successive emperors who traced their political authority to divine sources as opposed to the people.1 Although Emperor Haile Selassie promulgated Ethiopia’s first constitution in 1931, which was revised in 1955, it was meant more to constitutionalize his autocratic rule rather than entrench a democratic system. Indeed, the constitution established a bicameral parliament with a chamber of deputies (the lower house) and a senate (the upper house).2 The house of deputies was composed of elected representatives; however, the elections were held on non-partisan basis, since forming a political organization was not then allowed. Moreover, only those owning property in the relevant electoral districts could run as candidates in the elections to the chamber of deputies.3 The Emperor retained the prerogative to select members of the senate.

The state of political inclusion of ethnic communities under Kenya’s devolved system

No Abstract

The politics of sub-national constitutions and local government in Ethiopia

The paper first describes the institutional structures, powers and functions of Ethiopia’s federal and state governments. This is followed by a brief discussion of the ethnic, social, and economic contexts of the regional states, after which an overview is provided of the structure, functions and powers of local government in Ethiopia. The paper then discusses the political circumstances that led to the involvement of the EPRDFdominated federal government in the process of establishing local government, the role that the government played and the consequences thereof.The federal Constitution of Ethiopia provides the regional states - the constituent unit of the federation –with the power to draft, adopt and amend their own constitutions, thereby allowing each of the regional states to use its constitution, among others, to design and adopt a system and structure of local government fitting to its circumstances. This is particularly important since the regional states differ from each other in terms of territorial size, ethnic composition and economic and social circumstances, making a one-size-fits-all approach inappropriate to the design of local government. Nevertheless, all levels of government in Ethiopia are controlled, directly or indirectly, by one party; the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF). Not only does it control all levels of government, the party has a highly centralised decision-making system founded on the principle of ‘democratic centralism’. Under this system, the party’s regional and local structures, which also control government institutions at those levels, are involved only in the execution of decisions passed by the centre. Given such a context, the establishment and empowerment of local government – which took place in two phases – were driven from the centre. The process of establishing local government was influenced by the political exigencies the ruling party faced at particular times and the choices it made in reaction to them. This has undermined the role of the regional states and the relevance of their constitutions in creating local government systems appropriate to their circumstances

EPRDF’s ‘menu of institutional manipulations’ and the 2015 regional elections

The paper begins with a discussion of what electoral authoritarians are, why they hold elections and the ‘menu of institutional manipulations’ they employ to retain their incumbency. It then deals with the political and institutional context within which the 2015 regional election was held. It introduces the political structures of the nine regions followed by a brief discussion of the political parties and the electoral system in use in the country. After outlining the results of the 2015 regional election, the paper turns to EPRDF’s ‘menus of institutional manipulations’ that help it sustain its dominance. Finally, it discusses the party’s notion of vanguardism that drives its electoral authoritarianism.Ethiopia is generally considered to have ‘a dominant party authoritarian’ system in which the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), along with its affiliates, enjoy electoral dominance. This contribution argues that EPRDF’s electoral dominance in the 2015 regional elections, indeed in all the elections held in the past two decades, is partly the result of the party’s use of what Schedler refers to ‘menu of institutional manipulations’ including electoral rules, government agencies, local authorities and even civil society organizations, to maintain its dominance. The semi-consociational system that guides the relationships of the constituent parties of EPRDF also provides the latter an electoral edge over the opposition parties which are often fragmented. The paper further argues that EPRDF’s vanguardist self-view, which is an offshoot of its ‘revolutionary democracy’ ideology, underpins its drive to be a dominant party and to use all of the institutional manipulations under its disposal

The Judiciary in Federal Systems in Africa

Eight states in Africa that have federal or federal-type government systems and most of these federations emerged in the post-Cold War period. The African federations are in various degrees characterised by a limited extent of self-rule and the concentration of power at the centre. The question this article addresses is whether, and if so, how, the federal character of the state organisation impacts on the administration of justice. In other words, is the judicial branch of government also part of the federal arrangements, and if so, how has that been manifested? Four sub-questions are posed in this regard. First, does the structure of the judicial institutions also follow the vertical division of powers between the central and subnational governments? Secondly, given the non-centrist or centrist structure of the courts, how are judges appointed? Thirdly, as language and ethnic diversity are often the key reasons for the establishment of federal arrangements, how is the language question dealt within in the administration of justice? Finally, what role have the courts played in realisation of the federal character of the state

Intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa and the role of the Financial and Fiscal Commission: A 20 year review

The Finance and Fiscal Commission is government’s primary advisor with regard to intergovernmental fiscal relations. Its constitutional entrenchment and establishment in 1994 signalled that the post‐apartheid government took serious the commonly held wisdom that national decisions on intergovernmental fiscal matters must be discussed between governments, that they must be evidence‐based and that intergovernmental fiscal relations must be reasonably predictable. This paper reviews the history of the Commission to mark its 20th Anniversary. The paper combines a thematic and a chronological approach. It contains a narrative of the development of the Commission since its establishment, which traces the development of the Commission from its conceptualisation and inception to the most recent initiatives and policy debates. It rekindles some of the debates that surrounded the inclusion of the Commission in the Constitution and the policy process that underpinned the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act of 1997 and assesses how this role unfolded in the subsequent years. Throughout this narrative, three dimensions are addressed. The first relates to the location of the Commission in the intergovernmental system, in other words the relationships between the Commission and the various component parts of the South African multilevel government system. The second dimension is concerned with the impact that the Commission has made on decision making in the realm of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Was the Commission taken seriously? To what extend did its recommendations influence government policy? The third theme examines the Commission as an institution and assesses its governance and administrative performance, given the importance of these themes in asserting the Commission’s enduring relevance and impact. In examining these themes, comparisons with comparable multilevel government systems are made as and when relevant. The authors reviewed a range of current and historic document, including annual reports, submissions, discussion documents and selected academic literature. In addition, ten indepth interviews were conducted with current commissioners, past commissioners, Commission staff, officials representing (organised) local government, Parliament and provincial government