Central Unification versus Local Diversity: China’s Tax Regime, 1980s-2000s

This article firstly present a systematic overview on national tax regime by classifying China’s tax regime into three broad phases in context of underpinning market-oriented institutional development during last two decades and, then, in supplement to previous literatures that largely stop at provincial level, unveil the complex and obscure local tax regime based on sub-provincial field research in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province. The authors observed dual existing tax regimes: the hard and standardized state tax regime under central custody versus de facto soft and flexible local tax regime under local promotion and argue that despite central persisting initiatives in unifying tax regime and recentralization, local variation and divergence continue to play indispensable role in implementation of central reform due to China’s sheer size, geographical, cultural and resource endowment disparity as well as local state’s self-interest seeking inevitably induces localized adaptation of central policy and, consequently, calls for further decentralization

China’s Emerging Tax Regime: Local Tax Farming and Central Tax Bureaucracy

China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax system compatible with a market economy, in particular, an efficient tax administration system with capable tax bureaucrats. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which central government attempts to accompany economic transformation via tax farming to tax bureaucratisation in tax administration. Based on empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China’s fiscal federalism cannot be analysed and argues that China’s emerging tax system depends on the institutional and organizational design that shapes the interaction between central government, local governments and economic agents

Mycoflora associated with cocoa (Theobroma cacao) pods in Cameroon and antifungal effect of plant extracts

Mycoflora associated with the pod rot disease of cocoa (Theobroma cacao) and evaluation of the in vitro efficacy of aqueous and ethanolic extracts of A. conyzoïdes and Chromolaena odorata against the pathogenic fungi, C. gloeosporioides and B. theobromae, isolated from cocoa pods were investigated. After isolation, the fungal species were exposed to various concentrations (5 ; 10 ; 15 ; 20 mg/ml) of aqueous, and ethanolic (1.25 ; 2.5 ; 5 ; 10 mg/ml) extracts. Results obtained showed some variations in isolation frequency of fungi from cocoa pods of each locality. Aspergillus, Colletotrichum, Botryodiplodia, Trichoderma and Verticillium were the most common genera that colonized the cocoa pods from Akonolinga and Tonga with different incidences. Colletotrichum gloeosporioides was present (48.84%) in pods collected in Tonga and in those from Akonolinga (41.46%), followed by Botryodiplodia theobromae which was present on 20.93% and 29.27% respectively. All the used concentrations of extracts of both plants significantly reduced the growth of the fungal pathogens. For ethanolic extracts, Ageratum conyzoïdes completely (100%) inhibited the growth of both fungi at 10 mg/ml and for Chromolaena odorata, total (100%) inhibition was observed on B. theobromae at 5 mg/ml while C. gloeosporioides was completely inhibited at 10 mg/ml. In the case of aqueous extracts, Chromolaena odorata, completely (100%) inhibited the growth of B. theobromae and C. gloeosporioides at 20 mg/ml. Similarly, Ageratum conyzoïdes completely suppressed the growth of B. theobromae at 20 mg/ml, however, this dose was obtained as an inhibition of 78% of C. gloeosporioides. Further investigation of the isolation of active antifungal compound should be done

China’s emerging tax regime: Devolution, fiscal federalism, or tax farming?

China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax regime compatible with a market economy. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which national legislation attempts to accompany economic transformation. Based on an empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China’s fiscal federalism cannot be analysed. This paper argues that China’s emerging tax regime depends on the institutional design that shapes the interaction between firms (as major tax payers at the local level), local government agencies, and the national tax administration

Essays on China's Tax System

Het belastingsysteem is een van de beste startpunten voor een onderzoek naar China's transitie omdat de transformatie van een maatschappij altijd gepaard gaat met snelle veranderingen in het oude fiscale regime. Dit boek ziet de centrale overheid, lokale overheden en ondernemingen als de drie grote spelers en laat zien dat interactie tussen deze drie spelers heeft geleid tot China's unieke, "centraal-lokaal tweesporige" belastingsysteem. De centrale overheid mobiliseert lokale overheden door fiscale decentralisatie, wat resulteert in toenemende lokale autonomie en hen drijft tot maximalisatie van lokale belastingopbrengsten. Zij concurreren voor mobiele belasting bases ondernemingen door het lokale belastingbeleid te manipuleren. Dus, in tegenstelling tot een formeel en gestandaardiseerd nationaal belastingsysteem dat gecontroleerd wordt door de centrale overheid, worden informele en flexibele lokale belastingsystemen geleid door lokale overheden. Dit boek bevat vier essays. Het eerste essay analyseert systematisch de evolutie en huidige status van China's belastingsysteem. Het illustreert hoe de formele en informele interactie tussen de centrale overheid, lokale overheden en ondernemingen vorm geeft aan de instituties van China's belastingsysteem. Het tweede essay onderzoekt de interactie tussen de eerstgenoemde twee spelers in fiscale decentralisatie en laat zien dat deze de grootte van de overheid beperkt. Het derde essay modelleert de interactie tussen de laatstgenoemde twee spelers in een onderhandelingsspel waarin een onderneming een exit en voice strategie gebruikt om te onderhandelen met een lokale overheid voor gunstige belastingen en verklaart daarmee de diversiteit in lokale belastingsystemen. Het laatste essay modelleert de veranderingen van het belastingsysteem als een interactie tussen de drie spelers onder varierende economische, politieke en sociale beperkingen; de veranderingen bereiken een evenwicht waarin efficiency, macht en legitimiteit in balans zijn.The tax system is one of the best starting points for investigating China's transitional course because the transformation of a society always involves rapid changes in its old fiscal regime. Seeing central government, local governments and firms as three major players, this dissertation shows that interactions between them lead to the emergence of China's unique "central-local dual-track" tax system. The central government mobilizes local governments by fiscal decentralization, which results in growing local autonomy and thus drives them to maximize local tax revenues. They compete for mobile tax bases firms by manipulating local tax policies. Thus, in contrast to a formal and standardized national tax system overseen by the central government, informal and flexible local tax systems are operated by local governments. This dissertation consists of four essays. The first essay systematically analyzes the evolution history and status quo of China's tax system, which illustrates that the formal and informal interaction between the central government, local governments and firms shapes the institution building process of China's tax system. The second essay, then, examines the interaction between the former two players in fiscal decentralization and finds that it curtails the expansion of government size. The third essay models the interaction between the latter two players by a bargaining game in which a firm employs an exit and voice strategy to bargain with a local government for preferential tax treatments and thus explains the diversity of local tax systems. The last essay models changes of the tax system as a result of interaction between the above three players under va

Rational Entrepreneurship in Local China: Exit Plus Voice for Preferential Tax Treatments

Bearing the legacy from central-planned system, the tax system in local China still lacks transparency and, in many cases, the liabilities of firms, especially those with extensive influences, are subject to negotiation despite the new tax-reform 1994. Applying Hirschman’s Exit-Voice theory, we construct a game model of interplay between firm and local government, in terms of exit and voice for preferential tax treatments, thereby revealing dynamics of these two options under rational entrepreneurship of economizing transaction cost. Suggested by the model, exit not only induces firm to opt for voice, it also underpins firm’s voice that forces local government to compromise. Particularly, when holding private information of exit cost, firm is able to mimic behaviors of those with high mobility so as to boost the effectiveness of voice. The empirical cases fully illustrate such rational entrepreneurship of exit plus voice to profit from local preferential policy