On the Lifecycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital- and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms

We use a new data set that tracks U.S. firms from their birth over two decades to understand the life cycle dynamics and outcomes (both successes and failures) of VC- and non-VC financed firms. We first ask to what market-wide and firm-level characteristics venture capitalists respond in choosing to make their investments and how this differs for firms financed solely by non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital. We then ask what are the eventual differences in outcomes for firms that receive VC financing relative to non-VC-financed firms. Our findings suggest that VCs follow public market signals similar to other investors and typically invest largely in young firms, with potential for large scale being an important criterion. The main way that VC financed firms differ from matched non-VC financed firms, is they demonstrate remarkably larger scale both for successful and failed firms, at every point of the firms' life cycle. They grow more rapidly, but we see little difference in profitability measures at times of exit. We further examine a number of hypotheses relating to VC-financed firms' failure. We find that VC-financed firms' cumulative failure rates are lower than non-VC-financed firms but the story is nuanced. VC appears initially "patient" in that VC-financed firms are less likely to fail in the first five years but conditional on surviving past this point become more likely to fail relative to non-VC-financed firms. We perform a number of robustness checks and find that VC does not appear to have more stringent survival thresholds nor do VC-financed firm failures appear to be disguised as acquisitions nor do particular kinds of VC firms seem to be driving our results. Overall, our analysis supports the view that VC is "patient" capital relative to other non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital in the early part of firms' lifecycles and that an important criterion for receiving VC investment is potential for large scale, rather than level of profitability, prior to exit.

Married to the firm? A large scale investigation of the social context of ownership

Research summary: Using a large sample of private firms across Europe, we examine how the social context of owners affects firm strategy and performance. Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that embeddedness in a family, in particular the nuclear family, can strengthen identification and commitment to the firm, but can also induce owners to behave more conservatively. Consistent with this argument, we find that family-owned firms have higher profit margins, returns on assets, and survival rates compared to single-owner or unrelated-owners' firms, but also invest and grow more slowly, hold greater reserves of cash, and rely less on external debt. These differences are most pronounced when the two largest shareholders are married. Our results highlight the key role of marital ties in explaining differences in behavior and performance among firms. Managerial summary: Despite the prevalence of the married-couple ownership structure in firms, little research has been dedicated to understanding how these firms are managed and perform. We examine the behavior and performance of firms owned by married couples in a large panel of closely held Western European firms. We find that married-owner family firms are managed more conservatively relative to firms with unrelated owners and even to other family-owned firms. In particular, married-owner family firms invest and grow more slowly and rely less on external finance. However, they also exhibit greater performance stability and higher profitability. Our findings suggest that social relationships among owners have a large impact on firm strategy and performance, and highlight some potential trade-offs to performance when married couples control firms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Essays in corporate finance and taxation

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliographical references.This dissertation is a collection of three essays which address several questions in corporate finance and taxation. The first essay uses a panel dataset of balance sheet and income information, taken from the tax returns of U.S. corporations, to study the relationship between bank competition and the financing of firms. Over the period 1987 to 1998, I find that in more competitive banking markets firms use less outside debt and more inside debt and equity than firms in less competitive banking markets. The evidence is consistent with models in which market power provides banks with implicit equity stakes in their borrowers, making banks more willing to begin lending relationships with borrowers whose projects are characterized by substantial asymmetric information or delayed payoffs. In the second essay, I reconsider the distortionary impact that the U.S. corporate and personal tax systems may have on organizational form choices by firms. I show that when Project choice is endogenous and when one considers the non-linear nature of the corporate tax schedule, it is not necessarily inefficient for a firm to choose to be a pass-through entity rather than a non-pass-through entity in response to differences in after-tax returns between the two entity types. I provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this theoretical point by examining the behavior of a sample of S corporations and C corporations. The third essay is co-authored with Daniel Bergstresser and James Poterba. In this essay, we use a panel dataset of mutual fund characteristics and returns from Morningstar, Inc. to develop measures of the effective capital gains tax burden mutual fund investors face on unrealized capital gains in mutual funds. We explore the determinants of the effective capital gains tax burdens and the impact they have on net inflows of savings into mutual funds.by Rebecca Elizabeth Zarutskie.Ph.D

Who Works for Startups? The Relation between Firm Age, Employee Age, and Growth

We present evidence that young employees are an important ingredient in the creation and growth of firms. Our results suggest that young employees possess attributes or skills, such as willingness to take risk or innovativeness, which make them relatively more valuable in young, high growth, firms. Young firms disproportionately hire young employees, controlling for firm size, industry, geography and time. Young employees in young firms command higher wages than young employees in older firms and earn wages that are relatively more equal to older employees within the same firm. Moreover, young employees disproportionately join young firms that subsequently exhibit higher growth and raise venture capital financing. Finally, we show that an increase in the regional supply of young workers increases the rate of new firm creation. Our results are relevant for investors and executives in young, high growth, firms, as well as policymakers interested in fostering entrepreneurship.

Acquiring Labor

We present evidence that some firms pursue M&A activity with the objective of obtaining a larger workforce. Firms most likely to be acquired for their large labor force, firms with the largest ex ante employment, are associated with more positive post-merger employment outcomes. Moreover, we find this relation is strongest when acquiring labor outside of an M&A is likely to be most difficult, due to tight labor conditions, or most valuable, in high human capital industries. We further find that high employment target firms are associated with relatively greater post-merger wage increases and lower post-merger employee turnover. We find no evidence that the positive relation between target ex ante employment and ex post employment change is driven by target asset size, market capitalization, industry, profitability or acquirer characteristics. Our findings do not exclude the possibility that a different subset of M&A activity may be motivated to penalize managers who have tolerated over-employment. Indeed, we find evidence consistent with this disciplinary motivation when considering acquisitions of targets in declining industries.

On the Lifecycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital- and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms

We use a new data set that tracks U.S. firms from their birth over two decades to understand the life cycle dynamics and outcomes (both successes and failures) of VC- and non-VC financed firms. We first ask to what market-wide and firm-level characteristics venture capitalists respond in choosing to make their investments and how this differs for firms financed solely by non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital. We then ask what are the eventual differences in outcomes for firms that receive VC financing relative to non-VC-financed firms. Our findings suggest that VCs follow public market signals similar to other investors and typically invest largely in young firms, with potential for large scale being an important criterion. The main way that VC financed firms differ from matched non-VC financed firms, is they demonstrate remarkably larger scale both for successful and failed firms, at every point of the firms’ life cycle. They grow more rapidly, but we see little difference in profitability measures at times of exit. We further examine a number of hypotheses relating to VC-financed firms’ failure. We find that VC-financed firms’ cumulative failure rates are lower than non-VC-financed firms but the story is nuanced. VC appears initially “patient” in that VC-financed firms are less likely to fail in the first five years but conditional on surviving past this point become more likely to fail relative to non-VC-financed firms. We perform a number of robustness checks and find that VC does not appear to have more stringent survival thresholds nor do VC-financed firm failures appear to be disguised as acquisitions nor do particular kinds of VC firms seem to be driving our results. Overall, our analysis supports the view that VC is “patient” capital relative to other non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital in the early part of firms’ lifecycles and that an important criterion for receiving VC investment is potential for large scale, rather than level of profitability, prior to exit.