The "New Keynesian" Phillips Curve: Closed Economy vs. Open Economy

The paper extends Woodford's (2000) analysis of the closed economy Phillips curve to an open economy with both commodity trade and capital mobility. We show that consumption smoothing, which comes with the opening of the capital market, raises the degree of strategic complementarity among monopolistically competitive suppliers, thus rendering prices more sticky and magnifying output responses to nominal GDP shocks.

Understanding the "Problem of Economic Development": The Role of Factor Mobility and International Taxation

The problem of economic development, as Lucas (1988) states it, is the problem of accounting for the observed diversity in levels and rates of growth of per capita income across countries and across time. We study conditions under which capital mobility and labor mobility (two seemingly income-equalizing forces) may interact with cross-country differences in income tax rates and income tax principles (two seemingly income-diverging forces) to generate such diversity. As a corollary, we also examine when countries with different initial endowments may finally converge in their income levels.

A Dynamic General Equilibrium Framework of Investment with Financing Constraint

In this paper, we provide a dynamic general equilibrium framework with an explicit investment-financing constraint. The constraint is intended as a reduced form to capture the balance sheet effects that have been widely regarded as an important determinant of financial crises. We derive a link between the value of the firm and social welfare. We find that the value of the firm can be greater with the constraint. Our model also sheds light on how the effects of productivity shocks and investors' misperception of productivity shocks may be amplified by the financing constraint.Investment Constraint, Value of the Firm

A Dynamic General Equilibrium Framework of Investment with Financing Constraint

In this paper, we provide a dynamic general equilibrium framework with an explicit investment-financing constraint. The constraint is intended as a reduced form to capture the balance sheet effects that have been widely regarded as an important determinant of financial crises. We derive a link between the value of a firm and social welfare. Using this link, we show the somewhat surprising possibility that the value of a firm can be greater with the constraint. Our model also sheds light on how the effects of productivity shocks and investors' misperception of productivity shocks may be amplified by the financing constraint. Copyright 2003, International Monetary Fund

Capital Income Taxation and Long Run Growth: New Perspectives

We study the effects of capital income taxation on long run growth in an endogenous growth framework with two distinguishing features: endogenous population and international capital mobility. Endogenizing population growth introduces a new channel for taxes to affect economic growth and enables us to discriminate the effects of taxes on total versus per capita income growth. Allowing for capital mobility in the open economy, we show how the effects of taxes on population growth and income growth across countries will vary in specific ways, depending on the international income tax regimes and the relative preference bias of people towards the 'quantity' and 'quality' of children. The numerical results based on our calibrated model for the G-7 also indicate that, although the effects of liberalizing capital flows on long run growth may not be very sizable, the growth effects of changes in capital income tax rates can be tremendously magnified by cross-border capital flows and cross-border spillovers of policy effects.

Do Debt Flows Crowd Out Equity Flows Or the Other Way Round?

In the presence of asymmetric information, the stage at which financing decisions are made about investment projects in a small open economy is crucial for the composition of international capital inflows as well as for the efficiency of channeling savings into investment. This paper compares the implications of two extreme cases regarding the information possessed by the firms at their financing stage for whether inflows of foreign debt may crowd out foreign equity or the other way round. The scope for corrective tax policies is examined. We also provide a welfare comparison between the two mechanisms of capital flows.

Do Debit Flows Crowd out Equity Flows or the other way Round?

In the presence of asymmetric information, the stage at which financing decisions are made about investment projects in a small open economy is crucial for the composition of international capital inflows as well as for the efficiency of channeling savings into investment. This paper compares the implications of two extreme cases regarding the information possessed by the firms at their financing stage for whether inflows of foreign debt may crowd out foreign equity or the other way round. The scope for corrective tax policies is examined. We also provide a welfare comparison between the two mechanisms of capital flows.debt and equity flows; asymmetric information; bankruptcy costs; market failures; corrective taxation

Why International Equity Inflows to Emerging Markets are Inefficient and Small Relative to International Debt Flows

This paper considers the financing of investment in the presence of asymmetric information between the 'insiders' and the 'outsiders' of the firms in a small open economy. It establishes a well-defined capital structure for the economy as a whole with the following features: low-productivity firms rely on the equity market to finance investment at a relatively low level; medium-productivity firms do not invest at all; and high-productivity firms rely on the debt market to finance investment at a relatively high level. It is shown that the debt market is efficient, with respect to both its scope and the amount of investment that each firm makes. However, the equity market fails: its scope is too narrow and the investment each firm makes is too little. A corrective policy requires just one instrument which is rather unconventional: lump-sum subsidies to those firms that choose to equity-finance their investment (i.e., equity-market-contingent grants).