American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged

Transatlantic Trade Policy: US Market Opening Strategies. European Policy Paper #1

[Introduction.] Since the 1950s, the European Community (EC) has been trying to build up a new independent legal and economic order. This exercise has been difficult and gradual. Indeed, each step forward in the build-up of the community's legal and economic order requires a new compromise formula between the member states--for example, between the free traders and the economic interventionists; between the more service-oriented, the more industrial-oriented, and the more agricultural economies; and between the richer and the poorer regions. Obviously, the Community is not developing in a vacuum. Since the Community is a major player in international trade relations, its development has an effect, not only within the EC, but also on third countries. Naturally, since Community measures also affect third countries, those third countries, including the United States (US), have been trying to influence or even control the final shape of the EC's legal and economic order. As Jeffrey Garten, the US Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, has recently explained, the US is determined to try and shape its trading partners' economic system in view of the US market opening objective. According to Garten, Washington would use its power to try to pry open markets even if it meant challenging "the very industrial organization of countries"(cited in Friedman, 1995). As a result, tension has developed between, on the one hand, the EC's sovereign right to set up its own legal order and, on the other, the outside world's interest in monitoring and influencing the EC's development. This paper examines this tension as it arises in the relationship between the Community and the United States. More specifically, the paper deals with the institutional strategies (multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral) used by the United States to monitor the EC's development and to keep the Common Market open for US exports. The main question is how far each of the institutional strategies was able to help resolve, or better, help prevent, "market opening" conflicts between the US and the EC. At the end of the paper, the current US market opening options toward the EC will be analyzed, including the recent suggestion to create a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

EU Decision-making after the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. European Policy Papers #9, July 2004

[From the Executive Summary]. This paper offers an institutional analysis of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. It identifies the Treaty-Constitution’s main implications for the decision-making process in the European Union (EU). While the aim was to streamline EU decision-making in light of the expansion from 15 to 25 Member States, the Treaty-Constitution is characterised by numerous safeguard mechanisms. These are designed to preserve a high degree of Member State control over what is decided in terms of new constitutional, legislative or budgetary commitments in the EU. Veto-rights and blocking options have been retained, notably in procedures for the adoption and revision of the Treaty-Constitution as well as in a number of crucial policy fields. This is unlikely to foster a dynamic decision-making process in an expanded European Union of 25 Member States

"US lobbying and influence on the internal market"

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European Union Law and Practice in the Negotiation and Conclusion of International Trade Agreements

As the world\u27s largest trading block, the European Union (EU) has committed itself to an ambitious strategy of enhancing trade with its strategic partners through the conclusion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The launching of negotiations between the EU and the United States for the conclusion of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement is part of this strategy. Understanding the EU\u27s law and practice in the negotiation and conclusion of such agreements is essential for the Union\u27s negotiating partners, who have often been puzzled by its decision-making complexity. Following a systematic presentation of the EU\u27s institutions and their legal functions in the making of trade agreements, this Article provides an in-depth and step-by-step analysis of the EU\u27s inter-institutional and legal practice in the negotiation and conclusion of international trade agreements. As such, this Article also constitutes a thorough assessment of the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon in the trade policy field. After almost three years of practice, it can be concluded that the enhanced role of the European Parliament in the making of trade agreements is the Lisbon Treaty\u27s most important change in this area. Far from being the disruptive element that a number of prominent legal scholars had predicted. Parliament has not only brought a much needed element of democratization and open political debate in EU trade policy making, it has also delivered proof of its added value, notably by reinforcing the preservation of fundamental rights. The next step should be for Parliament to gain a formal role in the determination of the EU\u27s negotiating directives