Peak-Hour Pricing Under Negative Externality: Impact of Customer Flexibility and Competitive Asymmetry

Several industries that provide services to customers (e.g., public utility and transportation) charge higher prices during peak hours to smooth demand. With technologies (e.g., electronic shelf labels) enabling retailers to change prices easily within each day, should supermarkets use peak-hour pricing? To examine this question formally, we introduce a stylized duopoly model in the presence of “negative externality,” where firms compete for congestion-averse customers. We characterize how customers endogenously segment themselves regarding when and where to shop, and then use the equilibrium outcomes to examine whether the firms should implement peak-hour pricing for varying types of customer flexibility and competitive asymmetry. Our analysis shows that, if customers are not flexible in their store choice, then both firms would always use peak-hour pricing. However, if store choice flexibility is present, then firms’ decisions depend on the competitive asymmetry as follows. If one firm has a clear competitive advantage (in terms of value or price) over the other firm, then the dominant firm will use peak-hour pricing, whereas the other firm will not. Otherwise, both firms will use peak-hour pricing if they engage in symmetric competition (in terms of similar value and price), or neither firm will use it if they engage in differentiated competition (high value versus low cost). Through our analysis of different extensions, we find that a firm’s ability to set its regular price would dampen the effect of peak-period pricing. Also, we obtain consistent results when there is heterogeneity in customer valuation and customer congestion aversion level

The Time–Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs: When to Hire the First Employee?

For many early-stage entrepreneurs, hiring the first employee is a critical step in the firm’s growth. Doing so often requires significant time and monetary investments. To understand the trade-offs involved in deciding when to hire the first employee and how hiring differs in entrepreneurial settings from more established firm settings, we present a simple growth model that depends on two critical inputs for revenue generation: the entrepreneur’s time and money. We show that without hiring, the entrepreneur’s time eventually becomes more valuable than money in contributing to the firm’s growth. In that context, the value of the employee is driven by how much relief he provides to the entrepreneur. We characterize the optimal timing of hiring in terms of the firm’s cash position and how the firm is affected if it requires an upfront fixed investment in time and/or money. We find that the upfront investment in time needed for hiring cannot be converted to an equivalent upfront investment in money and that mistiming hiring can be very costly, especially when these upfront investments are high

Can Third-Party Sellers Benefit from a Platform’s Entry to the Market?

Because of the informational advantage of online marketplaces (i.e., platforms), it is a common belief that a platform’s market entry will be detrimental to third-party sellers who sell similar products on the platform. To examine the validity of this belief, we conduct an exploratory analysis using the sales data for a single product category provided by JD.com for the month of March 2018. Our analysis reveals an unexpected result. Upon the platform’s entry, third-party sellers who sell similar products can afford to charge a higher price, obtain a higher demand, and earn a higher profit. To provide a plausible explanation for this unexpected exploratory result, we develop a duopoly model that incorporates the changing competitive dynamic before and after the platform’s entry. Specifically, before entry, the platform earns a commission (based on the seller’s revenue), whereas the seller sets its retail price as a monopoly. After entry, the platform earns a profit generated by its direct sales in addition to the commission from the seller. In addition, the seller and the platform operate in a duopoly and engage in a sequential game. By examining the equilibrium outcomes associated with this sequential game, we identify conditions under which the platform’s entry can create a win-win situation for both parties. Specifically, these conditions hold when the platform’s market potential is moderate and when the platform’s entry creates a sufficiently high spillover effect on the seller, providing a plausible explanation for our empirical finding that the seller can benefit from a platform’s entry

Time Allocation in Entrepreneurial Selling: Impact of Consumer Peer Learning and Incumbent Reaction

How should technology entrepreneurs allocate their time to potential customers? Considering two important dynamics that influence consumers’ purchase decisions regarding new technology products, consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction, we study the tactical-level time allocation decision with a simple game-theoretic model. We offer an economic rationale for the entrepreneur’s optimal time allocation for different levels of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction as well as different revenue distributions between the buyers, and we discuss theoretical and practical implications for technology entrepreneurship

Time Allocation in Entrepreneurial Selling: Impact of Consumer Peer Learning and Incumbent Reaction

How should technology entrepreneurs allocate their time to potential customers? Considering two important dynamics that influence consumers’ purchase decisions regarding new technology products, namely, consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction, we study the tactical-level time allocation decision with a simple game-theoretic model. We offer an economic rationale for the entrepreneur’s optimal time allocation for different levels of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction as well as different revenue distributions between the buyers, and we discuss theoretical and practical implications for technology entrepreneurship

The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs: When to Hire the First Employee?

For many early-stage entrepreneurs, hiring the first employee is a critical step in the firm’s growth. Doing so often requires significant time and monetary investments. To understand the trade-offs involved in deciding when to hire the first employee and how hiring differs in entrepreneurial settings from more established firm settings, we present a simple growth model that depends on two critical inputs for revenue generation: the entrepreneur’s time and money. We show that without hiring, the entrepreneur’s time eventually becomes more valuable than money in contributing to the firm’s growth. In that context, the value of the employee is driven by how much relief he provides to the entrepreneur. We characterize the optimal timing of hiring in terms of the firm’s cash position and how the firm is affected if it requires an upfront fixed investment in time and/or money. We find that the upfront investment in time needed for hiring cannot be converted to an equivalent upfront investment in money and that mistiming hiring can be very costly, especially when these upfront investments are high

Optimal Time Allocation for Process Improvement for Growth-Focused Entrepreneurs

For many entrepreneurs, time is a key constraint. They need to invest time to achieve growth, but also lose time because of recurring crises. We develop a simple stochastic dynamic program to model how an entrepreneur should prioritize between improving processes to reduce crises versus harvesting revenue or ensuring future growth. We show that it is initially optimal to prioritize process improvement: an entrepreneur should strive for high process quality early in the venture’s growth process. We numerically analyze a simple heuristic derived from this optimal policy and identify the conditions under which it is (or is not) effective. It performs near optimally except when process quality or revenue rate may deteriorate too fast or when the cost of process improvement or revenue enhancement is too high. Our work provides a theoretical foundation for the advice found in the popular entrepreneurship and time management literature to invest time now to save time later