Permutation-invariant qudit codes from polynomials

A permutation-invariant quantum code on $N$ qudits is any subspace stabilized by the matrix representation of the symmetric group $S_N$ as permutation matrices that permute the underlying $N$ subsystems. When each subsystem is a complex Euclidean space of dimension $q \ge 2$, any permutation-invariant code is a subspace of the symmetric subspace of $(\mathbb C^q)^N.$ We give an algebraic construction of new families of of $d$-dimensional permutation-invariant codes on at least $(2t+1)^2(d-1)$ qudits that can also correct $t$ errors for $d \ge 2$. The construction of our codes relies on a real polynomial with multiple roots at the roots of unity, and a sequence of $q-1$ real polynomials that satisfy some combinatorial constraints. When $N > (2t+1)^2(d-1)$, we prove constructively that an uncountable number of such codes exist.Comment: 14 pages. Minor corrections made, to appear in Linear Algebra and its Application

Permutation-invariant codes encoding more than one qubit

A permutation-invariant code on m qubits is a subspace of the symmetric subspace of the m qubits. We derive permutation-invariant codes that can encode an increasing amount of quantum information while suppressing leading order spontaneous decay errors. To prove the result, we use elementary number theory with prior theory on permutation invariant codes and quantum error correction.Comment: 4 pages, minor change

Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility

The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,1981) and has no closed-form characterization for agents with non-linear utility (cf. Alaei et al., 2012). Nonetheless, for linear utility agents satisfying a natural regularity property, Alaei et al. (2018) showed that simply posting an anonymous price is an e-approximation. We give a parameterization of the regularity property that extends to agents with non-linear utility and show that the approximation bound of anonymous pricing for regular agents approximately extends to agents that satisfy this approximate regularity property. We apply this approximation framework to prove that anonymous pricing is a constant approximation to the revenue optimal single-item auction for agents with public-budget utility, private-budget utility, and (a special case of) risk-averse utility.Comment: Appeared at EC 201