Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space

Predator protection dampens the landscape of fear

Apex predators structure ecosystems by hunting mesopredators and herbivores. Their ecological influence is determined not only by the number of animals they kill, but also by how prey alter their behaviours to reduce risk. Predation risk is variable in space and time creating a landscape of fear. In Australia, dingoes hunt red foxes and suppress their populations. As both predators are commonly subjected to eradication programs, the question arises whether humans alter the risk dingoes pose to foxes and in turn alter the foxes' avoidance behaviours. We studied the spatio-temporal activity patterns and wariness behaviours of foxes and dingoes at sites where they were protected (predator friendly), where they were persecuted (predator persecuted), and at sites where foxes were persecuted, and dingoes had been eradicated (dingo eradicated). The landscape of fear hypothesis predicts that foxes will be the most spatiotemporally restricted and most fearful at predator friendly sites, and least restricted and fearful at dingo eradicated sites. We found that fox occupancy was highest at dingo eradicated sites; and that they avoided times of heightened dingo activity at predator friendly sites more than at predator persecuted sites. Contrary to predictions, foxes were the least fearful (lowest frequency of cautious and vigilant behaviour) and most social (highest frequency of social interactions) at predator friendly sites. Our findings suggest that in the absence of persecution, mesopredators living with socially-stable apex predators can anticipate and avoid risk, reducing the need for constant vigilance (i.e. fear). Where predators are protected, predator avoidance may be driven by knowledge rather than fear alone.</p

Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13494 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/helenkopnina