ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ НЕПОТИЗМ КАК МЕХАНИЗМ ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ И КОНТРОЛЯ СОВЕТА ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

This paper investigates the mechanism of application of the political nepotism in formation of the Federation Council. It shows how the conditions for this process were created by making purposeful amendments in the federal law on formation of this chamber of the Russian Parliament. Currently, 90% of the body of the Federation Council and all its leadership are the members or apparent advocates of the Party “United Russia”. The formation of the Federation Council by means of political nepotism, and the Party “United Russia” is used as a tool for this purpose, enabled the Russian political establishment to “privatize” this supreme body of state power, to build it rigidly into the presidential “vertical of power” and to ensure its complete control by the ruling political regime.Рассматривается использование механизма политического непотизма для формирования Совета Федерации. Показано, что условия для этого создавались целенаправленными изменениями федерального закона о порядке формирования этой палаты российского парламента. В настоящее время до 90% членов Совета Федерации и все его руководители являются членами или явными сторонниками партии «Единая Россия». Формирование Совета Федерации посредством политического непотизма, для чего в качестве инструмента и используется партия «Единая Россия», позволило российской номенклатуре приватизировать этот высший орган государственной власти, жестко встроить его в президентскую «вертикаль власти» и обеспечить полный контроль над ним правящего политического режима

A proof of the Grothendieck-Serre conjecture on principal bundles over regular local rings containing infinite fields

Let R be a regular local ring, containing an infinite field. Let G be a reductive group scheme over R. We prove that a principal G-bundle over R is trivial, if it is trivial over the fraction field of R.Comment: Section "Formal loops and affine Grassmannians" is removed as this is now covered in arXiv:1308.3078. Exposition is improved and slightly restructured. Some minor correction

Reshaping the Government of the Modern State

The reorganization of government of the modern state includes idea-philosophical component, based on rejection of etatist approach to destination and role of the state and its replacement with liberal approach; organizational component, based on depolitization and reorganization of peopleware of the state apparatus and structural-technological component, based on decentralization and functional optimization of the structure of state authority, implementation of the principles and methods of management from the private sector of economy to the sphere of state government

The Role of Competition in Support of Socio-Political Stability and Suppression of Corruption

Fair, transparent and professional competition is the basis of functioning and dynamic stabilization of political system. Further broadening of economical, political and informational freedom and competition is a requirement for lowering of corruption and securing of effectiveness of application of special legal and administrative measures for its suppression

Unitary Syndrom

The process of transformation of federal relations in Russia is underway since 2000. This process is determined by the policy of centralization, building of «the vertical of power». The desicions made in context of this policy are oriented on unitary of the state and collide with constitutional principle of federalism and tendencies of development of modern federal state

ELECTORAL CORRUPTION AND MODEL OF ELECTION PARTICIPATION IN RUSSIA

Objective: to show that electoral corruption can affect all stages of elective process. To prove that electoral corruption is used both for barring political competition and for pressing the voters directly to distort their declaration of will. Methods: comparative-legal, systemic analysis. Results: the definition of electoral corruption is proposed, as well as its institutional mechanism as abuse of administrative resource of public power. Classification of the types of administrative resource of public power is given. Scientific novelty: the Russian model of election participation is described. Basing on its analysis, it is revealed how various types of administrative resource abuse can influence the election results. Practical value: the provisions are researched which characterize the main types of “administrative resource”: power, regulatory, legislative, institutional, financial, information-communicational and status. Interconnection is shown between using the administrative resource and the election results

POLITICAL NEPOTISM AS A MECHANISM OF FORMATION AND CONTROL OF THE FEDERATION COUNCIL

This paper investigates the mechanism of application of the political nepotism in formation of the Federation Council. It shows how the conditions for this process were created by making purposeful amendments in the federal law on formation of this chamber of the Russian Parliament. Currently, 90% of the body of the Federation Council and all its leadership are the members or apparent advocates of the Party “United Russia”. The formation of the Federation Council by means of political nepotism, and the Party “United Russia” is used as a tool for this purpose, enabled the Russian political establishment to “privatize” this supreme body of state power, to build it rigidly into the presidential “vertical of power” and to ensure its complete control by the ruling political regime

Administrative Reform: Targets and Results

The target of administrative reform is to increase the efficiency of Russian executive authority and introduce advanced methods of state administration. The renovation of soviet organizational structures and mechanisms of administration distorts reform's targets and results