Axiomatizations of two types of Shapley values for games on union closed systems

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the Shapley value. In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper, we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. We consider and axiomatize two solutions or rules for these games that generalize the Shapley value: one is obtained as the conjunctive permission value using a corresponding superior graph, the other is defined as the Shapley value of a modified game similar as the Myerson value for games with limited communication. © 2010 The Author(s)

Relocation and investment in R&D by firms

The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed corporate location decisions when firms invest in R&D to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining their domestic plants. In contrast, we here consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by investing in R&D and likewise by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to relocate.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Endothelial dysfunction in obese non-hypertensive children without evidence of sleep disordered breathing

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Endothelial dysfunction is a complication of both obesity and obstructive sleep apnea syndrome (OSAS), the latter being highly prevalent among obese children. It is unknown whether obesity causes endothelial dysfunction in children in the absence of OSAS. This study examines endothelial function in obese and non-obese children without OSAS.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Pre-pubertal non-hypertensive children were recruited. Endothelial function was assessed in a morning fasted state, using a modified hyperemic test involving cuff-induced occlusion of the radial and ulnar arteries. The absence of OSAS was confirmed by overnight polysomnography. Anthropometry was also performed.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>55 obese children (mean age 8.6 ± 1.4 years, mean BMI z-score: 2.3 ± 0.3) were compared to 50 non-obese children (mean age 8.0 ± 1.6 years, mean BMI z-score 0.3 ± 0.9). Significant delays to peak capillary reperfusion after occlusion release occurred in obese compared to non-obese children (45.3 ± 21.9 sec <it>vs</it>. 31.5 ± 14.1 sec, p < 0.01), but no differences in the magnitude of hyperemia emerged. Time to peak reperfusion and percentage of body fat were positively correlated (r = 0.365, p < 0.01).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Our findings confirm that endothelial dysfunction occurs early in life in obese children, even in the absence of OSAS. Thus, mechanisms underlying endothelial dysfunction in pediatric obesity are operational in the absence of sleep-disordered breathing.</p

Labor Unions and the Adoption of New Technology.

This paper examines whether unionization by workers discourages the adoption of labor-saving techniques. This is done in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small number of firms, s ome of which are unionized. The authors find that unionization can ac tually encourage the adoption of labor-saving technology, provided th at the technological improvement is mild and that demand is sufficien tly high (or demand elasticity sufficiently low). If there is an effe ctive threat of entry that causes the union to moderate its wage dema nds, then unionization may encourage the adoption of new technology e ven at low levels of demand. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Bargaining with a property rights owner

We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a solution every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players, where the weights are the same across all agents and all bargaining problems. The IPRO obtains the remaining surplus. The symmetric solution is the nucleolus of a naturally related coalitional game.</p