Information, incentives, and commitment : an empirical analysis of contracts between government and state enterprises

The authors analyze experience with written performance contracts between developing country governments and the managers of their state-owned enterprises. Such contracts have been a vogue since the mid-1980s, and substantial resources have been sunk into their design and enforcement, yet the few assessments to date show mixed results. Using a simple agency model, they identify how problems of weak incentives sthemming from information asymmetry, lack of government commitment, and lack of managerial commitment can lead to shirking. They apply the model to a sample of 12 contracts with monopoly enterprises in six developing countries (Ghana, India, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, and Senegal). All suffer from serious contracting problems. They find no pattern of improved performance that can be attributed to the contracts. Only three of the 12 case-study companies showed a turnaround in total factor productivity after contracts were introduced, six continued past trends, and three performed substantially worse under contracts than they had before. Labor productivity improved at a faster pace in four cases, and deteriorated in none, but the improvement predated the contract. Performance contracting assumes that government's objectives can be maximized, and performance improved, by setting targets that take into account the constraints placed on managers. For this to occur, the principals must be willing to explicitly state their objectives, assign to them priorities and weights, translate them into performance improvement targets, provide incentives to meet those targets (or monitor the agents without incurring significant costs), and credibly signal their commitment to the contract. These conditions failed to materialize. Why would governments adopt contracts to which they were notcommitted or that were politically unrealistic? Sometimes because it enabled themto get foreign assistance. How explain the managers'lack of commitment? Not surprisingly, managers with information advantages and bargaining power, and with no strong incentives or commitment from the government, used their advantages to manipulate the targets so as to ensure that their performance would be judged satisfactory. The authors outline the conditions under which performance contracts might succeed in improving performance.Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Health Economics&Finance,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Knowledge Economy,Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,National Governance,Education for the Knowledge Economy

Reforming the urban water system in Santiago, Chile

In the late 1980s, Chile planned to privatize Santiago's sanitary works enterprise (EMOS) but instead reformed it under public ownership. It did so through a regulatory framework that mimicked the design of a concession with a private utility, setting tariffs that ensured at least a seven percent return on assets, creating a neutral regulator independent of ministry intervention, and giving EMOS the right to appeal the regulator's tariff decisions. This reform of Santiago's water system is often cited as a case of successful reform under public management. Comparing a comprehensive measure of welfare with a counterfactual example, the authors show surprisingly large gains from Santiago's reform, given the relatively good initial conditions. (The gains accrued largely to government and employees, but consumers benefited from improved service and coverage). Why did reform in Santiago improve water system performance, when similar reform attempts under public management in other countries failed? 1) Chile has a long tradition of private water rights, shaped by early recognition that water is a scarce and tradable private good. 2) The reformed regulatory framework was designed to attract private investors to the water system and to motivate them to operate efficiently and expand the system. 3) Chile's unique electoral institutions sustained this framework under state operation after democracy was restored. 4) Chile's strong bureaucratic norms and institutions (permitting little corruption), combined with Santiago's relatively low-cost water system, permitted prices that effectively increased quasi-rents for investing in the system while minimizing the risk of inefficiency or monopoly rents. The authors also address the question of why EMOS was reformed but not privatized, and what the costs of not privatizing were. The system was privatized in 1999, but the changes from privatization are likely to be less significant than those introduced in 1989-90.Decentralization,Water Conservation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water and Industry,Water Supply and Systems,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water and Industry,Water Conservation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Town Water Supply and Sanitation

Emergent fermionic gauge theory and foliated fracton order in the Chamon model

The Chamon model is an exactly solvable spin Hamiltonian exhibiting nontrivial fracton order. In this work, we dissect two distinct aspects of the model. First, we show that it exhibits an emergent fractonic gauge theory coupled to a fermionic subsystem symmetry-protected topological state under four stacks of $\mathbb{Z}_2$ planar symmetries. Second, we show that the Chamon model hosts 4-foliated fracton order by describing an entanglement renormalization group transformation that exfoliates four separate stacks of 2D toric codes from the bulk system.Comment: 18 pages, 9 figure

New tools for studying network industry reforms in developing countries : the telecommunications and electricity regulation database

Infrastructure industries-including telecommunications, electricity, water, and gas-underwent massive structural changes in the 1990s. During that decade, hundreds of privatization transactions valued at billions of dollars were completed in these sectors in developing and transition economies. While privatization has received the most attention, reforms also included market liberalization, structural changes like unbundling, and the introduction of new laws and regulations. To date, regulations have received far less attention than their potential economic effects warrant, largely due to lack of data. In order to address this problem, the authors set out to compile a comprehensive and consistent dataset through an extensive survey of telecommunications and electricity regulators in developing countries. The authors describe the surveys and the resulting database. The database of telecommunications regulations includes 178 variables on regulatory governance and content in 45 countries. The database of electricity regulations includes 374 variables in 20 countries.Administrative&Regulatory Law,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Trade Finance and Investment,ICT Policy and Strategies,ICT Policy and Strategies,Administrative&Regulatory Law,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,National Governance

New Tools for Studying Network Industry Reforms in Developing Countries: The Telecommunications and Electricity Regulation Database

Infrastructure industries including telecommunications, electricity, water, and gas underwent massive structural changes during the 1990s. During that decade, hundreds of privatization transactions valued at billions of dollars were completed in these sectors in developing and transitional economies. While privatization has received the most attention, reforms also included market liberalization, structural changes like unbundling, and the introduction of new laws and regulations. To date, regulations have received far less attention than their potential economic effects warrant, largely due to lack of data. In order to address this problem, we set out to compile an extensive, comprehensive, and consistent dataset through an extensive survey of telecommunications and electricity regulators in developing countries. Our database of telecommunications regulations includes 178 variables on regulatory governance and content in 45 countries. Our database of electricity regulations includes 374 variables in 20 countries.

Layered SnS2-reduced graphene oxide composite--a high-capacity, high-rate, and long-cycle life sodium-ion battery anode material.

A layered SnS -reduced graphene oxide (SnS -RGO) composite is prepared by a facile hydrothermal route and evaluated as an anode material for sodium-ion batteries (NIBs). The measured electrochemical properties are a high charge specific capacity (630 mAh g at 0.2 A g ) coupled to a good rate performance (544 mAh g at 2 A g ) and long cycle-life (500 mAh g at 1 A g for 400 cycles). © 2014 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim. 2 2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -

Loops in 4+1d Topological Phases

2+1d topological phases are well characterized by the fusion rules and braiding/exchange statistics of fractional point excitations. In 4+1d, some topological phases contain only fractional loop excitations. What kind of loop statistics exist? We study the 4+1d gauge theory with 2-form $\mathbb{Z}_2$ gauge field (the loop only toric code) and find that while braiding statistics between two different types of loops can be nontrivial, the self `exchange' statistics are all trivial. In particular, we show that the electric, magnetic, and dyonic loop excitations in the 4+1d toric code are not distinguished by their self-statistics. They tunnel into each other across 3+1d invertible domain walls which in turn give explicit unitary circuits that map the loop excitations into each other. The $SL(2,\mathbb{Z}_2)$ symmetry that permutes the loops, however, cannot be consistently gauged and we discuss the associated obstruction in the process. Moreover, we discuss a gapless boundary condition dubbed the `fractional Maxwell theory' and show how it can be Higgsed into gapped boundary conditions. We also discuss the generalization of these results from the $\mathbb{Z}_2$ gauge group to $\mathbb{Z}_N$.Comment: 49+21 pages, 13 figures, more clear explanations added for sections V and VI in v