"What's the Use of Having a Reputation If You Can't Ruin It Every Now and Then?" Regulatory Enforcement Actions on Banks and the Structure of Loan Syndicates

A decrease in the reputation of a loan syndicate's lead arranger, caused by a regulatory enforcement action for non-compliance with laws and regulations, disincentivizes potential syndicate participants from co-financing the loan. We formally argue that in such cases, the lead arranger must increase his share of the loan in order to make the loan sufficiently attractive to potential participants. We provide strong empirical evidence to support our theoretical argument, using the full sample of enforcement actions enacted on U.S. banks from 2000 through 2010 as well as syndicated loan-level data

Enabling risk assessment and analysis by event detection in dementia patients using a reconfigurable rule set

Chronic mental illnesses pose a great burden on the lives of citizens worldwide. In modern health-care, decentralization and enabling the self management of patients at home are crucial factors in improving the every-day lives of patients and the people close to them. People in general tend to dislike obtrusive monitoring on their daily activities, so how can we implement a platform that can provide clinicians with adequate and concise information on their patients health status and at the same time be unobtrusive and easy to use. Moreover, how can we make such an unobtrusive system capable of providing the doctor with highimpact warnings on the patient's health status only when it is needed, thus relieving him of unnecessary workload? In this paper, the authors present a reconfigurable Event Detection mechanism used in the ALADDIN platform for Risk Assessment and Analysis

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

In the classic Hotelling-Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (i) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (ii) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (iii) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.