Market coverage and the nature of product differentiation : a note

In this note, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of pricing games with product differentiation in relation with the extent of market coverage. It is a received idea in the IO literature that the horizontal and vertical models of product differentiation are almost formally equivalent. We show that this idea turns out to be wrong when the full market coverage assumption is relaxed. We then argue that there exist two fundamentally different classes of address-models of differentiation, although their difference is not perfectly captured by the standard horizontal/vertical typologyprice competition, product differentiation

Market coverage and the nature of product differentiation: a note

In this note, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of pricing games with product differentiation in relation with the extent of market coverage. It is a received idea in the IO literature that the horizontal and vertical models of product differentiation are almost formally equivalent. We show that this idea turns out to be wrong when the full market coverage assumption is relaxed. We then argue that there exist two fundamentally different classes of address-models of differentiation, although their difference is not perfectly captured by the standard horizontal/vertical typology.price competition, product differentiation, vertical differentiation, horizontal differentiation

Competitively Neutral Universal Service Obligations

Universal service obligations impose specific costs on the universal service provider. The measure of these costs and their financing have been studied along two complementary lines of reasoning: is the uni- versal service obligation sustainable? Who should bear its costs? Most often, a two-step procedure is put forward. In a first step the cost of USO must be assessed; in a second step the USP must be compensated for this cost. In this paper we argue that this procedure is most often problematic because the implementation of the compensation scheme directly affects the effective cost of USO. We therefore put forward an alternative approach to this problem which does not rely on this two- step procedure and fully acknowledges the distortions that result from the compensation mechanism.

Export Restraints and Horizontal Product Differentiation

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation. We characterize the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna (89). We show that a foreign producer would choose a VER in the vicinity of the Free Trade Equilibrium. In order to maximize domestic welfare, a government would necessarily choose complete protectionism nor Free Trade.Hotelling; optimal quota; price competition

On the Nature of Price Competition Under Universal Service Obligations: a Note

The imposition of universal coverage and uniform pricing constraints, as part of the universal service obligations, makes the universal service provider less aggressive in the price game when it competes with a rm that does not cover the whole set of markets (Valletti et al., 2002). In this paper, we fully characterize the resulting price equilibrium when universal service obligations are imposed. With a limited market coverage by the entrant or a small degree of degree of product di erentiation, the equilibrium is a mixed strategy one.

No free lunch sur le Web 2.0! Ce que cache la gratuité apparente des réseaux sociaux numériques

Cet article vise à décomposer les principaux mécanismes économiques sur lesquels s’appuie le développement des réseaux sociaux et des sites du Web 2.0. La gratuité d’usage, érigée en norme sur Internet, nous y apparaîtra comme la composante partielle d’un système de tarification plus large, obéissant à une logique de marché multiface. L’article analyse ensuite les principales questions de régulation que le développement de cette nouvelle industrie pose à l’autorité publique

Université et Concurrence: Quelques Apports Théoriques Récents

Les dernières réformes de l'enseignement supérieur en Communauté Française sont inscrites dans le processus de Bologne. La dynamique de Bologne est quant à elle directement liée à la création d'un espace européen de l'enseignement supérieur. Le processus de Bologne peut en fait être considéré comme un pas déterminant vers le véritable grand "marché"de l'enseignement supérieur au sein duquel étudiants et enseignants pourraient circuler librement, au cours de leur trajectoire de formation ou de leur vie académique. Bien évidemment, la question n'est pas tant celle de savoir si les étudiants peuvent circuler librement que celle de savoir si les diplômes qu'ils emportent avec eux sont considérés comme équivalents partout en Europe. Si l'on part de l'hypothèse que les institutions restent, quant à elles, posées sur le sol, on perçoit immédiatement combien la mise en oeuvre d'un processus où tant les étudiants que les enseignants sont mobiles peut mettre à mal lesdites institutions. Celles-ci sont en effet soumises à une concurrence nouvelle, ou accrue, sur le marché des enseignants et sur celui des enseignés. Il y a là un double défi: faire face à la concurrence pour des étudiants et faire face à la concurrence pour les professeurs. Or, que connaît-on réellement de la nature de la concurrence que se livrent les universités ? Quelles sont les conséquences prévisibles de cette concurrence sur l'organisation et les performances des universités