Contract Enforcement in Transition

The mix of formal and informal mechanisms for contract enforcement is examined using survey data from Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. Using the size of trade credit to quantify the success of contracting, we ask: Do the courts have a perceptible effect on contracting? When can a firm rely on its customer to repay trade credit voluntarily? Which is more effective, the courts or relational contracting? Do trade associations play a role in contract enforcement? Does relational contracting entail inefficiencies? Is the reliance on relation contracting merely a transitory phenomenon, reflecting the inadequacy of these countries' legal systems?

Property Rights, Finance, and Entrepreneurship

Is investment constrained more by insecure property rights or by limited external finance? For five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we find that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup ma nufacturing firms. Access to credit does not appear to explain differences in investment. At least in the early stages of post-communist reform, retained earnings appear to have been enough to finance the investments that managers wanted to make.

Property Rights and Finance

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

Relations between the Netherlands government-in-exile and occupied Holland during World War II

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston UniversityThe present study deals with the relations of the Netherlands "London" Government with the German-occupied territory during World War II. The writer begins with the postulate that the London Government might be expected to provide in some measure for the maintenance of domestic order, for the welfare and safety of its citizens in the occupied territory; that it would be able to maintain communications with that territory; to serve as a focus for national unity; and to maintain its existence in order to assume authority at the time of liberation. Owing to the nature of the german occupation, the London Government could neither directly engage in "remote" administration nor provide directly for the welfare and safety of its citizens. A single major exception appears in an effective railway strike ordered by the London Government [TRUNCATED

Scholastic Records and Personality and Character Traits of the Public-school Trained and the Parochial-trained Students of the Graduating Class of 1952, Central High School, Aberdeen, South Dakota

For many years at Aberdeen, South Dakota, a difference of opinion has existed regarding the relative academic achievement, rank in class, and social adjustments of the students in the public school system and parochial -school system. The advocates of the two school systems have base their opinions on observations only and without the benefit of statistical evidence. To present impartial evidence upon which the proponents may form a more logical conclusion was the purpose of the investigator. The purpose of this study was to compare the students who had received the first nine years of their training in a parochial school with those who had received their training in a public school to see if there were any statistical differences in their performance during the last three years of their high-school training in the public school. They were compared in mental ability, academic achievement, rank in class, and social ability development by the investigation cf the high school records of the graduating class of 1952. The school performances made by these students grouped into their respective origins were the records used in making the comparisons

Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order

Businesspeople need contractual assurance. Most transactions are less straightforward than a cash sale of an easily identifiable item. Buyers need assurance of the quality of what they are purchasing, and sellers need assurance that bills will be paid. The legal system may not always be available to provide contractual assurance - and when the law is dysfunctional, private order might arise in its place. Many developing and transition economies have dysfunctional legal systems, either because the laws do not exist or because the machinery for enforcing them is inadequate. In such countries, bilateral relationships, communal norms, trade associations, or market intermediaries may work in place of the legal system. In this Article, we use data obtained from surveys of firms in five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as Vietnam to show that, at least in these economies, social networks and informal gossip substitute for the formal legal system, while business networks and trade associations work in conjunction with it. These transition countries provide an informative place to examine the interaction between the formal legal system and private-order mechanisms because both are in a state of flux. Although market-oriented laws have begun to replace the bureaucratic controls of the old planned economy, private firms\u27 access to the courts varies, from almost no access in Vietnam to considerable access in Poland and Romania. Even within these countries, the transitional state of the legal system means that managers vary in their perceptions of the courts\u27 usefulness, and ultimately it is their willingness or unwillingness to utilize the formal legal system that shapes the development of private order. Because the data from these economies contain more variation than would be found in a steady-state economy, we can run meaningful regressions relating firms\u27 behavior to their perceptions of the courts\u27 workability

Property Rights, Finance, and Entrepreneurship

Is investment constrained more by insecure property rights or by limited external finance? For five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we find that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup ma nufacturing firms. Access to credit does not appear to explain differences in investment. At least in the early stages of post-communist reform, retained earnings appear to have been enough to finance the investments that managers wanted to make

Contract Enforcement in Transition

The mix of formal and informal mechanisms for contract enforcement is examined using survey data from Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. Using the size of trade credit to quantify the success of contracting, we ask: Do the courts have a perceptible effect on contracting? When can a firm rely on its customer to repay trade credit voluntarily? Which is more effective, the courts or relational contracting? Do trade associations play a role in contract enforcement? Does relational contracting entail inefficiencies? Is the reliance on relation contracting merely a transitory phenomenon, reflecting the inadequacy of these countries' legal systems