Outsourcing and structural change: shifting firm and sectoral boundaries

The paper aims at investigating the structural change implications of outsourcing. In trying to bridge the organizational/industrial and the sectoral/structural analysis of outsourcing, it discusses the rational and the methodological pros and cons of a “battery” of outsourcing measurements for structural change analysis. Their functioning is then illustrated through a concise application of them to the OECD area over the ’80s and the early ’90s. A combined used of them emerges as recommendable in checking for the role of outsourcing with respect to that of other structural change determinants

The Anova-Based Competitive Balance Measure: A Defense

Conventional wisdom holds that parity has increased in college football in recent decades due largely to limits on the number of scholarships teams can offer. The authors find that competitive balance has not increased in college football since the end of World War II, and they find mixed evidence of scholarship limits' effect on a range of measures of parity, including the standard deviation of winning percentages and Associated Press rankings. They also examine the 1991 NCAA roll-call vote to reduce the scholarship limit and find some evidence that stronger teams were more likely to vote for the lower limit.

The "Law of One Price" in 1901

Price dispersion in 1901 is analyzed using a unique U.S. government survey yielding retail prices for four products at more than 1500 stores nationwide. Three of these products are still sold today, allowing comparisons based on modern survey data. Despite the introduction of significant search cost-reducing technology during the intervening century, dispersion appears to be lower in 1901. (JEL L11, D83) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence

Autocratic rulers can use economic regulation under their control to affect individual stock prices and then profit through insider trading. They are therefore less likely to have or enforce insider trading regulation. A cross-sectional analysis of 101 countries with stock markets supports the hypothesis. The probability of observing an enforced insider trading law is much lower in autocracies than in other countries. (JEL D73, G28, L51) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Baseball’s Blue Ribbon Economic Report

In July 2000, Major League Baseball published a report claiming a recent marked decline in competitive balance. The alleged cause is growing disparities in team revenues and payrolls driven ultimately by market size. Consequently, sweeping changes in the game’s economic structure are necessary, mainly composed of new labor market restrictions. The report, however, fails to present evidence of a decline in competitive balance or of a significant link between market size and winning. The present study seeks to provide the missing analysis. Although competitive balance might have declined in the American League (AL), it improved in the National League (NL). The difference is important, as both leagues are subject to the same governance structure—that is, the AL decline is likely due to idiosyncratic causes. Also, there is (at most) a weak relation between winning and market size that has not worsened in recent years.