Respiratory illness in a piggery associated with the first identified outbreak of swine influenza in Australia: Assessing the risk to human health and zoonotic potential

Australia was previously believed to be free of enzootic swine influenza viruses due strict quarantine practices and use of biosecure breeding facilities. The first proven Australian outbreak of swine influenza occurred in Western Australian in 2012, revealing an unrecognized zoonotic risk, and a potential future pandemic threat. A public health investigation was undertaken to determine whether zoonotic infections had occurred and to reduce the risk of further transmission between humans and swine. A program of monitoring, testing, treatment, and vaccination was commenced, and a serosurvey of workers was also undertaken. No acute infections with the swine influenza viruses were detected. Serosurvey results were difficult to interpret due to previous influenza infections and past and current vaccinations. However, several workers had elevated haemagglutination inhibition (HI) antibody levels to the swine influenza viruses that could not be attributed to vaccination or infection with contemporaneous seasonal influenza A viruses. However, we lacked a suitable control population, so this was inconclusive. The experience was valuable in developing better protocols for managing outbreaks at the human–animal interface. Strict adherence to biosecurity practices, and ongoing monitoring of swine and their human contacts is important to mitigate pandemic risk. Strain specific serological assays would greatly assist in identifying zoonotic transmission

Pandemic potential of highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses

The panzootic caused by A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-lineage highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses has occurred in multiple waves since 1996. From 2013 onwards, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses of subtypes A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) emerged to cause panzootic waves of unprecedented magnitude among avian species accompanied by severe losses to the poultry industry around the world. Clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses have expanded in distinct geographical and evolutionary pathways likely via long distance migratory bird dispersal onto several continents and by poultry trade among neighboring countries. Coupled with regional circulation, the viruses have evolved further by reassorting with local viruses. As of February 2019, there have been 23 cases of humans infected with clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 viruses, 16 (70%) of which had fatal outcomes. To date, no HPAI A(H5) virus has caused sustainable human-to-human transmission. However, due to the lack of population immunity in humans and ongoing evolution of the virus, there is a continuing risk that clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses could cause an influenza pandemic if the ability to transmit efficiently among humans was gained. Therefore, multisectoral collaborations among the animal, environmental, and public health sectors are essential to conduct risk assessments and develop countermeasures to prevent disease and to control spread. In this article, we describe an assessment of the likelihood of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses gaining human-to-human transmissibility and impact on human health should such human-to-human transmission occur. This structured analysis assessed properties of the virus, attributes of the human population, and ecology and epidemiology of these viruses in animal hosts

An epidemiological study of Vibrio cholerae O1 in the Australian environment based on rRNA gene polymorphisms

Since 1977, Vibrio cholerae O1 has been isolated from the Australian aquatic environment and periodically cholera cases have occurred following exposure to these environments. To study the relationships between clinical isolates and environmental isolates from rivers and aquatic life, widely distributed throughout the country, a wide range of molecular typing methods were employed. In this paper we report the analysis of the 180 Australian isolates (10 clinical and 170 environmental) using ribotyping. Seven ribotype patterns were observed among the Australian inaba isolates, 2 of which included all clinical inaba isolates and 84% environmental inaba isolates collected from 9 rivers and creeks in eastern Australia during an 8-year period. Isolates from epidemiologically related clinical cases, asymptomatic household contacts and sewage were indistinguishable. The ogawa isolates were more diverse, with 9 ribotypes observed among 24 isolates from 8 rivers during the same period. Ribotype patterns were not shared between the serotypes with the exception of one ogawa isolate which could be distinguished using PFGE. Ribotyping has been useful in confirming an association between epidemiologically related clinical isolates and the aquatic environment and the persistence of several clones of the O1 serovar in the Australian environment during an 8-year period

Serologic evidence of exposure to highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses in migratory shorebirds, Australia

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5Nx viruses of the goose/Guangdong/96 lineage continue to cause outbreaks in poultry and wild birds globally. Shorebirds, known reservoirs of avian influenza viruses, migrate from Siberia to Australia along the East-Asian-Australasian Flyway. We examined whether migrating shorebirds spending nonbreeding seasons in Australia were exposed to HPAI H5 viruses. We compared those findings with those for a resident duck species. We screened >1,500 blood samples for nucleoprotein antibodies and tested positive samples for specific antibodies against 7 HPAI H5 virus antigens and 2 low pathogenicity avian influenza H5 virus antigens. We demonstrated the presence of hemagglutinin inhibitory antibodies against HPAI H5 virus clade 2.3.4.4 in the red-necked stint (Calidris ruficolis). We did not find hemagglutinin inhibitory antibodies in resident Pacific black ducks (Anas superciliosa). Our study highlights the potential role of long-distance migratory shorebirds in intercontinental spread of HPAI H5 viruses.Michelle Wille, Simeon Lisovski, Alice Risely, Marta Ferenczi, David Roshier, Frank Y.K. Wong, Andrew C. Breed, Marcel Klaassen, Aeron C. Hur

Divergent human-origin influenza viruses detected in Australian swine populations

Global swine populations infected with influenza A viruses pose a persistent pandemic risk. With the exception of a few countries, our understanding of the genetic diversity of swine influenza viruses is limited, hampering control measures and pandemic risk assessment. Here we report the genomic characteristics and evolutionary history of influenza A viruses isolated in Australia during 2012–2016 from two geographically isolated swine populations in the states of Queensland and Western Australia. Phylogenetic analysis with an expansive human and swine influenza virus dataset comprising >40,000 sequences sampled globally, revealed evidence of the pervasive introduction and long-term establishment of gene segments derived from several human influenza viruses of past seasons, including H1N1/1977, H1N1/1995, H3N2/1968, H3N2/2003, and H1N1pdm09, and a genotype that contained gene segments derived from the past three pandemics (1968, re-emerged 1977 and 2009). Of the six human-derived gene lineages only one comprising two viruses isolated in Queensland during 2012 was closely related to swine viruses detected from other regions, indicating a previously undetected circulation of Australian swine lineages for approximately 3–44 years. Although the date of introduction of these lineages into Australian swine populations could not be accurately ascertained, we found evidence of sustained transmission of two lineages in swine during 2012–2016. The continued detection of human-origin influenza virus lineages in swine over several decades with little or unpredictable antigenic drift indicates that isolated swine populations can act as ‘antigenic archives’ of human influenza, raising the risk of re-emergence in humans when sufficient susceptible populations arise.IMPORTANCE We described the evolutionary origins and antigenic properties of influenza A viruses isolated from two separate Australian swine populations during 2012–2016, showing that these viruses were distinct to each other and to those isolated from swine globally. Whole genome sequencing of virus isolates revealed a high genotypic diversity that had been generated exclusively through the introduction and establishment of human influenza viruses that circulated in past seasons. We detected six reassortants with gene segments derived from human H1N1/H1N1pdm09 and various human H3N2 viruses that circulated at various periods since 1968. We also found that these swine viruses were not related to swine viruses collected elsewhere indicating independent circulation. The detection of unique lineages and genotypes in Australia suggests that isolated swine populations that are sufficiently large can sustain influenza for extensive periods, we showed direct evidence of a sustained transmission for at least 4 years between 2012–2016