Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective.

This article reviews the literature on lobbying in the European Union. After initial surveys of the landscape of non-governmental actor participation, theoretical investigations have focused on the modes of network governance and later on the phenomenon of Europeanization. Yet studies have increasingly moved away from considering EU lobbying as a sui generis phenomenon. Normalizing the study of interest group participation in the EU and understanding the opportunities and constraints that are characteristic for it has led more and more scholars to adopt a comparative perspective. The most interesting parallels exist between Washington and Brussels, but unfortunately there have been very few attempts to explore the connection between the American literature on lobbying and EU studies. This article makes a first step towards such a comparison and points to concepts common in comparative politics that could provide considerable insight into the study of EU lobbying.European Union;institutional constraints;interests groups;lobbying;opportunity structure;United States;

Beyond Ideological Battles: A Strategic Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in Europe

The highly politicized debate about the recent Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) Directive of the European Union led many observers to suspect an ideological battle between countries seeking to impose transnational regulation on financial service industries such as hedge funds and liberal market economies insisting on the benefits of market discipline in order to protect their financial centers. The battle that appeared to particularly pit France against the United Kingdom can thus be interpreted as an example of a regulatory paradigm shift in the aftermath of the crisis. This article cautions against such an ideas-centered account of financial regulation and points to the economic interests that drove the French and German agendas. However, contrary to the assumptions of traditional political economy approaches, national preferences were not simply defined by the aggregate of a country’s economic interests. Rather, industry success in shaping government positions on alternative investment regulation crucially depended on how a given industry fit into the government’s overarching geo-political agenda. By highlighting this feedback loop between government strategy and industry lobbying, the paper proposes a strategic analysis of financial regulation, as opposed to accounts that consider positions to be pre-determined by ideas or socio-economic structures.economic policy; financial markets; ideas; liberalization; regulation

Road to External Representation: the European Commission's Activism in International Air Transport.

This article argues that the role the Commission plays in European foreign policies goes beyond the execution of the competences delegated by the member states. The Commission is not just the external negotiator of the EU, it can also use its powers as the guardian of the Treaties to expand its foreign policy competences. The case study of international air transport illustrates how the Commission was able to obtain an external negotiation mandate in June 2003 to which member states were originally opposed. The analysis draws particular attention to the Commission's reliance on the European Court of Justice and to a cognitive strategy centred on the United States. By means of these two tools, the Commission was able to affect the default condition of member state preferences and reorient the focal point of intergovernmental negotiations.European Commission;European foreign policies;external negotiation mandate;international air transport;open aviation area;transatlantic relations;

Strategies of the Emerging Countries in the World Trade Organization.

No abstract available

National Business Associations under Stress: Lessons from the French Case.

Since its reform in 1998, the national association of French employers and industry, MEDEF, appears to be an example of strong interest organisation. Unlike trade unions, the peak business organisation has been stable and unified, especially in terms of membership density. Through a study of the collective action of businesses in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression and argues that the national business association has been put severely under stress in recent years. Like all encompassing associations, MEDEF comprises a great variety of interests and constantly has to manage its internal heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its recent reform demonstrates that MEDEF's forceful media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action that the association can claim legitimately as its responsibility.

ideological battles: a strategic analysis of hedge fund regulation in Europe .

The highly politicized debate about the recent Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) Directive of the European Union led many observers to suspect an ideological battle between countries seeking to impose transnational regulation on financial service industries such as hedge funds and liberal market economies insisting on the benefits of market discipline in order to protect their financial centers. The battle that appeared to particularly pit France against the United Kingdom can thus be interpreted as an example of a regulatory paradigm shift in the aftermath of the crisis. This article cautions against such an ideas-centered account of financial regulation and points to the economic interests that drove the French and German agendas. However, contrary to the assumptions of traditional political economy approaches, national preferences were not simply defined by the aggregate of a country’s economic interests. Rather, industry success in shaping government positions on alternative investment regulation crucially depended on how a given industry fit into the government’s overarching geo-political agenda. By highlighting this feedback loop between government strategy and industry lobbying, the paper proposes a strategic analysis of financial regulation, as opposed to accounts that consider positions to be pre-determined by ideas or socio-economic structures.economic policy;financial markets;liberalization;regulation;

Scripts European Trade Policies? Business-Government Relations in the EU-Canada Partnership Negotiations.

No abstract available

"Associations matter: reconsidering the political strategies of firms in the European Union"

[From the introduction]. This paper tries to understand whether the EU system of interest representation is indeed Americanizing. How important are sector-wide groups at the European and at the national level for the political activities of their members? Are comprehensive business groups side-lined on salient issues, because firms chose to lobby on their own? How do firms pursue their interests in a multi-level policy? To answer these questions, we have selected 14 recent EU policy issues that have been particularly salient to the firms in the sector to which the proposed legislation would apply. We have then studied the ten largest firms in each affected sector, their national business associations and the most relevant EU associations, a total of 136 firms and 115 associations, of which 80 are national and 35 are EU-groups. To gather information on the ways in which firms tried to represent their interests, we have conducted a newspaper search for each policy issue and surveyed all articles that associated the policy issue with the name of a firm or association to find information about lobbying activities. Such a newspaper survey certainly does not reveal all political activities of the firms in question, but it helps to distinguish when and how firms are becoming active on their own behalf and when they choose to remain less visible

Scientific project, Sciences Po | LIEPP laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'evaluation des politiques publiques or in english, interdisciplinary research center for the evaluation of public policies

Sciences Po develops an interdisciplinary research program for the evaluation of public policies (in French: Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d’évaluation des politiques publiques, LIEPP), based on four founding units: Department of Economics, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Centre d’Etudes Européennes and Observatoire Sociologique du Changement. Its aim is to be (1) independent and non-partisan to ensure its credibility, (2) international to learn from experiences in other countries, and finally (3) multidisciplinary in order to achieve thorough and comprehensive knowledge of our environment and its institutional, social, political, legal and economic mechanisms. The project is financed as a through the Excellency Initiative of the French Government (Investissements d'Avenir: LABEX) with a budget of 10 million euros between 2011 to 2020.Public Policy Evaluation, Interdisciplinary Research in Social Sciences

Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics.

Business-government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or – less often – lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public-private interactions with examples from the U.S., the E.U., and Brazil.